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PREVIEW OF HISTORY

RAYMOND GRAM SWING



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In addition to a carefully selected list of broadcasts, the book includes a considerable number of brilliant and hitherto unpublished speeches. The material is all carefully assembled with the object of presenting a well articulated picture of the events of the war and their interpretation in terms of the future.

An unusually complete index is a feature of the book, for not only are names and dates included, but there is a topical index as well. This enables the reader to refer quickly to what Mr. Swing has had to say at various times on any given subject, and should prove of the greatest assistance in reference work.

Raymond Gram Swing needs no introduction to the British public. For many years now his famous "American Commentary" series has been one of the most constant and eagerly attended features of the B.B.C.'s Saturday evening programmes. In America he is, beyond doubt, the leading figure in the world of radio comment, and he has received many awards as the outstanding commentator of the year.

PREVIEW OF HISTORY


RAYMOND GRAM SWING

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REALITIES OF A POWER PEACE

POWER is the framework of all states. The better the state, the more sublimated its expression of power and the more safeguarded are its citizens from its abuse. But states exist through their power to enforce their will on all members of the community. A democracy is a state in which power is diffused, so that the will enforced upon all is the will of the majority. In a tyranny power is concentrated in the hands of a few, to whom the community must bow. But what distinguishes a free nation from a tyranny is not the absence in it of power, but that its power is diffused and expresses the will of the majority. The refinement of power, by its subjugation to a system of law, is the basis of political civilization. An enlightened state, in which the laws are written and enforced by men directly representing the people and answerable directly to them, is a partnership of equals. A less advanced state, in which laws are decreed and enforced on behalf of a few, stands sponsor for a system of slavery, and its citizens are slaves even if they approve of their masters' decrees.

Some states in the modern world are advanced, most of them are not. Those which are not have not learned the benefit in the diffusion of power. The power in such states often has been passed on from the few to the few, and the many have not been alert or desirous to share it. Those who have the power also have the means to keep it. Those without it have been laggard in organizing themselves to wrest the power from the few.

It is essential to understand that power is the framework of the state, free or slave, if one is to come to grips with the basic problems of the post-war world, for power is also the framework of the relationship between states. In international relations the world has not yet ascended to the plateau where power is subjugated to the discipline of law. The post-war world cannot begin at the level of American or British domestic democracy, because not all the world has arrived on that plateau and it is not to be reached by any short cut. The post-war world will be a web of relationships of many kinds, in which the common denominator is bound to be power at a fairly crude level. The morals of states, we are told, are never as high as the morals of individuals. The fact is that the morals of international relations are as high as the component states can maintain, and any plan to create a post-war world which starts out on the moral plane of the few best is a daydream. The post-war world will be made up of states as they are. In some the

power will be diffused, so that tyranny cannot be practised within the community. In other states power will be concentrated, and, being in the hands of the few, their neighbours are less safe than from those states with diffused power. Hence there is certain to be more display of power than in an enlightened community. A British police officer is altogether unarmed. On the frontier, where the acceptance of law was not yet general, every private citizen carried his revolver. International relations have been conducted for all past centuries in the atmosphere of the frontier. There being no general acceptance of law, each state has been the judge of its own case. It pulled its gun if its rights were challenged. That is not to say that international relations in the past have not responded to increasing intelligence in the pursuit of self-interest. Peace has been considered good throughout history, and great efforts have been made toward its preservation. The progress has not been the fruit of exhortation, or come about through the exorcising of the evil of war. It has come as wisdom has expanded. The need for this wisdom has pressed with sharply increased heaviness on mankind in the past century, when science and industry were shrinking the dimensions of the world, making nations unwilling neighbours of each other. The world reached a stage where war was becoming too expensive, in terms of life, wealth, and happiness, to be tolerable. It reached that stage long before the present war or the First World War.

What was known as the art of statesmanship developed political relationships in the international field that succeeded in maintaining peace through considerable periods. The great device of this statesmanship was the balance of power. No attempt was made to diffuse power, since the world could not, as a world, simply apply the lessons of democracy. Power being there—naked power it was, too—it was held in stability by the art of balancing it. So and so many states joined on one side of the balance, so and so many on the other. If either side tried to use its power, the outcome was too uncertain, and sure to be too expensive, to justify the risk. And by common agreement the leading states ganged up on any not yet powerful state that wished to grow powerful enough to upset the balance. The balancing of power became the one security of peace.

Balance can be permanently achieved only with static elements, and society is not static. Hence the balance of power has been an ideal that could not be achieved. But the effort to achieve it was continuously and honestly made. Statesmen wanted peace and strove for it. Some of them strove for it with great skill. As long as the volatile factors in human society permitted, they could pit

their ingenuity against deep forces and prevail. But there never was enough genius, and not the inertia in society, for them to succeed for long periods. The power was there, it was naked, it was ready for use, and when the tugging and troubled statesmen failed to maintain the balance, the power struck and war came.

That is the picture at the outbreak of the First World War. No state was then ready to yield to a system of law by surrendering its right to be a judge in its own cause. All states were still on a gun-toting basis. Their one improvement on frontier practice was that they did not shoot individually, they fired only if one side or another in the community was getting too formidable. They kept the peace by making sure that if fighting started the many would be involved. They tried to curb war by making it too dreadful and too dangerous to be risked. Thus they gave to guard peace only the shield of fear. And enduring peace, being the child of wisdom—which is not afraid—was not to be redeemed.

After the First World War most of the nations of the world, but not the United States, undertook to establish peace in an unprecedented way. Power was no longer to be balanced. It should be joined against any individual state which sought to coerce any other state.

The experiment failed for a variety of reasons. One is that even before it began it was crippled by the withdrawal of the United States. Also before it began the pledge to secure France, given by Britain and the United States, was repudiated by both these countries, so that France entered the League of Nations feeling compelled to transform anything it did into a protection of France against Germany. It sought through the League to make forty million Frenchmen more powerful than sixty-five million Germans. France used its relations in the League to play power politics against Germany. An instrument of collective security never was developed to serve this purpose, and the League, for all its worthier functions, became also a new vehicle for power politics.

The League of Nations set up a hierarchy of power. It was on three levels: the Great Powers, the lesser powers, and the little states. Whatever its defects, this system of maintaining peace might have worked for a considerable period if the Great Powers had been trustworthy in leading it. In theory, the balance of power was gone, and in its place was a concentration of power. Peace did not depend on the approximation of a balance, but on a new concept, that the overwhelming power of all should crush any resort to violence by a single member. There were to be first the long procedures of conciliation, arbitration, and then of economic sanctions before the stage of war was to be reached. Thus the use of power was to be civilized.

The concept was sound. Indeed after the present war the same concept will have to be adopted and established if peace is to be stable. For unless there is to be a return to the balance of power, there is no other foundation on which peace can be built. Without this system or a balance of power, the predatory system of the more distant past prevails. When the League broke down, having neither balanced power nor used concentrated power intelligently, the world slipped back to predatory practices. That is what produced the Second World War. If this war is being fought for anything, it is to abolish the predatory system. One can hardly wish the war to result in the restoration of a balance of power, for the First World War gave proof of its dangerous weakness. So in planning the post-war world we are committed to the concentration of power. A second chance will have come to apply this concept. Having failed in applying it wisely before, and done so at an egregious price, one should expect the world to insist on it being established wisely this time.

The failure of concentration of power to function in the League of Nations is to be attributed to a number of causes. Two of them already have been mentioned: the absence of the United States, and the policy of France. Other causes were the niggardly treatment of Germany and the delay in inviting the Soviet Union; then the rejection of multilateral disarmament, which symbolized the avowal of power politics. What was still more important was the nature of the guarantor Great Powers, without whose wholehearted co-operation the whole system would collapse. Finally, the most important cause of failure was that the people of the leading nations did not understand the new principles of the avoidance of war. True, they wanted no war. The peoples of Britain, the United States, and France in particular were opposed to war with the intense resistance to violence that inheres in a lawful society. They did not realize that willingness to fight would become the final security against having to fight. In time the very unwillingness of the democracies to fight was to be exploited by two of the guarantor Great Powers. It is this development on which thought must focus in considering the post-war world.

Among the guarantor Great Powers were states which considered themselves have-nots, Japan and Italy. Among the second rank of powers was Germany, which felt very much a have-not, and it was to transform its domestic regime to a war footing by concentrating all power in the hands of a few and by basing its entire economy on war production, which could lead only to war. No doubt the haves among the Great Powers could have found means, not of appeasing the have-nots, but of demonstrating to them

that the necessity of "having" was losing importance in the present world. But this was not the era of such wisdom. Most countries, the democracies included, were seeking to prosper at the expense of their neighbours, and markets and raw materials were not equally accessible to all. The dispensation of the haves was penurious. The United States, in its isolation from the League, was draining Europe of its gold and refusing to accept goods in payment from its debtors. The British Empire, once free economically, fell to the control of conservatives who set up a system of protection at home and of an empire cemented by preferences. One folly produced another folly. The world at large tried to keep its mind on two planes, believing on one that war was to be avoided merely by refusing to fight it, and on the other that economic disparities could be promoted in utter safety.

It would be interesting to know at what moment the Japanese leaders completed their appraisal of the situation and perceived that here was a propitious occasion for predatory expansion. They learned from the League itself that it was not a system of collective security and would be unable to function as one. They must have realized, too, that they could count on the one certainty that neither the British nor the Americans would take the trouble to stop a policy of expansion at the outset. Both the democracies were passively pacifist. They might have been ready to partake in minor police action against some little state, but against a Great Power possessing strong arms they would not move at an early stage of expansion. The British people were not interested in the fate of Manchuria; the Americans, who had more reason to be, were engrossed by the depression. Even if the British and American governments should join in a purely diplomatic move, the diplomatic threats could have no persuasion unless the public in each country would not shrink any consequences, war included. So the Japanese set the stage for the drama which was to develop. Theft was safe and profitable under the protection of pacifism. If voices were raised against the theft, they could be stilled by the threat of war. The only possible opponents to Japan believed war to be the greatest of all evils, certainly greater than the breakdown of law and order in a far-off place. They were unable to see that their very avoidance of war must produce war, for they failed to comprehend that if peace begins to disintegrate, only early action can restore it. Peace is not like the mortal who can be saved on his deathbed.

The League of Nations could not deal with Japan's aggression in terms of collective security because Britain and France, the two Great Powers of the League, would not fight, and the United States, the other natural collaborator, was of the same mind. So

the League side-stepped any deed of power and resigned itself to condemning Japan with harmless words. From there onward the story need not be recited in detail. Italy perceived what Japan had seen, and by the time Italy was ready to acquire an empire by violence Hitler had overthrown the Weimar Republic. The thieves themselves were becoming powerful. In actual armament and wealth they were not equal to their possible opponents; but their opponents were determined to avoid war, and Mussolini had only to threaten to go to war to restrain his opponents from applying effective sanctions against his rape of Ethiopia.

Next Hitler came on the stage. While pacifism stood guard he occupied the Rhineland, denounced the Treaty of Locarno, and occupied Austria. Then he turned to Czechoslovakia, and in its final throes the pacifism of Britain and France carved up Czechoslovakia like a father offering his child on the propitiatory altar of an evil deity.

It is well to see this episode—Munich and appeasement—in its basic terms, for an understanding of it must guide the future. Munich was the product of nothing so much as of the desire to avoid war. It is no glib paradox to say that the present war became inevitable only because of the stubbornly stupid effort to avert it. Fear of war produced the war, and it is high time that the American and British publics in particular assume their share of the responsibility. It is fashionable by now to abuse the leaders who tried appeasement, but there would have been no appeasement if the British and American publics had understood that wars, if they are to be avoided, must be stopped violently, if need be, at their little beginnings. These two publics had to learn to preserve peace actively, first in terms of the justice without which it is unattainable, and then by moving with violent coercion against its violators. In 1932 the American citizen could not see that the place to avert Pearl Harbour was in Manchuria. Nor could the British citizen see that in Ethiopia and Spain he could prevent the bombing of London.

II

In the simplest of terms, no peace after this war can endure without two conditions that were lacking after the last war: the Great Powers who are to be its basic guarantors must be trustworthy, and the publics of the guarantor countries must not be so frightened of war that they will not move promptly and violently, if need be, to crush any little beginnings of war. If there is to be peace after this war it must be a peace of power. The power can—and, one hopes, will—be expressed in a civilized way.

But unless it is alert and ready to strike, the thieves will stalk again, they will combine again, and the war which will follow will shake the corners of the earth.

The first consideration of the peace is the relation of the major powers who are to guarantee it. There must be no Japan or Italy among them. Each must be content as to the others and as to its own importance. Since power is to be concentrated, diplomacy must not operate as though a balance were desirable. The guarantors must renounce ambitions to become stronger at the expense of one another. They must be satisfied with what they have.

These conditions are not to be achieved by wishing them. Either the guarantor powers are mature and wise enough to know that only in such a relationship with one another can they thrive, prosper, and pursue happiness, or they will not be wise enough, and the relationship will not come into being, nor will a durable peace. Obviously these powers must be *haves*. Being *haves*, they also must pursue their self-interest with the intelligence to use their wealth for the general welfare as well as for their own. In a high civilization, "having" entails responsibility equal to the profit to be derived from it. These guarantor powers must be wise enough to assure justice in the management of their wealth, otherwise their power will be the instrument of tyranny.

The war is almost certain to end with four nations commanding most of the physical power, and these four must become the nucleus of the peace and its prime guarantors. These four are the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. Of the four one is doubtful, China. China is enduring great inner strains, and its ability to remain united after the war is in question. But each of the other three is sure to be united and strong, and among them they may be able to succour and influence China so as to assure its place in the quartet.

What remains to be seen is whether they will emerge from the war wise enough to dispense over their domains and rule their relations with the rest of the world in a spirit of justice. If not, they will become tyrants, and there can be no enduring peace. But there is reason to believe that they will, for all four will need peace. The need for peace was the dominant, obsessing theme after the last war, so one can be sure it will be still more so after this one. Indeed, if this war establishes at the top of the hierarchy four such powerful nations, the prospect is that little wars will be crushed in advance or at their incipience with so much vigour that the very nature of sovereignty of the small states may be changed. For though big wars often start with small ones, as the present one did, all small wars are not necessarily evil. If the Great

Four are not going to permit a small war for a just cause, they must see to it that justice is provided in some other way, which is asking for statesmanship the world has not yet produced. It may be that the rule of the Great Four will prove a disappointment to many a liberal-minded person if he gets caught up in some righteous cause. Since the Great Four are more than likely to veto the start of any war, that might be an inducement to small states to exploit their safety in tantalizing their neighbours. But if we are to have the Great Four at all, we are fairly sure to have not only enduring peace (after the world settles down) but to have it to the point of not always liking it.

III

In this country we are busily discussing plans for the post-war world down to their smallest details. Every schoolroom has its blueprint, every village its forum. Never has there been wishing on such a national scope. It still is pure wishing, for we do not yet know if there are to be the prerequisites for these plans. The wishers do not begin by thinking in terms of power and its uses. They are designing the top floors of an edifice of whose foundations they appear to be ignorant. Few of them start at the beginning, which is the relationship of the Four Great Powers. If more did, they would set out to study the realities of American-Russian relations, which already have a long and commendable history. Then they would try to train their fellow citizens to distinguish between considerations of sentiment and the realities of power as regards our future relations with Russia. They would discuss our future relations with Great Britain. We are to become something of a senior partner of Britain in the post-war world, but we have no forum debates prodding Americans into the wisdom of assuring Britain its full place in our joint activities, not for Britain's sake but for our own. They would discuss the realities of China, as to ourselves, as to Britain, and as to Russia. Such a discussion might have direct influence on the present rulers in China in pushing them toward democratization, the one step which can prevent chaos there after the war.

In the place of an intelligent understanding of the primary factors in the post-war world we hear in this country much inane chatter. Politically moronic businessmen see the post-war world as a time to down British business; others demand American air supremacy the world over, which is asking for a new war about the quickest way it can be produced; others announce that there is to be a next war between this country and Russia, a thought

popular even among certain officers in the army who ought to know more about power. For wars are over power—and nothing else, unless it is freedom. They seem not to know that we have had no better relationship in our history in terms of power than with Russia.

The American public is not alone in this kind of unrealism. The British Government has not yet abandoned the practices of the days of the balance of power in its dealings with Russia. Britain appears to be intent on building on the continent of Europe a constellation of states which shall counterbalance Russia, which explains in part its support of De Gaulle in France and Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly this is not the major motive in British thinking, and perhaps it is no more than the survival of a once excellent habit acquired in the time when it was supreme wisdom to preserve a balance of power. The British foreign-office official used to come to his desk in those days and scan every event and every move to see whether it weakened his side or the other side. It was his reason for being, to strengthen his side and weaken the other side. It is asking much of a man with such training to acquire the new thought habits of the concentration of power.

Many officials in our own State Department are even less equipped with the new thought habits. Their only training has been to protect American interests in an era of semi-isolation and in not going further in any direction than Congress would approve. Some few in the State Department do have a sense of the responsibilities of world trusteeship which we shall have to assume if we promote our own self-interest. But the house cleaning the department must go through to staff it with able servants in that time, when it comes, will indeed need to be thorough.

The immediate task before the peacemakers is to create a working basis among the Great Four, and first of all among the United States, Britain, and Russia. This basis must be one of trust. In all seriousness one can ask if this should not be simple. Why should there be distrust? Its only authentic ground could be that Britain and Russia aspire to each other's land and power, or the United States and Russia aspire to each other's land and power, or that Britain and America aspire to each other's land and power. Yet suspicions still prevailed in the summer of 1943, with the war entering its final phase. The suspicions were not unnatural ones, and all of them had their roots in history. Russia lived for twenty years behind barbed wire, regarding all the outside world as its enemy. Its one excursion into the Western world was to Geneva, where its experiences were less than reassuring.

British and American suspicions of Russia are based mostly on their fear of the Russian revolution. No doubt if the Western world were to build again a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia, or if Russia were to emerge from the war a revolutionary movement, there could be no trust—and no peace. As to Britain and the United States, their suspicions of each other are not important, for the reason that the silly people who talk nonsense in both countries about relations between the two after the war do not wield much power.

But the problem of Russian suspicions is paramount. Russia somehow must understand that the Western world will not combine against it, and the Western world must understand that Russia will not foment revolution in their lands. So far Russia has maintained its Communist parties in Britain and the United States, and though they supported the war as soon as Russia was attacked, they are and remain instruments of potential power politics by which Russia can intrigue against the British and American governments. It is not to the point to decide whether the Russians conspired in Britain and America through the Communist parties merely as a defence against the *cordon sanitaire*. The point is that both causes for distrust must be removed. They can be, for new experiences in our relations have voided the old ones. Russia has fought the war with tremendous success, which it did as an ally receiving unstinted help, and if there is to be victory it will be a joint one. We have established comradeship and mutuality. The *cordon sanitaire* has been obliterated. So far the Communist parties in Britain and the United States have not also been swept away, but the Russians have taken the initiative in abolishing the Comintern, and thus cutting the umbilical cord to these Communist parties. How much of a change of heart this represents remains to be seen. The Russians know, for instance, that the United States and Great Britain are headed toward a policed peace system, yet they ask first for strategic frontiers. In this they are like France after the last war, which was ready to experiment with a League of Nations if its own security first was guaranteed. Moscow has been saying in effect, "Assure us our strategic frontiers, and then we shall look at your blueprints." This is not stupidity on the part of Moscow. The policed peace system has not yet been assured. Mr. Stalin may not understand all the subtleties of American politics, but he understands clearly that if the Republicans think they can win an election by abandoning police responsibilities in the world they will do so. And the Republicans so far have not made up their minds which way to plump. Until the United States forges a non-partisan peace

policy, Mr. Stalin is entitled to his suspicions. But as long as dominant Republicans hate Mr. Roosevelt more than they hate a future war they may defeat Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. Stalin will badly need his strategic frontiers. So all the work of allaying suspicion does not consist of sweeping cobwebs from the mind of Mr. Stalin. It is just as essential that the United States convince the world that it is capable of supremely intelligent self-interest, that it has mastered the lesson of the two-world war, and is ranging itself unitedly behind the new experiment with the concentration of power.

If and when the Four Powers have reached the ground of trust, the next subject on the agenda is not the structure of the peace system but the future of Germany. If the Four Powers are to conspire against one another, obviously Germany is the prize for which they will contend. A strong Germany as part of a British system would go far to balance a strong Russia. A strong Germany absorbed in the Soviet Union would realize the geopolitician's dream; it would dominate the world, that is, until the next war. But if the Four Powers are not to be rivals, they can solve the problem of Germany for their mutual good, which will be for the good of Germany's neighbours too. The point is that they cannot solve it as rivals and that they can if they are not rivals. One can pray for a union of the Four Powers for the immediate, intrinsic, and essential blessings of such co-operation. But if that prayer is not enough, it becomes doubly forcible in contemplation of the problem of the future of Germany.

It may be that the one inducement which will bring Russia into the Four Power system will be a guarantee that this is not to deteriorate into power politics. It may be that the United States alone can give this guarantee. The United States may have to assure Russia that it will undertake to prevent the peace system becoming a system of power politics and will remain in Europe, in some way, though not necessarily with a large army, as a pledge that collective security will not again be debased and stultified. If so, the guarantee will save and serve the peace, and if it is understood in this country, it will be valid.

IV

If and when the two stages have been passed through, in which the Four Power accord has been established and the German question has been solved without rivalry, comes the time to proceed with the organization of the post-war world. That is not to say that this organization is less important than the other two stages. In some respects it is more so. For the organization of the post-war world must present a guarantee of safety of the less powerful

against the Great Powers. This will not be by balancing of power, in terms of armaments, for the Great Powers will dominate in that respect. But the stability of peace cannot rest alone on the harmony of the Four Powers. What has been said about the necessity of that harmony is to be understood in a negative sense: there can be no peace without it. But peace itself should not be committed to that one factor alone. Peace in international relationships is like peace on the domestic plane—it rests on the establishment of a system of law and on the swift enforcement of law by coercion. There can be no thought of passing to the Four Powers the policing of the world. If the world should do this, it would submit itself to tyranny by these powers. That would exchange the tyranny of fear which has ruled mankind disastrously in the past twenty-five years for the tyranny of unrestricted concentrated power. While there will be concentrated power, the Four will achieve their own well-being only by delegating some of that power and limiting their own sovereignty.

Much is being said about regionalism as the best solution of the problems of a world organization. The case for it cannot be put too strongly. Regionalism not only is desirable, it is quintessential. Is a dispute between two Latin-American countries to be settled at some new world court and then enforced by Russian, Chinese, British, and American planes, ships, and guns? Are Americans and Chinese to take part in the suppression of some dangerous uprising in Macedonia? Must Americans enforce peace in a conflict between Iran and Afghanistan? Policing should be a neighbourhood function. Conciliation and arbitration also should be regional, with appeal to a central court only in event of failure. Justice by its nature does not come from on high, but from the neighbourhood. It emanates from on high only when more distant neighbourhoods find themselves in jeopardy.

It need not appear a fallacy to hail first a system of concentrated power, then to demand decentralization in its use. If the mind is too obtuse to reconcile these concepts, there is little hope for the future. For on this paradox the future of human liberty rests. Only the concentration of power in states mature enough to press no power rivalry against each other, and wise enough to set up a system of justice, will prevent the recurrence of a world war between nearly equal sides. And only the grant of self-determination to regions can save small states from the tyranny of the great. Indeed democracy itself is moving toward the same paradox in domestic affairs, by committing greater power to central government, combined with sharpened decentralization in the application of the government's policies.

The question of disarmament after the war must be seen in the light of these realities. The Great Powers are sure to decrease their arms for reasons of economy, but they will not consent to scrap them. Not all the smaller states can be expected to disarm. Some will hold arms as delegates of the world to use in enforcing peace. This is not only good theory, it also is unavoidable. Who should undertake, for instance, to disarm Brazil after the war? Or Mexico? Or Spain? Or France? Or Turkey? Nor is it a mockery of the theory that disarming these and other countries is not practicable. They can have their arms for the one purpose of the general good. If they attempt to use them for any purpose beyond it, the arms of the Great Four will tower over them with an unrelenting forbiddance. It will need nice adjustment to decide how much armament is to be permitted regional states. It will need the wisest statesmanship to decide to which states this service shall be delegated. Old habits of pride and prestige, old irredentist wounds, old rivalries are sure to flame up. The building of the post-war organization is going to be no simple and orderly ceremony. But if the Great Powers are obviously seeking the general good, the problems should not be unsolvable.

The limitation of sovereignty by the Big Four has been mentioned as a prerequisite for a sound world order. By this should be understood simply that each of them renounces the right to be judge in its own cause. This is not so great a departure from the past as it may appear. If the determination of a nation to judge its own cause sends it on the path of war, it dare not proceed without counting its possible allies and enemies. It did not, even before the last war. Nations in the system of a balance of powers accepted informally, if not formally, a limitation of their sovereignty. They dared not upset the balance and require the help of other nations without giving those nations some voice in their decision. Indeed if Austria had lived up to balance-of-power ethics in 1914, it would have consulted more frankly with Germany before issuing the ultimatum to Serbia. Sovereignty is limited by the very nature of international relations in the present-day world. Unless the United States, for instance, should determine to keep a two-ocean navy, a huge army, and a vast air force, and to forgo co-operation in a system of law and peace, it would not embark on a policy which threatens war without yielding to others some voice in its decision. For the world will be one of power, and we should need friends if we were going to fight. Otherwise we should have to maintain a military establishment capable of cowing and subduing the rest of the world. Indeed there is really no issue over isolationism in the future of American policy. Either we collaborate

or we go in for the greatest splurge of imperialism the world has ever witnessed, which is what so-called isolationists consciously or unconsciously are asking for.

Our prompt agreement to submit our own international disputes to a world court, and to abide by its decisions, would only simplify a practice implicit in the nature of power relationships. It would be the practical and helpful thing to do. But even if we lagged, we still should be dominated by the reality that we could not judge our own cause without risking war, and that we either fight with the help of friends or fight alone. If we rely on friends, our friendships of themselves limit our sovereignty. We probably shall have the good judgment to perceive this and quickly agree to a system of arbitration, conciliation, and final appeal to a court. But even if we do not, we cannot change the realities. We still shall not be free to judge our own cause. We still shall live in a system of limited sovereignty, unless, as has been said, we go in for an imperialism that outdoes the dreams of Napoleon and Hitler.

V

To sum up, the essentials of an enduring peace are, first, a relationship of trust among the Great Powers, all of whom are maturely self-sufficient as to power and territory and wise enough to recognize that their own interest lies in serving the general interest; then a system of justice, in which no nation is a judge in its own cause, and one in which the great as well as the small voluntarily accept the limitation of their sovereignty; and finally the enforcement of law on a neighbourhood basis.

But before this system can function the first prerequisite is that the people constituting the states with the greatest power shall know that they must never again fear war more than they fear injustice. For if they do, they will get the war and it will be a great one. If they do not, they can keep any future wars little ones, while most of those that threaten can be avoided altogether.¹

¹ Cf. the discussion of peace and power on pp. 202-10.

BROADCASTS

THE selection from broadcasts herewith made does not constitute a chronology of the war in any sense. Only if the broadcasts were to be reproduced in their entirety could they become a day-to-day history. They would fill about four volumes of the present size. The broadcasts and passages chosen for publication have been selected as comments, not as a record of the time covered.

THE PRELUDE

October 18, 1938

A MONTH and a half ago I broke off my talks on world events to visit Europe. I knew that the momentum of crisis was very great, but I did not foresee that before I could return to America the crisis would have reached its breaking point and that grave decisions of an unalterable nature would have been taken. To-night I have a sense of the almost painful limitation of the time at my disposal, and of my own mind in grasping the full measure of what has happened. Very great forces have been at work, far greater than the individuals who have seemed to shape them. The stage of the drama of Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich is too vast to be seen at a glance. It will be my temptation to simplify and so unintentionally falsify the story, but you will welcome simplification, because one *has* to try to understand what has happened and how it could have happened. I must confine my account of what has taken place to a few of the undeniable facts and leave out a great deal that belongs in the story. Let us look first at results.

Try to think back six months ago when the crisis was first evident. If anyone had told you then that by to-night Czechoslovakia was to be deserted by its allies, dismembered at their request; that Germany in this short time was to be given mastery of eastern Europe and so of the European continent; that France would voluntarily step down from being a first-class power to being shut up in western Europe with only Britain and no further allies to secure it; if anyone had said this would happen at the point of a gun, in terms of an ultimatum, and would be accepted by Britain and France without the firing of a shot, you would have thought such a prophet was mad. You would have said that to achieve such a result the statesmen of Britain and France would have had to show great creative power, that they would have had to devise a

new way to lose a war without bloodshed, and indeed in *this* result would have had to lose two wars, for they have now lost the world war and the war that threatened over Hitler's demand that Czechoslovakia should be demobilized as a power factor in eastern Europe. What I am trying to remind you is that this result, six months ago, would have seemed wholly incredible. And then I must do my best to explain how this incredible thing has happened. It would be convenient to be able to explain it all in terms of treachery. Well, I believe there has been some treachery, but that does not explain it. It would be convenient to explain it in terms of a victory for peace; how glad I would be if I could for a moment regard the peace that has been bought as either lasting or indeed anything but a peace of decaying morals and mounting tyranny. It would be convenient to say, simply, that the British and French leaders preferred to live under Hitler's domination than to beat him with the aid of Soviet Russia, which is, I think, an element in the story. But none of these key phrases are enough to explain what happened. I think one must start with the examination of air power. Now Mr. Chamberlain decided to go to Berchtesgaden, on the urging of Premier Daladier of France, on the day that the British and French governments were officially informed that in event of war Italy would fight on the side of Germany. You may doubt whether Italy would in fact have fought. But if you had been responsible for the safety of Britain and France you would have had to believe it and act accordingly. If Italy came in, the British and French air forces in the west of Europe would not have been equal to the air forces against them. They might have been sure of beating Germany in a year or so by military action and blockade. But the price would have been the ruin of many British and French cities. There was doubt, too, about the effectiveness of the Soviet air force. I believe the doubt was exaggerated. I am not in a position to know; all I say is that the decision to carve up Czechoslovakia and make a present of part of it to Germany was due in the first place to a sense that the British and French air forces were inadequate to protect their home countries, and that the Soviet air force was not to be relied on. If the British and French leaders wanted to avoid the disaster of a war in which they were inferior in the air, they had to clear their conscience for making Czechoslovakia pay the price. And this they did, perhaps more reasonably than they have been given credit for doing. At first they were not going in for dismemberment. They hoped for a solution in Czechoslovakia which would maintain that country's strategic frontier and give enough rights to the Sudeten Germans to satisfy them. But when the crisis reached the boiling

point they saw that in the Sudetenland the fury had gone too deep for compromise. Agitation, provocation, and racial hysteria had been pushed so far that it was impossible to appease these Germans. If they were kept within the Czech state they would be a permanent menace to its security. Furthermore, if war came, the help that could be given Czechoslovakia would not have saved it from fairly complete ruination. Even if Germany had been beaten in the end, there would not be much left of Czechoslovakia, and the men at the helm said to themselves, Czechoslovakia is ruined in any case, it must be dismembered in any case, so why fight a ruinous war about it? There is a risk in war, there is a risk in peace. It is hard to say which is greater, but if they are in any way comparable, we must choose the risk of peace. That, I think, is a fair presentation of the minds which chose the way to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich.

But now let us look at other elements in the story. The Czechs were not consulted about their sacrifice. Nor was the true military position ever at the disposal of the Anglo-French conference where the decisions were made. I was in Prague on September twenty-first, the day when the Czechs submitted to the Anglo-French programme calling for dismemberment. Czechoslovakia was ready to fight. It was ready to go through the war, even through ruination, if in the end it might live on its democratic life. But Beneš on that day was told that he must accept the Anglo-French plan, and that if he did not, Britain would not support France in any war that ensued, and so France would consider Czechoslovakia the guilty party and would not fulfil its treaty obligations. These were the two threats that were used to club down President Beneš. He could not believe his ears. He could not believe that what he was being told was the true desire of the French Cabinet. He had reason to suspect Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, and he did suspect him. He at once told Ossousky, the Czech Minister in Paris, to go to Daladier and find out if what Bonnet was doing was the will of the French Cabinet. To get this word to Ossousky he could either telephone, in which case the Germans could hear the conversation, or send the message in code by telegraph. He telegraphed. Someone in the French post office held up that wire, and Ossousky did not receive it in time to go to Daladier. And Beneš, without being able to make sure that he needed to, agreed to the Anglo-French demands. Now the fact is that the French Cabinet and the British Government had neither of them authorized that Beneš should be threatened as he was. And when the French Cabinet was told what Bonnet had done, that he had exceeded his instructions, six ministers resigned, including Reynaud, Mandel, and Sarraut. And more will

be heard of this phase of M. Bonnet's zeal for peace. There is, too, another charge against Bonnet. At the Anglo-French conversations in London, where the surrender to Germany was decided on, he had to give a report on France's military preparedness. General Gamelin, the French chief of staff, was not there to speak for himself. Bonnet spoke of weakness in the air, and that he could do truthfully enough. But he did not tell the truth about France's military preparedness. He implied that the French Army, because of the new Siegfried Line, would be unable to render any useful aid to the Czechs. But a few days later, when Gamelin did go to London, when the British and French were actually preparing for war after the Godesberg ultimatum, Gamelin astonished the British by saying that the French Army was at the peak of its power, that the Siegfried Line—and these are Gamelin's own words—was so much marmalade and he could be through it in four days. There is going to be, I am sure, a great debate for many years as to who sold out Czechoslovakia and the Western democracies to the domination of Hitler. Was it Chamberlain and the British pro-Nazis, or was it the French? I happen to know that many months ago Chamberlain told American correspondents in an interview they were not allowed to use that he favoured the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. I am sure that he will be called the architect of this peace of Munich. But this needs to be said.

France was the country which had a treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia. France was the country whose power in Europe depended in part on the survival of Czechoslovakia. France did not have to consult Britain about its obligations to its Bohemian ally. It needed only to consult its own interests and its own conscience. If France had so wished, there need have been no surrender to Hitler, and Mr. Chamberlain, even though he was ready to submit to Hitler, would have had to follow the French lead.

There are many aspects of this peace of Munich which I should like to stress. I want to say with all possible emphasis that the people of Britain and France did not demand this peace. They were magnificent. God knows they did not want war, but they were ready for war after Godesberg, and they knew what it was to have been about, a war to keep one man from dominating Europe. They looked into the coming horrors of that war grimly, silently, and unflinchingly. One could never have asked more from a nation than the British and French gave in those days of the crisis. When they were given peace they rejoiced. Why not? Will ever any democracy throw out its rulers and insist on going to war? I think that is impossible. They had been told by their leaders they must face war and they faced it. They were then told by

their leaders they need not fight, that a peace had been made for them that was peace with honour. They believed it. But now they are beginning to see that something about it is false and humiliating. They begin to see that they lost to Hitler because they were weak in armaments, and yet, in losing, they have made Hitler relatively still stronger. If they are not to be humiliated again they must redouble the effort to build armaments, and yet if they do that they repudiate the peace that they so desperately want to believe in. They will be preparing for a war that in the next crisis will not be averted. I cannot begin to tell you of the perplexity and despair that reign in Paris and in London. There will be war if Britain and France stand up to Germany. And it will be fought on far worse terms than if it had been fought this summer. Hitler has free now the divisions he needed to overrun Czechoslovakia. In a few months he will have ready another army recruited from his Austrian provinces. France and Britain have wrecked the Soviet pact, and in another crisis they cannot count on the Soviet air force or the vast Soviet armies. They have driven Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia into the arms of Germany and Italy. But if there is not a war, they are junior partners of Nazi Germany, putting off the evil day when they themselves will be victims of German expansion. It is on a Europe in such a dilemma that the peace of Munich has dawned.

PEARL HARBOUR TO TUNISIA

WE WERE ATTACKED BECAUSE OF OUR PRINCIPLES

December 8, 1941

THE most important truth that shines forth from the events of the last two days is twofold. The United States was attacked. The one thing it had thought would not, and even could not, happen, it was the victim of a surprise attack. But that is only part of the truth. The United States was attacked because of its principles. The motive for the attack was Japan's knowledge that it could not wheedle the United States into sacrificing its principles in the Far East and in Europe. Japan had only two choices, to recant of its dream of conquest in the Far East—or go to war. To recant was hard, if not politically impossible. To go to war was politically easier. And since the choice was for war, Japan struck first and with all the surprise it could conjure up. That does not make the perfidy any the less perfidious. It will stand through history as a classic instance of deceit. But it is losing some of the truth of America's position to focus only on the perfidy. The United States is at war because it was aiding China, because it had solemnly warned against further aggressions in the Far East, because it had shown its sincerity in backing its principles with the economic penalties imposed after Japan's entry into Indo-China. In a still larger sense the United States is at war because it was aiding Britain and the Soviet Union, because it has dedicated itself to the active service of nations fighting Hitler's aggressions. Japan went to war not as an isolated country dealing with its own problems. Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, which was formed for the express purpose of intimidating the United States so that it would not help nations who were fighting the Axis. It is a literal fact that we are fighting Japan because Japan struck first. But that is a minor fact, whereas the major fact is that we were struck first because of what we believe, because of what we have been willing to do to express our beliefs, and because we declined to abandon our beliefs. Our beliefs rise out of the political freedom in which this nation was born and in which it has lived. This freedom is now at stake, in every quarter of the globe, not only the freedom enjoyed by other peoples whom we have been aiding. Our own freedom has now become an intrinsic part of the issue of the world's greatest war of all times. Surely it is this sense which has united the American nation as it never has been united and dedicated in its existence.

The British declaration of war, promised within the hour by Prime Minister Churchill, came actually before the American declaration. Mr. Churchill was able to tell the House of Commons: "We are ahead of our commitment to the United States." Canada is at war with Japan; Australia and South Africa will be. The Dutch East Indies have declared war. China is declaring war on Japan, Germany, and Italy. Among Western Hemisphere countries war has been declared on Japan by Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. Mexico and Colombia have broken relations with Japan. The Argentine will not penalize the United States by imposing the restrictions meted out to belligerents. So within ten days a large part of the Western Hemisphere has entered the war, and the United States finds itself not only a nation bound together by an unprecedented unity, but shoulder to shoulder with co-fighters for freedom in the far reaches of the world.

DAY OF APPRAISAL—"PRINCE OF WALES" AND "REPULSE"
SUNK, THE OCEAN OUR MAGINOT LINE

December 10, 1941

THIS must be a day of appraisal, of searching for utter reality, and of self-examination. Not anyone with a sense of the power factors in the Pacific will have heard the news of the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* without anguish. This is a bitter blow; in a temporary measure, it is a decisive blow. Japan went into the Pacific war with superiority. It had naval superiority from the moment that part of our navy was moved into the Atlantic. The superiority was not levelled off by the arrival at Singapore of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*. Before Pearl Harbour was attacked we were already on the defensive. That defeat made us more so. Now the loss of the two British battleships reduces still more the Allied defensive power.

The British hold Malaya and Singapore. The United States holds the Philippines. The Philippines will not be yielded without a tough fight. But it is a reality that anything held in the immediate future in the western Pacific is held more by heroism than by weight of power. It is realism to recognize that the Allied position in the Pacific, and particularly the western Pacific, is one of extreme peril.

"These are the times to try men's souls," so wrote Thomas Paine in the days of the early reverses of the American Revolution. Lethargy and divided opinion at that time were obscuring the

certainly of ultimate victory. The Revolutionary War began with discouragement, and Thomas Paine rallied flagging spirits in the American Army and throughout the thirteen states. To-day, with opinion undivided, with no lethargy, with spirits unflagging, the United States is again sure of ultimate victory. But to-day the full power of the United States is held back by a drag unique to our times. It is that we have been the victims of certain illusions. We have been the safest-minded people on earth. We have been brought up ocean-conscious. We have an out-of-date measurement of distance. And we have indulged to the full the extravagance of underestimating our opponents.

It is not to our reproach that we were caught by surprise. In one sense it is to our credit. For the only nations not caught by surprise are the military oligarchies, which are organized for attack. By its nature a democracy in peacetimes can think only in terms of defence. And a nation that thinks in terms of defence is foredoomed to being taken by surprise. For that reason the price of democracy is high. But the price of utter safety is still higher. It is to be a nation of obedient soldiers whose lungs draw no breath of free air.

Our enveloping oceans have been our Maginot Line. We saw world dangers through their mists, and chatted about them as though they were faraway astronomical phenomena. We were so safe that we were not goaded by motives of self-preservation. We did more than any other nation to develop the airplane, which now has led to our own acute discomfiture. Some of our airmen cried to us of our danger; the most spectacular one of them cried to us that there was none. We had habits of thinking formed in the pre-airplane world, and we did not break the habits. So as a people we went into modern warfare with thoughts attuned to another age even if we did possess up-to-date weapons. We still thought we were safe behind the oceans. We were like France behind her Maginot Line.

Because we had little to fear for our own safety we did not appreciate the meaning to us of the danger to other countries. Not until late did we see the self-interest in international co-operation and helpfulness. And for this reason the price we now must pay for our own survival and our aid to others is ten or even a hundred fold of what it would have been had we seen reality sooner.

There is, however, one mercy in this grievous situation. Our Maginot Line has fallen at the outset of our entry into the war. Our defeat has come at the beginning, and is, in effect, only the loss of a great battle, not of the war. But it is a costly battle, more costly than may be realized.

Thomas Paine was able to write, while the Revolutionary Army was in retreat and New Jersey was being ravaged, that ultimate victory was assured, for that assurance lay in the larger realities of the war. And so is victory in this war assured. But it asks different habits of thinking, and a different application to the task now in hand. How much longer the war will last because two battleships were sunk off Malaya yesterday can only be a guess. But victory has been postponed and no truth-speaking person can deny it. This can be our Dunkirk, if we look at it squarely in the way the British looked squarely at reality after Dunkirk. Last night the President said, "It will not only be a long war, it will be a hard war." He was speaking without knowledge of the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*. To-day the estimate of the duration and the difficulty of the war must be increased.

But the war will be won, and for two fundamental reasons. We can outproduce the Axis, and we can outwill the Axis. Free men merged in a single endeavour are mightier than any combination of underlings. Wars are not won by machinery alone, but by the spirit, and the spirit of free people, once they are aroused and once they are sufficiently armed, will sweep away any foe. Now we must face reality, purge the illusions, and work. It is true that to-day we have unprecedented unity. But we need a still more fitting sense of the gravity of our position and of the effort it will cost us to overcome our difficulties. We must realize we have to save our free lives. These, too, are the times to try men's souls.

GERMANY AND ITALY DECLARE WAR

December 12, 1941

It has taken only four days from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour for Germany and Italy to declare war on the United States and to sign an alliance with Japan. No one will believe that to-day's declarations of war were a casual and comradely afterthought. Japan's action is now more comprehensible. It asked a price for making war on the United States. To-day Hitler and Mussolini publicly paid the price. No one will believe that Hitler was contented when he had to tell the German nation that after Russia he now had taken on the United States. What Hitler was telling the German nation to-day was, in effect, that Germany now must expect to live 1918 over again. He had to tell it in the same speech in which he admitted his failure to knock out Russia before winter, and defeat of German forces in Libya. What could he say to bolster up his war-weary people? He had to appeal to his largest dream.

The war, he said, would determine the fate, not alone of the Germans, not of Europe, but of the whole world, for five hundred to one thousand years.

Benito Mussolini also spoke. Being only a junior partner, he talked for only five minutes. But in that time he used a line which should enshrine his memory with language experts for all time. He was saying that neither the Axis nor Japan wanted an extension of the conflict. "One man," he shouted (meaning President Roosevelt), "one man only, 'an authentic democratic autocrat,' wished and prepared the war." That phrase "an authentic democratic autocrat" is the one touch of humour in this otherwise solemn day.

BILL OF RIGHTS—ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY

December 15, 1941

TO-DAY is the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Bill of Rights. It is not unfitting in a broadcast about war news to devote some comment to this celebration. If the observance had come, say, a month ago, all of us might have thought about it in somewhat different terms. The Bill of Rights is venerable. It sets forth truths that to us had become "self-evident." These were so much part of normal American life that it took a shock to make us realize, as we realize to-day, that the Bill of Rights is in danger in a world war, and that essentially it is the truths in those very amendments for which we are fighting.

For we did not need to be in this war. If we had been willing to betray our belief in the freedom of the individual, and in his protection under the law, which is what the Bill of Rights safeguards, we might easily have come to terms with the powers fighting to establish a world without personal liberties. We were attacked because we do believe in freedom and were consecrated to help nations defending their freedom. There was no time till last week when the United States could not have bargained handsomely for peace with Germany and Japan. All it would have taken on our part would have been indifference to totalitarian concepts and the end of aid to free countries. We knew we faced risks in rejecting compromise with Hitlerism.

But in all the doubts about incurring the risks I cannot recall any speeches setting forth any advantages for a compromise of principles with Hitlerism. We were told that if we went to war we might lose our freedom, but we were not told that the freedom we enjoy is not worth preserving. In a most real sense we are at war because we are a free people who have insisted on living like

free people. We were attacked because of what we believe, and insisted on doing, in expressing our beliefs, and what we believe is embodied in the Bill of Rights. It is the seed out of which root and branches of our individual liberties developed. It is worth pointing out, then, that the Bill of Rights is live news to-day. It is something more than a valued document in the crypt of history. It is the very essence of our national identity. Out of the freedom which it defined and guaranteed we have grown to be what we are.

It is well to remember, too, that other nations had their counterparts to the Bill of Rights, their guarantees of personal liberty, so that in fighting for our liberties we are fighting, too, for theirs. Germany had civil liberties before and during the Weimar Republic and during the nineteenth century. Civil liberties were the insignia of civilization. The Nazis of Germany and the Fascists of Italy first suppressed these liberties in their own lands, years before the war began. It was the nature and the necessity of their new regimentation to do so. They made of the suppression of individual rights a religion. They did so in the name of military strength. As soon as individual rights were abolished in those countries the world already was hurtling toward war, for two kinds of society, one of free individuals, dedicated to peace, and one without individual rights and dedicated to military power, could not remain long in balance. The disciplined armies of the military powers were certain to strike at the unprepared individuals of peace.

To-day can well be dedicated not only to a review of our liberties for a hundred and fifty years, but also to a look ahead. And the look ahead is not given to many of us. I am sure that few thoughtful people exist in the United States who are not troubled by deep perplexities about the future. If, as appears plausible, we are passing through an evolution in which government control of and participation in peacetime economic life is on the increase, who is to say where it will carry us? If there is to be a limitation of the individual economic freedoms, or a substitution of government responsibility for them, what will happen to the political freedom of the individual?

The dictatorships were imposed on the German and Italian nations with big pledges of economic as well as military strength. People were told that they would have safer individual lives under dictatorship than under democracy. They were not told the truth, for the economic security in Hitler's Germany, such as there has been, was the fruit of a gigantic armament programme and not much else. We, too, could have solved our unemployment the same way. A huge armament programme in the end is the greatest economic insecurity there is. In looking ahead we may well be alert that

we do not get confused, like Hitler's and Mussolini's subjects, and exchange our individual liberties for a bogus economic security. To be a free nation means to be a nation of free persons, and we cannot be made free by any system that abolishes or weakens the right of free speech, of a free press, of worship, and that does not restrain the actions of arbitrary authority over individuals. I am not implying that any form of society unlike agrarian democracy in the original thirteen states is bound to undermine freedom. We have preserved our freedom in a complex industrialism with a high degree of concentration of economic power.

To-day we can rededicate ourselves to the principle of individualism and say of the future that we want no form of economic change that departs from the principles of the Bill of Rights.

The Bill of Rights appears only as a set of constitutional amendments. Still it puts first things first. If we keep these principles as first principles, and mould our economic future accordingly, we can continue to be free people. I have no prophetic powers to suggest how this will be done. But one need have no doubt that it can be done, and still less that it is essential, if we are to hand on to the future our heritage of a hundred and fifty years.

TWO NEW PHRASES—"UNIFIED COMMAND" AND "GRAND STRATEGY"

December 16, 1941

Two phrases about the war which are going to be heard with increasing frequency are already in use. They are "unified command" and "grand strategy." But before there can be any grand strategy it must be remembered that the Allies are behind in their timetable. The Axis is still the stronger team. Nineteen forty-one was a year of catching up by the Allies. Nineteen forty-two will be a year of drawing even. Not till 1943 will there be a surplus of Allied power to conjure with. So the problem of the present is how to make the best use of a deficiency. That must be the chief objective of any grand strategy by the Allies for many months to come. The most important factors in administering a deficiency, as the Allies must be doing, is to hold their key bases. They will have power enough in another year and a half. But if they do not hold the bases from which to launch that power, they have to lose the time and energy to capture the bases. And the most important base in the world, for the Allied cause, is the British Isles themselves.

Britain and the Soviet Union already have scheduled talks about

grand strategy; similar talks between Britain and the United States are to be held in Washington. Military and naval plans are to be discussed by the British, Australians, and Chinese at Chungking, by the Americans, British, and Dutch at Singapore. But it is easy to forecast delay and difficulty in solving these problems. There are many sovereignties at stake, and the world is still strangled by the concept of unlimited sovereignty. The basis is there for some kind of federation. It may take federation to evoke the utmost possible strength and the best possible timing against the Axis. A federation of this magnitude has never been needed before, but the democratic countries never faced a task of this magnitude before. And if it is not going to be federation of any kind it will have to be something which seems even more difficult, the efficient, flexible, self-sacrificing, and voluntary collaboration of sovereign states. That was enough in World War Number One, but it was fought, in the main, in Europe. World War Number Two at this moment flames on three continents.

WINSTON CHURCHILL AND LORD BEAVERBROOK AT THE
WHITE HOUSE. HITLER TELLS THE WORLD ABOUT HIS
"INTUITIONS"

December 22, 1941

WINSTON CHURCHILL and Lord Beaverbrook are at the White House, and this week is set to be one of the most important in American and British history. The word "preliminary" has been officially attached to the discussions which are to take place. But that is a word which cannot dim their intrinsic importance. To have America and Britain in conference, in the persons of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in a war involving many other nations, raises matters of some delicacy. Soviet Russia is not there, and is not able to be there, since only Stalin himself would have the rank of the other two conferees. China, the Netherlands, the Dominions, the governments in exile, all must have a place at a conference that decides on a Supreme War Council and an Allied Supply Council. The British are about to hold crucial talks with the Russians, and yet the Prime Minister did not go to Moscow, he came to Washington. No doubt the Russians estimate things wisely, but it is clear why the discussions have to be described as preliminary. That they are preliminary to the formation of alliances, of a supreme board of strategy, and a unified supply system cannot be doubted. The war against the Axis powers must be waged with the utmost co-ordination, with a sure

flow of supplies to the chosen places of supreme effort, and with pledges by all concerned against a separate peace.

Hitler's removal of Marshal von Brauchitsch from the command of the German Army and his own assumption of direct command are events which would be astonishing even without the astonishing documents by which they were made known to the German nation. The Germans continue to retreat in Russia, and if ever a time called for a cool, stable conduct of German national policy this would be the time. If it were only a strategic retreat, dictated by the coming of winter, a show of confidence at the top in Germany might carry conviction down to the masses. But instead of confidence Goebbels went to the microphone Saturday and issued a heart-rending appeal for winter clothing for the forces in the East. That advertised as nothing else could advertise that the German High Command had not made preparations for a winter campaign, that the winter campaign was causing acute suffering, and that the High Command had met an unexpected defeat. Before this broadcast Hitler had already issued to the troops a proclamation announcing the removal of Von Brauchitsch. It turns out to be a still less confident performance than the Goebbels broadcast. The announcement of the proclamation and the proclamation itself both bear evidence of having been written by Hitler. Listen to this sentence. It is explaining why Hitler had taken over supreme command of the armed forces in 1938. "Furthermore," it says, "the consciousness of an inner call and the will to take the responsibility that was his were of importance when the statesman Adolf Hitler resolved to be his own supreme military leader." Who else in the world but Hitler talks publicly about his "inner call" and his "will" to responsibility? "The Fuehrer influenced to the utmost the operations and armament of the army and, following his intuitions, reserved for himself personally all essential decisions in this field." Only Hitler would tell the world about his intuitions. Then in the proclamation to the troops he writes: "After fifteen years of work I have achieved, as a common German soldier, and merely with my fanatical will power, the unity of the German nation, and have freed it from the death sentence of Versailles." The man who boasts thus to his troops of the achievements of his own fanatical will power is of prime interest to a psychiatrist. Here is a man who can't get over being just a common German soldier who has rocked the world with his own demonic power.

But that is not the most important aspect of the story. Why was Von Brauchitsch removed? The tussle between the Nazi party and the army is one of long standing. Hitler intervened on the side of the army in the purge of Roehm. The party had its revenge in

the purge of Von Fritsch and the ouster of Von Beck. In Von Brauchitsch it seemed that Hitler had the man he needed to keep his control over the army. He was a good politician, he was a loyal Nazi, he had a record of faithful service in the Reichswehr. Hitler had a further control over him, having made it possible for him to obtain a divorce, which he could not afford, along with payments to his wife. Hitler provided him the money out of his secret funds. It does not seem quite fair for Hitler to blare out that he has made all the big decisions so far and then dismiss his commander-in-chief if it is because of a setback in Russia. But the logical explanation must be that Von Brauchitsch is a scapegoat and that Hitler very much needs a scapegoat. And the fact that Germany has been badly beaten both in Russia and in Libya makes Hitler's decision look like an act to get the German Army wholly in his own hands. This is a deed of fear. Ominous possibilities may rise like phantoms to torment Hitler. He is driven to make his personal position still stronger, and he does so with a frenzy that reveals his weakness.

PROBLEMS AHEAD : CO-ORDINATION AND EDUCATION

December 23, 1941

Two objectives are being served in the historic conferences now being held in the White House. One is immediate. It is the tremendous task of co-ordinating the war against the Axis. The other is not so obvious. It is the education of the American nation, and indeed all the nations which are fighting the Axis, in the problems of waging global warfare. This process of education can't be direct, but it is essential, for the people of the democracies will not be at their best at military and industrial fighting if they do not begin to stretch their minds to the almost immeasurable scope of this war. The more an individual knows about it, the more humbling is the effect on him of serious study of the intricacies of war on three continents. And a degree of humility by democratic citizens will make for a better morale on both the fighting and the home fronts.

When the problem of war effort on the various theatres has been somewhat simplified there arises the problem of supply, and this is a second dimension of headaches and heartaches. What shall be manufactured and where? Will there be enough of it? Will it arrive on time? Which theatre is to get what, and which is to get it first? How is it to be sent? How is it to be protected? Supply is just as much of the war as fighting. There must be co-ordination between the supply programmes of all industrial Allied nations,

Bearing in mind that Allied war production is still far behind the needs, deft leadership will be needed to administer supply so as to obtain the maximum results from the weapons at hand. And finally there must be great elasticity in the whole concept of co-operation.

The men in Washington may hammer out a programme, they may obtain the adherence of all the anti-Axis powers to it—and yet they must have leeway if they are to pounce upon the Axis, if the opening is presented, or to improvise an effective defence against an Axis surprise. The more one catalogues the problems the more gigantic appears the task to which Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt, and other Allied leaders have put their shoulders. The last World War was man's greatest co-operative effort. But this one calls for co-operation on a scale many times greater. And I repeat, the leaders cannot master it without mind-stretching by the citizens of the democracies. They must understand what is at stake, and if they do understand, they will have something like awe at the times they live in.

CHRISTMAS EVE. WAR IS THE BREAKDOWN OF PEACE

December 24, 1941

It need not strike anyone as incongruous to think about peace this Christmas Eve. If ever there were an evening to think about peace, this one is fitting, since the whole world is at war. Anyone who does not think of peace to-night with fervour and determination must be indifferent indeed. In past Christmases there was easy-going praise of peace, for which people were thankful but did not fully understand that peace was a personal and national responsibility. As some of you will have heard me say before, war is the breakdown of peace. So since there is war to-night, the peace has been allowed to break down, and that took place over a period of many years. It was no sudden breakdown, it was adequately foreseen, eloquent warnings were given, but they went unheeded. So the thought of peace to-night cannot be incongruous, it must be the most sharply shaped thought in the mind of every responsible person.

Of all the countries at war, the United States goes into Christmas with fewer of the ravages and the personal tragedies known in many other lands. But since the United States is now in the fellowship of the war it is becoming to make a survey of Christmas as it is being experienced elsewhere.

Christmas Day was just an hour old when the Japanese bombers raided Manila again. So Manila lies to-night in darkness and danger; every Philippine community is gripped by the gravity of the peril

that threatens the commonwealth. Already the count mounts of the Philippine homes where some member of the family either has paid his sacrifice for independence or is in the firing line making his contribution.

Christmas in Europe is a celebration of the spirit, for it cannot be a season of material generosity or gladness. Short rations, reduced fuel, impoverishment to the point of pauperism are the rule in large areas of the continent. In regions like Poland and Yugoslavia hideous persecution adds to the bitterness of the suffering. In regions like Norway, Holland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and France the ruthless heel of military dictatorship rests almost on the bodies of the inhabitants. But one can say of most of these countries that if there are few candles burning to-night, there is more hope than burned last Christmas. The Germans are being thrown back in Russia, the United States in the war. Last Christmas most of these lands prayed for liberation. This Christmas they can see into the future with expectation.

In Germany itself the nation is wrestling with shortages and is shaken in spirit, by the defeat in the East and by the signs of upheaval in the High Command. The German radio, the other night, struck this note: "Let us," it said, "make this Christmas a Christmas of enchantment. Let us imagine that we have a Christmas sausage, and marzipan and Christmas cakes, and that the pleasure of making gifts has been restored to us. Then the memory of this Christmas will be our deepest experience." Christmas in Germany this year is less than ever before a festivity of Christendom. The German radio has omitted any reference that Christmas is a religious festival. Last Sunday two home talks deliberately emphasized the paganism of Nazi teachings. There was the reminder of the *Wintersonnenwende*—the day when the winter sun begins its change—which was described as the pristine festival of Nordic man. One speaker said this: "With every candle we light on Christmas Day, for us and for our children, we should remember that it was through the Fuehrer that a new light was lit in our movement and through the world."

In Great Britain are much of the same poverty and shortages as in the rest of Europe, but the British have had no more gladsome Christmas celebration since the outbreak of the war. They have the immediate refreshment of the British victory in Libya, the enormous encouragement of the German defeat in Russia, and they rejoice at the visit of Mr. Churchill to Washington with all its promise of all-out collaboration of the two great democracies. Having the United Nations in the war may not have turned out to be quite the mercy the British public had anticipated, for it was

not well instructed about the risks in the Far East. But if the entry of the United States in the war lies like lead in the hearts of rank-and-file Germans, it gives a corresponding lift to the British. They have been lonely since a year ago June, and it is human to prefer to face great dangers with company than to face them alone. It is not a Christmas in England of handsome presents and plum puddings and steaming roasts, but it is a season of sober and profound faith.

I want to quote a passage from President Roosevelt's words at the lighting of the community tree at Washington, and one from Prime Minister Churchill's words on the same occasion. "There is demanded of us," said the President, "the preparation of our hearts, the arming of our hearts. And when we make ready our hearts for the labour and suffering and the ultimate victory which lie ahead, then we observe Christmas Day, with all its memories and all its meanings, as we should." "Let the children have their night of fun and laughter," said Mr. Churchill. "Let us grown-ups share to the full in their unstinted pleasure before we turn again to the stern task and the formidable years that lie before us, resolved that by our sacrifice and daring these same children shall not be robbed of their inheritance or denied their right to live in a free and decent world."

And now may I express my own wish that each of you has an unashamedly happy Christmas in the spirit of these exalted words.

NEW YEAR'S EVE—1941—YEAR OF DECISION

December 31, 1941

ONE would have to go back to the year 1776 to find in American history a year to rank in importance with the one which is coming to a close to-night. It has been a year not only of fateful decisions, it also has been a year of great discussion. It has been a year not only of great surprises, but a year of clarification of ideas. The year brought the United States into the war, and did so before we expected it. But we had thought through the role we were determined to play. We debated it from hamlet to metropolis. We were surprised only by the swiftness with which our enemies, understanding the meaning of our debate even better than we, struck at us. But before they struck, our ideas had become clear and steady. We knew what the war was about, what our contribution had to be at a minimum, and we knew we would make it a maximum contribution if the need became apparent.

Looking back over the year, one sees that it was dominated by two chief events: Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union and the entry of the United States into the war. In these two events the war assumed its destined proportions. It became global in fact, whereas before it had been global only potentially. Of these two events the entry of the United States is the one which is most familiar to us but which perhaps we fail to see in perspective, even now. If anyone could have broadcast on last New Year's Day what this year was to bring forth, he would have appeared irrational, to put it kindly. Remember a year ago the United States had only recently gone through the election campaign, which had ended on the stay-out-of-war note. By January first a change had set in. The President was about to deliver his special message to Congress calling for all-out aid for the democracies and defining the Four Freedoms. But even then we were at such a distance from entering the war that anyone with a sense of the slow tempo of change in national opinion would not have dreamed it was possible that by fall we should be in a shooting war in the Atlantic, and that by November the salient parts of the Neutrality Act would be repealed.

Our change-over did not come on December seventh, as we may be tempted to think. December seventh came because of our change-over. This transformation of American thought and policy in 1941 deserves to be narrated in history as one of the most remarkable events in the life of any nation. It is well to stress that it was democracy at work, and it was at work in a setting of vaster size than democracy has ever dominated before. During this year everyone has had his say. And everyone has had his earful, too. For the scientific age has brought everyone into communication with everyone. And it undoubtedly is true that in the smallest town of America this year a greater proportion of inhabitants heard all about the issues than did Philadelphia itself in the spring of 1776. Probably never in all history have so many people taken part in a discussion of public policy as in America during this year.

In this period the leadership by President Roosevelt has been both patient and constructive. There was criticism of the step-at-a-time progress. But if a nation was going to see the issues of the war, this was the way the panorama could be taken in. And it was as desirable as it was inevitable that the country should decide first what it believed, before counting the consequences of its belief. It is the essence of faith that it does not look first at the price label. And the faith of America was defined, formulated, and adopted before the swift blow of December seventh. If it had not been, there would have been no war in the Pacific and no parallel declarations of war by Germany and Italy.

But American faith was not only enshrined in words, it was expressed in preliminary deeds. The President called for aid to the democracies on January sixth. The Lend-Lease Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives four days later. It passed the House February eighth; it passed the Senate March eighth; it became law March eleventh. On April tenth the United States took over the protection of Greenland. On April thirtieth Mr. Roosevelt announced that the navy would patrol the defence zones. Less than a month later the Office of Civilian Defence was set up. Two weeks later all Axis assets in the United States were frozen and all Nazi consulates were closed.

Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on June twenty-second; on June twenty-fourth the President promised all aid to Russia. On July seventh the United States established its base on Iceland. On August first the sale of aviation gasoline to Japan was forbidden. Then followed the notable Atlantic meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and when it ended the Atlantic Charter was on the war books as the first authentic peace formula that the Allied side had produced. It was produced not only with American concurrence but with American participation. On September eleventh the President ordered the navy, in its patrol duties in the Atlantic, to shoot at sight. Five days later the navy took over, protecting all shipments as far as Iceland. By October twenty-seventh the President could tell the country that the shooting war had begun. And by November eleventh the Neutrality Act was amended to permit arming of merchant ships and ending restricted zones. This was a few days after the billion-dollar Lend-Lease aid had been extended to Russia, and it was at the same time that the final negotiations with Japan were getting under way.

The climax of those negotiations was the memorandum handed by Secretary Hull to the two Japanese envoys reaffirming the major principles of American foreign policy, probably the best statement of American faith to have been produced since the last war. Passing over those events in rapid review, they lose their dramatic impact. But for my part, a newspaperman for more than thirty years, I want to testify that I have never seen so deep, swift, and genuinely exciting a change work itself out in the thought and policy of a self-governing nation. Simply to watch it, and to record it, has been one of the most stirring experiences of my life.

The other great event of the year was Hitler's attack on Russia. When it was made, very few persons outside of Russia had any idea that it would turn out as it has. I was in London in the middle of July and had a long talk with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr.

Maisky. This was in the days when the Germans were rolling forward relentlessly. The Germans had a terrific reputation in those days, built up in Poland, in Norway, in Holland, Belgium, and France, and then in Yugoslavia, Greece, and North Africa. But Mr. Maisky, who is a man of shrewd and hard judgment—as far removed from being a romancer as one could find—told me that the Russians would be able to strike back. And he said what seemed incredible then: “I *think* we shall even be able to save Moscow.”

What the Russian campaign has cost the Germans in men and materials is prodigious. But what it has cost them in prestige is even more prodigious. One trembles to think what the world would have been like had the Russian armies crumpled as all the previous armies the Germans had encountered. The myth of German invincibility might well have lain like lead on the human race and held it down in docile slavery for decades. But now the nations fighting Hitler have proof of the vulnerability of Hitler's military machine. And, what is just as vital to victory, the Germans themselves have lost their own sense of high destiny. They were entitled to it on overwhelming evidence up to October. But now something is gone, not only from their armour, but from their morale, which is as essential to victory as armour.

That is not to say that German strength in the East is broken. The military machine Hitler has built is still more powerful than the combined military machines against him. But if Hitler had marched into Moscow in December, and the doorway to the Caucasus had been open to him for winter operations, he then would have had the mastery of Europe, the control of lands, mines, and oil fields, and be in sight of dominance of the continent.

In 1940 Hitler miscalculated when he failed to invade the British Isles after winning the battle of northern France. In 1941 he miscalculated in not knowing Russian reserves, Russian fighting capacity. The attack on Russia could have been justified by quick success. Now, no matter how strongly German forces can strike early next spring, it is too late for him to win that justification. And his victory next spring is no foregone conclusion, no more so than was victory this fall.

The review of the year must end with the war in the Far East. This has been one of the hardest experiences this country has had to bear. The initial weakness of the United States in the Pacific as to sea and air power was something for which the public was not prepared. But it could not have been told about it in advance, as anyone with a sense of the elements of war will appreciate. The catastrophe of Pearl Harbour has had some bearing on the plight

of the Philippines, but it has not determined that plight. The naval forces of the United States were divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific as part of the Battle of the Atlantic, and only those with the gift of prophecy can say that that division of forces was misguided.

The initial weakness in the Pacific was well known to those responsible for American policy, and it did not weaken their stand on American faith. When Secretary Hull wrote his fateful declaration of American principles and handed it to Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, he knew all about the initial weakness of the United States in the Far East. And the only legitimate criticism of his firmness would be from those who would have had him whittle down on those principles because certain American battle-ships were too far away to defend the Philippines. We always could have had peace in the Far East if we had been willing to hand over the people of China, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, and, ultimately, of Australia and New Zealand, to Japanese domination. In the same spirit we could have had peace with Hitler if we had been willing to have him dominate the free nations of Europe. It may be that the Japanese, by striking with greater strength and preparation than we had anticipated, are winning earlier and more lasting successes than had been believed probable. That is not yet to be judged. But it still would be true that the difference would be only as to speed. We had not expected them to be able to dispose over air strength of the effectiveness which has been shown. But it need be no secret that the general position of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East was foreseen, and whatever the next weeks or months will bring will not be unexpected by the heads of the administration. It may be coming sooner than they had reasonably hoped, and the time is no small disappointment. But the time is not of the essence of the problem in the long view.

It may be said in conclusion that any dismay felt over the Japanese at Pearl Harbour, and since, has had its very real compensations. It has set the United States to work, and set it to planning on a scale that would have been hard to introduce in the flush of earlier successes. So that the United States, having traversed the distance from a year ago to the doorway of the war by November, will leap over the early period of getting under way slowly. We shall get into the war with full power, full production, and full determination, and, with a sense of the size of the job, more quickly than any other country that has been drawn into the war.

YEAR OF STRAIN—A LOOK AHEAD

January 1, 1942

To look into 1942 is a somewhat sombre undertaking. But it may have struck you that the preview of the year is not fundamentally different to Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Tojo of Japan, and Hitler. The Japanese Premier warned his people that even if Japan wins early successes the war will be long because the United States still has to develop its full strength. Hitler celebrated New Year's by not making his annual promise that the war is about to end in German victory. These two Axis leaders concur in the main thesis of Mr. Churchill, that this will be a hard year for the Allies, in that they will be marshalling their forces while bearing heavy blows. And yet it will not be a year of Axis victory. Obviously the agreement ends there, for Mr. Churchill looks confidently to 1943, when the Allies can begin campaigns of liberation and plan for their attacks on the home citadels of the Axis Powers in Europe and Asia.

In the United States the year offers certain tangible and invaluable promises. There is to be twenty-four-hour production seven days a week in munitions industries. It will be undisturbed by stoppages due to labour disputes. The most significant statement for America as to this year was President Roosevelt's mention of a programme of spending on the war effort at the rate of fifty billion dollars of a hundred-billion-dollar national income by the end of the year. The magnitude of the figure is beyond grasp, and it is no use trying to get the meaning of it by saying that the government will be spending so and so many million dollars a day. Nor is the figure to be regarded simply as a vast programme of appropriations by Congress. The President wasn't thinking in terms of voting money but of producing. And it will be a colossal feat to produce for the war up to half of our national income. It is easy enough to vote money; it is quite different actually to spend money. That takes organization, new plans, the assembly of labour and materials; all told, it is a complete transformation of our habits of life. What it will mean to civilians is almost beyond imagination to foresee. Normally a nation consumes what it produces, all but a margin of savings. Now the nation is to produce with half its labour things it cannot consume, like planes, tanks, guns. So it will have to cut down its consumption. The wages and salaries will be paid, and half the wages and salaries theoretically should be going to buy planes and tanks and guns. All that is not invested in these or saved will be competing for the goods on the market. And as

the consumers' goods will be reduced in quantity, this competition will tend to drive up prices.

It is plain that there are two ways to tackle the problem of rising prices. One is to take away the money from consumers by taxes and forced loans, the other is to control prices by police methods. It is impossible to take away *half* of all wages and salaries by taxation. But more will be taken away than ever dreamed of before in our history.

If the nation is to devote half its productive effort to making planes, tanks, and guns, it is obvious that its standard of living will decline. And this decline in the standard of living is going to be the average American's contribution to the war. He will serve his country if he accepts this reduction in good spirit, that is, if he understands that this is his service to his country and that the sacrifices will not be for always, but will be necessary so that when the war is over he can look forward to living in a free world. And in this free world he can legitimately expect a still higher standard of life than he had before the war. For with all the creation of new industrial capacity, the United States will emerge from the war the most powerful industrial nation of the world and more powerful industrially than normal peaceful living would have made possible.

But it appears as though 1942 were going to put a great strain on Americans. If it brings heavy Axis blows, and a certain measure of Axis successes, and calls on Americans to reduce their standard of life at the same time, much patience, much clear thinking, and a high degree of faith will have to be accepted with resignation, shortages will have to be borne, good things like education will have to be cut down, and the wide range of non-essentials in home life will have to be narrowed almost to the vanishing point. To achieve this within the year will be a triumph of organization and dispatch. But that is what it means for the nation to devote half its productive capacity to the war effort.

This is the level at which the British already are living. Our lot always will be somewhat better than theirs because we shall not have to wrestle with shortages of food and clothing. The Germans and Japanese too are spending half their national income on the war, but that leaves them at a much lower standard of life than the one we shall enjoy if we do the same. The Japanese, in fact, are approaching such a low standard that they begin to have a slowing up of production. And the German rate of production will not get higher. It already is at its peak. On the other hand, by putting half our national effort into the war we, and our associates in the war, will so outdistance Germany and Japan combined that the final victory is assured. That is the faith we shall need

as the year brings greater and greater privations. And we shall need it while we endure the frustrations of *not* having the crushing military successes we crave. Spiritually it is going to be an uphill year. It will be the greatest test this country has known since the Civil War. And in some ways it will be a still greater, because it will affect almost every person in the country, drastically and indeed disagreeably.

As to the military prospects of the year, it is possible only to suggest where the strains and stresses will be. The Allies will be on the defensive in the Far East, striving with might and main to hold Singapore and so to be able to continue the protection of the Dutch East Indies and Australia, and to hold the gateway open into China, and to keep Japan out of the Indian Ocean. The Germans, after a winter of feverish production, will prepare to smash again at Russia, expecting to complete the promised destruction of the Soviet Army. During the year—sooner rather than later—Hitler probably will make a drive at either or both ends of the Mediterranean. He may aim through Turkey at Suez, or through Spain and North Africa, at both the African west coast and Egypt. The long-threatened invasion of Britain may be attempted, and, if not actually tried, it will be kept so much in the forefront of possibility as to confine most of Britain's army and equipment to the home base. The initiative is still with the Axis, and will remain with the Axis for at least part of the year. But Axis superiority will lessen month by month. As the Allies grow stronger, Axis morale will decline, if not at the front, certainly behind the front.

While this goes on the centre of the Allied supply effort, and the centre of the direction of the Allied campaigns, excepting in Russia, will move to the United States.

This country has resisted world leadership. If ever a people tried to decline having greatness thrust upon them it is the Americans. But in this year of 1942 the American nation will either prove itself worthy to be considered great or the outcome of the war is in doubt. And no American with a sense of reality can believe that it is.

PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE NATION

January 6, 1942

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT's report on the state of the nation, delivered to Congress to-day, is to be commended for reading and rereading to everyone, not only to citizens of the United States, not only to citizens of the nations associated with the United States in the war,

but also to the rulers of the nations we are fighting. The text will be available to these rulers, even if they forbid its being read by the subjects whom they rule. The United States declared war on Japan on December eighth and on Germany and Italy December eleventh, but the real declaration of war came to-day. It was this report to the American people, and the full disclosure to them of what the war is to require in effort, in sacrifice, and in spirit. One can thumb through state papers of our entire history without finding a call of such dimensions, and though it is so great as not to be within the compass of easy imagination, there was something so concrete, clear, and frank in every phrase of the address that its final effect on Americans and Allies has been, and will continue to be, inspiring. And its effect on the leaders of the Axis, one can well believe, will be to alarm them and to put desperate speed into their efforts in the months that lie just ahead.

Since our entry into the war America has been in a necessarily grim, angry, but not exalted mood. It has watched the price being exacted for inadequate preparations and imperfect watchfulness. It has been facing the reality of the cost that total war would surely take in lives and dislocations and lower standards of living. But there has not been the vision of achievement, nor expression of the high aims which the achievement is to fulfil, not in the uplifting vigour such as moved the President to-day. The President himself has not been ready to present the whole picture of the war. Prime Minister Churchill could not do it for him. Not until the meeting between them drew to a close with its great decisions could such a picture be unfolded. To-day it was presented with courageous candour and in words of the President's deepest aspirations.

The address, to describe it further, was full of news. To-day Mr. Roosevelt revealed that our war programme for the coming fiscal year is to cost \$56,000,000,000, or more than half our estimated national income. We had known that the production of planes, tanks, and guns would be stepped up. But Mr. Roosevelt told just how much, and the figures are not dry statistics—in them is running the juice of victory.

"The superiority of the United States in munitions and ships," said the President, "must be overwhelming, so overwhelming that the Axis nations can never hope to catch up with it. The United States must produce arms not only for our own forces, but also for the armies, navies, and air forces fighting on our side. . . . Let no man say," he added, "that it cannot be done. It must be done. And we have undertaken to do it. Our task is hard, our task is unprecedented, and the time is short," he went on. "We must strain

every existing armament-producing facility to the uttermost. We must convert every available plant and tool to war production. That goes all the way from the greatest plants to the smallest, from the huge automobile industry to the village machine shop."

Meaningful though these figures and assurances are, they do not constitute the crux of what Mr. Roosevelt had to say. Let me repeat one passage verbatim: "American armed forces," he said, "must be used at any place in all the world where it seems advisable to engage the forces of the enemy. In some cases these operations will be defensive, in order to protect key positions. In other cases operations will be offensive, in order to strike at the common enemy, with a view to his complete encirclement and eventual total defeat."

And when and how will it end? "It will end," said the President, "just as soon as we make it end, by our combined efforts, our combined strength, our combined determination to fight through and work through until the end—the end of militarism in Germany and Italy and Japan. Most certainly we shall not settle for less."

SOME FRUITS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY

January 13, 1942

ANY man who ever set out a fruit tree knows the excitement that comes in picking the early fruit. Something like this excitement should be felt by all Americans in watching the conference of American foreign ministers at Rio de Janeiro. For years the people of the United States have been raising a fruit tree called the Good Neighbour policy. It has taken years to bring it to maturity. Much solicitude, skill, and faith have been invested in it. The policy has been the special consideration of the Roosevelt administration and the State Department under Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles. But it is not a Democratic party policy. It had its beginnings under Republican administrations. It is in no way a partisan product; it is truly national, and it is the expression of the best thinking and the best ethics of the American people. The policy has not been without its lapses, and there have been American representatives in Latin America who were not imbued with fervour for it. But that is the human way, and on the whole more sincere and determined effort has gone into the Good Neighbour policy than any other phase of our foreign relations. It would be wrong to say the tree has not yet borne fruit, and that the Rio conference is to be the first time that the worth of the tree is going to be tested,

But in a peculiar way it is the first great test of the policy. The United States is at war. As a Western Hemisphere power it has been attacked. And now the moment has arrived to translate into reality the fine words about solidarity which have been poured by the bucketful from all Pan-American conferences in the past. This time solidarity must mean something solid, not something high-sounding.

An important success, the joint military board with Mexico, already is in the fruit basket. The eight countries which still have not declared war or broken relations with the Axis are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Uruguay is to introduce the joint resolution calling for severance of diplomatic relations. If Mr. Welles can bring home this resolution with Argentina's adherence it will be of unique gratification to him. Without Argentina it still will count as superb fruit from the tree. And it will be fruit not only for the men who have worked hardest to establish the Good Neighbour policy, but for the country as a whole, which has supplied the enthusiastic approval without which it could not have been carried through.

SHIPPING, MUNITIONS, AND RAW MATERIALS POOL ANNOUNCED

January 27, 1942

THE announcement of the pooling of munitions, shipping, and raw materials by the United Nations under Anglo-American direction is an event like a high mountain most of which is hidden by clouds. Here is centralized control going far beyond what was established in the last war or ever before. In the last war there was no pool of raw materials. The British and French had a pool of sorts, but it included the French Empire, and though the French proposed a complete pool the British declined. Allied and neutral shipping in the last war was centrally and rigorously controlled, but not by so simple and direct a system as now has been set up. And in the last war a pool of munitions was there only in a vague way since the need for a world-wide pool was not present as it is to-day. To-day raw materials of the United Nations are pooled, the munitions made from them are pooled, and the ships to carry them are pooled. But this means more than control of war production and shipping; it means control affecting all economy. In the United States and Great Britain priorities already are in operation. Now control is extended to the economies of the Western Hemisphere. Russia and China are nominally affected, but obviously they will

be receiving goods rather than supplying much for the present in the way of raw materials or ships.

The shipping pool is quite as far-reaching as the pool of raw materials. Indeed we are living in a time with a new measure of economic value. The measure is a ton of shipping. A nation is no richer than its available transportation. The United Nations are as strong as their pooled shipping. Once we lived by a system in which value was measured in gold. But to-day the measure is shipping. You have goods, say, in Philadelphia, for which the market is Brazil or England or Australia. If you can't ship them, they are worth little to you. Some commodities are going to be shipped, some aren't. Those that aren't are temporarily without value.

Ships are going to carry munitions from the United States to all parts of the world. They are going to carry men. What will they bring back on the return voyage? What the persons who operate the pools judge to be of first use in the war effort. More ships will be going to England now; that means that more goods from England can get shipping space than formerly. What will be sent? Things needed in this country, or in Latin America, that the English can produce better than we, or that England has on hand to send at the moment the shipping is there. And so in Australia and Iran and Suez. The pool of shipping is like the policeman controlling the traffic. If he signals, it moves or it stands still. The effect is going to be felt not only in the matter of munitions and immediate war supplies. It will touch people in all the nations to be reached by shipping and where imports and exports are part of national needs.

Civilians in the United States, in Great Britain, in the British Commonwealth, and in Latin America have overnight become members in the temporary world economic superstate. It is more extensive and more powerful by far than the world economic superstate that emerged during the last war, or any that has ever been or ever was contemplated before.

SINGAPORE COMPARED TO COLLAPSE OF FRANCE

February 11, 1942

It is being said all over the world to-day that the loss of Singapore represents the worst Allied disaster since the collapse of France. That undoubtedly is true. But it is not true that positions *after* the two disasters are comparable. The position after the collapse of France was far more hopeless than it is to-day. To-day the situa-

tion is dark indeed. It presents elements of the greatest danger. But after the collapse of France there was almost nothing to redeem the picture. The odds were so heavily against Britain that it appeared as though only a miracle could keep the war going. It may be helpful to compare the two situations. After the fall of France, Britain lay twenty-one miles away from the foe. Its only equipped army had been shattered in Flanders, and part of its personnel had been rescued without equipment at Dunkirk. The country was not well organized for production; its land defences were utterly inadequate; its air force was only beginning to take shape. It is true that British sea power remained; so did the resources of the Empire. But after the fall of France, sea power could not be trusted to stave off invasion, and the air force was too small to cope with the giant air fleet of the Luftwaffe. The United States had not been able to send to France the sky-filling squadrons of planes for which Premier Reynaud so piteously begged. It could not send them to Britain either. It did not have them. It did send small arms, but American aid at that moment was of pathetic inadequacy. The Germans, on the other hand, were in the bright lustre of their then invincibility. They had chewed up Poland with their mechanized jaws. They had crushed Holland and Belgium. They had forced the capitulation of France. Their air power was intact, their losses negligible. Simply as a calculation, Nazi might compared with British might, at that moment, was overwhelming. No one in a mood for analysis could be certain that the British would not be conquered. The Churchill government might abandon the base of the British Isles and cross the Atlantic, to carry on the war, but that would be meaningless unless in due time it was certain that the United States was going to enter the war. Even then a war against the Nazis without a European base offered little hope. We all know that the Nazis delayed the attack on the British Isles so as to finish off France. We know that Lord Beaverbrook, with his unconventional and un-British frenzy, got enough Hurricanes off the production lines to break the air armadas later sent to subdue the British cities. We know that the British, under Mr. Churchill's inspiring leadership, moulded a spirit of resistance that was stronger than modern weapons. The tide of disaster slowly turned, and the Nazis had failed to register their overwhelming power. They had not been as overwhelming as the statistics. That is all history now. But even the sketchiest reference to the facts shows that the position to-day is basically different. To-day Nazi power is not statistically overwhelming. On the contrary, Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia must rank as a misjudgment on a par with his failure to yank the British apple from the twig when he had

it in his hand. Statistically the Nazi Army is stronger than the Russian in mechanized equipment and air power, but weaker in numbers and definitely weaker in available reserves. That is, leaving British Commonwealth and American man-power completely out of account. The British now have man-power enough to hold the home base. They have a surplus, though not a large enough one, for campaigns at the outposts that need to be defended. And the vast United States has come into the war with man-power already far along in training and equipment.

The combined air production of Britain, Russia, and the United States is now greater than the Axis air production. It is certain to become far greater by the end of the year. And if the war were being fought without the dimension of Japan, it would be utterly plain to everyone that, barring unforeseen developments, Hitler was going to be contained in Europe and could be beaten down. Japan, however, is in the picture, and no one can truthfully minimize the consequences. I am not trying to do so. I am only comparing the entirely differing situations, to-day and in June 1940. Giving the fullest credit to Japan for what it has done and still can do, one sees that to-day the Axis forces are at their peak. Germany cannot increase its power; it can only use the ever-dwindling margin of superiority still left to it. Japan cannot increase its power. It is striking in its fullest might right now. But British power is now coming to its prime. American power can expand with all the vigour of the most productive nation on earth. And Russian power, though badly crippled industrially, is still considerable industrially and can count on a large supply of men. So though we now stand at the lowest point since the collapse of France, we stand at a far higher level of strength than then and are developing our strength at an almost infinitely greater rate of speed.

This is not an argument that the United Nations are safe and bound to win. It is simply an assessment of the position to-day as compared with June 1940.

As to the certainty of victory, one has his judgment and his faith. Churchill, after Dunkirk, had his judgment, backed up by mighty faith. A similar faith is much better buttressed to-day. But to say that one has faith that the United Nations will win the war is not to disprove that they *can* lose. War is putting the power of nations to the arbitration of force. The leaders of a nation who deliberately go to war must be convinced they will win. Hitler believed he could beat continental Europe when he attacked Poland, and he was right. Then he believed he could destroy the Russian armies. So far he has been wrong. Japan believed it could

conquer what it wanted in the Far East and hold it. It has about cleared the way to make conquests. It still has to hold them. We believed we could delay Japan with the forces in hand. We were wrong. If the outcome were a sure thing, the attacking nation, if certain of its defeat, would not attack. Japan was sure of success. It knew how carefully it had prepared for the triumphs now being achieved. We who didn't dream of these preparations were wrong in our judgments. And any analysis of whether we are going to win or lose ought in all honesty to be left open. But it is essential to know, in terms of faith, that we are *determined* to win. Otherwise we might be tempted to let the pleasing statistics fight for us, which statistics just won't do.

There is bound to be an element of risk in a major war. That means that *any* modern war *can* be lost. That is why it is a challenge to the total effort of a people. The present position is one of great danger. This year is sure to ring with dreadful alarms. But to be reminded again of June 1940, a frenzy of production and a fullness of courageous faith again can surmount every peril. The faith will cushion the blow of bad news. The production and the will to win will prepare the ultimate victory.

INQUEST INTO SINGAPORE

February 12, 1942

THE inquest into the loss of Singapore already has begun. Such inquests are the inevitable accompaniments of defeat in democracies. The people trust their leaders, and if their leaders fail they hold them to account. It can't be otherwise under the system. But inquests in wartimes are painful affairs, and the post-mortem of Singapore promises to be one of the most painful. This one, however, will be somewhat different, for the fall of Singapore was foredoomed by Japan's first successes in the Pacific. And it leads back quite as much to the indifference of democratic nations to danger as to poor leadership. One needs look back only a short time in our own history to the days when those who cried danger were called warmongers. Active preparation in the south-west Pacific had to be done behind a veil of secrecy. We still don't know how effectively it could be done, under the necessity of avoiding agreements with our future allies and forbidding concrete plans for collaboration.

Another difference between the post-mortem over Singapore and that, let us say, over Crete is that the blame is international. The United States has its responsibility, the British have theirs. But

for Americans to blame the British, and the British to blame us, would not make for a constructive result, which should be the one purpose of such an inquest. It might relieve feelings, but even that would be at a costly price. For no one can seriously think the war is going to be won by the United Nations demonstrating that they are not united.

The need for the inquest lies in the undeniable truth that the Allied nations really know only vaguely why Singapore fell. They have a general outline. Here and there, part of the facts are known. One can cite the reports of the last-minute inadequacies of British preparations on the Malay Peninsula. These are well enough attested. But they are not more than a fraction of the story itself. In broad outline, one can start by saying that if the war in the south-west Pacific had been preponderantly naval, Singapore would not have fallen. As a naval position, supported by Hong Kong and Manila, it would have been what it was supposed to be, invulnerable. It would have kept the Japanese locked in the Pacific. It would have prevented conjunction of Japanese and German forces, now so greatly feared. But the war turned out to be different from expectations. It was not preponderantly naval. Japan won its early attacks with land and air forces. And it could do so for a number of reasons. First comes the surrender of French Indo-China to Japanese domination. In a sense Singapore was lost in Vichy. For in Vichy, action determined that a naval defence in the south-west Pacific would no longer be enough. Now what we don't know, and what an inquest would bring out, is how much was done after it was clear that the Japanese would have these advanced land and air bases in Indo-China. Nobody will say that nothing was done, for there were signs of a great deal happening. For one thing, the United States applied an embargo against Japan, a way of saying, "Don't go farther or it will be war." So Washington knew war was quite possible. For another thing, the talks between the ABCD powers began. You will recall them. The admirals and generals and air officers began meeting around, at Manila, at Batavia, at Hong Kong, at Singapore. How aware these clubby officers were of the danger, only they and their governments can say. But so far as Washington is concerned, it had to soft-pedal everything for fear of congressional and public criticism. This was in the era when no commitment could be made. And yet it was true then, as it became openly and unanswerably true on December seventh, that the burden of the fighting in a Pacific war would fall on the United States.

Vichy gave up the Indo-Chinese base to Japan on July twenty-third. Between that date and December seventh a great deal was

done in the way of preparation. How much was done an inquest would make clear. We know that air strength was sent to the Philippines, a great deal of it. We know that the reinforcements were not great enough to satisfy us or the ABCD powers, and that we were playing for time in the very days when we thought the Japanese were playing for time. If there was to be a war in the Pacific, we would much rather have had it a few months later. The Japanese chose the date for us.

In the surprise attack they wiped out some of the air power at Pearl Harbour and almost all of it on the Philippines. And if the bulk of the responsibility for the Pacific war rested with us, it is undeniable that after Pearl Harbour and the raids on the Philippines we were not able to discharge that responsibility with any effect whatsoever. This was clear, say, after the eighth of December. That did not leave much time for the British to fortify the Malay Peninsula or to send reinforcements of men and airplanes from Great Britain. It takes about three months to send supplies from the British Isles around the Cape to Singapore. Supplies could be diverted, and some did arrive at the Malay front in the last days of the resistance. These would be supplies intended, no doubt, for Libya. Assuming the British did not do what they could after December eighth, the time was short.

There was another miscalculation, and a sad one; nobody realized that the Japanese would make such a swift job of fighting their way through the Malay jungle. An inquest would be expected to determine whether, if this had been appreciated, there was time after December eighth to have made a defence that would have delayed the Japanese, delayed them long enough for Allied reinforcements to arrive. So the basic questions to be answered by any inquest would go beyond what the British did in the last frantic weeks, which obviously wasn't too good. An inquest would inquire what the leeway was for effective collaboration after Indo-China was occupied. That would lead to the state of public opinion in this country. Would it have tolerated effective measures of collaboration before war actually was declared? And the inquiry would come inevitably to the attacks on Pearl Harbour and the Philippine airfields, and their consequence to the whole concept of defence in the south-west Pacific. It is a vast subject, and if a temperate inquest could be held under temperate conditions, it would teach people a great deal about the problems of survival in this world of planes, tanks, and guns. It is learning the hard way, which is no doubt the democratic way.

THE INDIAN QUESTION

February 23, 1942

THAT a solution of the Indian question now lights the horizon is, in its vast scope, just as good news as the fall of Singapore in its vast scope was bad news. That is true even if it still has to come to pass. The solution may not be easy. It doesn't depend on the British simply saying to India: "Go ahead and take over your independence." It can't be done by giving the Congress party of Gandhi and Nehru the political control of all British India. The Indian Moslems, with their ninety millions, make up the world's largest minority, and they are not going to yield to the Congress party the control over their destinies. If India is to be independent, they want either a disproportionate representation in the government, so as to safeguard their rights, or they want certain Moslem regions to be declared independent of Hindu India, and to run it themselves in some form of loose federation with the rest of India. The Hindus refuse to give them more power in an independent India than their numbers entitle them to. And the Hindus are against an independent Moslem state with a large Hindu minority.

During the last few years, especially since the war, the British have moved toward granting independence to India. But they also have insisted, rightly or wrongly, that before it could be granted there must be an advance agreement that solved the differences of the Congress party and the Moslems. The solution offered by Congress leaders was that India should have its independence, *they* should have the power, and they would work out a solution with the Moslems. And they argued that so long as the British remained in the picture the Moslems would not be reasonable. But the British, feeling that they were the guarantors of Moslem rights, refused to solve the problem in that way. The charge has often been levelled against the British that they themselves created and kept alive the Moslem issue, and did so as a means to postpone giving India independence. A truer statement is that the British depend on Moslem opinion in many other parts of the world, and cannot afford the accusation that they have let the Moslems in India down. Here is a now familiar story, this triangle of conflicting interests, the Hindus, represented by the Congress party, the Moslems, and the British. And if the triangle were left to work out its own conflict, Indian independence might have to wait indefinitely.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

February 24, 1942

AN agreement was announced to day between the United States and Great Britain. In form it is an agreement postponing the settlement of Lend-Lease transactions, but in effect it is an agreement about the nature of the post-war world. As neither the United States Government nor the British Government is able to reach a hard-and-fast agreement now about the post-war world, the signed document is necessarily limited to intentions. By the expression of intentions, it is important. And this agreement is so important that Wendell Willkie described it as the most significant and beneficial understanding between the nations in many years. "It is," he said, "a direct and positive step toward the enlargement of the trade areas of the world, and the recognition of the mutual economic interdependence of nations in a modern industrial society." In only one sense does the agreement postpone a settlement of Lend-Lease transactions. It recognizes that there can be no settlement without knowing how large the obligations will be. Then it recognizes that there can be no settlement which does not take into account the mutual interests of the United States and Great Britain. So it sets forth that when the settlement is made it will include the return to the United States of defence articles deemed by the President to be useful to the defence of the United States or the Western Hemisphere. It also will take into account Lend-Lease aid given to the United States by the United Kingdom. Then in Article Seven of the agreement comes the important message. It is put into long sentences and long words, which I shall try to translate into shorter ones. The final settlement shall be one that does not burden commerce between America and Britain. It shall improve it. It shall improve world-wide economic relations. America and Britain will take agreed action to expand production, employment, and the exchange of goods. They will eliminate all discriminations in their own foreign commerce and reduce tariffs and trade barriers. And they will do this in a form that permits other nations to join their effort for the same end. The purpose of the effort will be to carry out the economic objectives of the Atlantic Charter.

The first point that should register in this programme is that it means that the British drop imperial preferences. So this is an undertaking not only to carry out the terms of the Atlantic Charter, but to improve on the charter. For in that, you will recall, there was a reservation. The economic terms were to operate "with

due respect for existing obligations." And that plainly was Winston Churchill's concession to his own conservatives, who built up the system of imperial preferences. The British Government would not have signed an agreement which is a promise to do away with imperial preferences without consulting the Dominions. The Dominions, who were the partners in them, as in the last Ottawa agreement, would have to consent to see the system abandoned. So this agreement, for all its long words and sentences, gives notice of something historic and far-reaching. It is the end of a British attempt to glue together the parts of the Commonwealth, which already are free politically, by the cement of imperial preferences. And it is done voluntarily in exchange for a new world order.

To this new order the United States must also make its contribution. It is committed to the promise not to repeat the Smoot-Hawley tariff experience after the last war. For then the United States, though a creditor nation, built up a towering tariff wall that made debt payments next to impossible and did the opposite of increasing production and employment and the exchange of goods the world over. It did not build what this agreement calls "the material foundation of the liberty and welfare of all peoples." More recently the United States has followed a policy of reducing tariffs and wiping out trade discriminations and has made great progress in this direction. It is committed, by the Atlantic Charter, in these words: "to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." The new agreement is a step toward the fulfilment of this kind of world, without reservations. It says in effect that whatever the debtor-and-creditor relationship shall be, after the war, it is not to be permitted to prevent the return of prosperity. And it acknowledges that prosperity will be possible only by increasing production, employment, and the exchange of goods.

A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE—"DEFENCE" TO "OFFENCE"

February 28, 1942

A WEEK's events in the life of the United States in wartime are always absorbing. This week started off with the President's broadcast and then went on to witness a revolt of the farm bloc, which, if carried through, might precipitate a rise of prices. The question to answer about the week is whether something has developed

that is going to make the United States war effort more effective and speed it up. There has been such a development, and it isn't in the records of the government organization, or in changes of personnel, or in bills passed by Congress. It is a development in thinking. Looking ahead toward this year of strain and disappointment, which is going to inflict hardships on the American people and promises them not enough of military triumph, this change in thinking may be the most significant item of news that America has brought forth for many weeks. It is a change the British will recognize at once, for British minds have experienced it. It is a change from one word to another, one war concept to another, from the word "defence" to the word "offence." It is too early to say how important the change is going to be or how deep it is. But it looks like a natural change, for Americans in their history have been active, not passive, and the idea of waging war offensively, instead of waiting for it to be brought to a crisis by the enemy, expresses the American temperament, at least of former times. A number of happenings have combined to produce the change in American thinking this week. One of them is the President's broadcast. For though he did not preach offensive warfare, he did give the public a lesson in geography and strategy. He provided the background. Another happening was the shelling of an oil refinery on the Pacific coast by a Japanese submarine. It dawned on all Americans living on the coasts that they were vulnerable to attack. And that set into operation a frantic feeling that whatever happened to the war the first duty of the armed forces of the United States was to defend Americans, particularly on the coasts. Secretary of War Stimson addressed himself to this fear by saying that nothing was more likely to lose the war than listening to these frantic counsels. He pointed out that the war could be won only by concentrating forces for offensive action against the enemy.

SECOND CONTINGENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS ARRIVES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE BEGINNING OF A PLAN

March 4, 1942

THE arrival to-day of another contingent of American troops in northern Ireland is not something that just happened. It is part of a plan. So was the dispatch of the first contingent. The first contingent arrived, as you will recall, just as the Japanese were bearing down on Singapore. It was a coincidence, and it inevitably drove people to asking why, if troops could get to Ireland, they

could not get to the Far East. Of course part of the answer is that the two problems were not in the least similar, and sending troops to the Malay Peninsula or to the Philippines, without naval or air protection, was virtually impossible. Sending them to Ireland was not impossible. The other part of the answer was that the troops were sent to Ireland for a purpose. What purpose could not be disclosed. It would develop in due time. Now the second contingent arrives in Ireland, and this time it is Java which is being defended with insufficient strength. And again the question has to be asked, Why to Ireland and not to Java? Again the answer is in two parts. One part is the difficulty of sending reinforcements to Java, which is a physical one. It is chiefly limited by the available shipping in the Pacific. It is also limited by convoy requirements. American reinforcements *have* reached Java. They are fighting there. Mention is made to-day of a particular unit of Americans taking part in the gruelling warfare. These Americans are not army pilots or ground crews, about whom there also has been news from Java. It has to be assumed that as many Americans were sent to Java as was possible. The other part of the answer is that the troops landed in Ireland are sent there according to the same plan as governed the first contingent. Since it must be a plan of action, the public will know that it isn't suitable for disclosure, or even public speculation.

SHOP TALK—THE GOVERNMENT NEWS POLICY

March 18, 1942

AMERICAN Naval planes and Australian planes have scored the greatest air victory of the Pacific war since the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*. Twenty-three Japanese warships and auxiliaries were sunk or damaged at bases in New Guinea opposite Australia. Official comment made it plain that the results were achieved in a single attack.

I wish to spend most of my time to-night talking shop. It is about the policy on war news announced by the government. This is shop for me, but it is also shop for you. War news isn't like ordinary news, which in this country flows to the public limited only by the capacity of news gatherers and the discretion of editors. War news is a highly specialized field, dominated by requirements of military secrecy, and there is a constant conflict between normal news interest and military requirements. This conflict is in daily need of arbitration. There are news needs which may lead to unwise demands. There are officers whose training has not placed

much emphasis on the rights of the public. But the treatment of war news in a democracy is a matter of utmost importance. Unless the public knows that it is being told the truth—every bit of the truth that can be told without reducing the national security—it will lose faith in its leadership and the war effort will suffer. So two vital principles have to be formulated: the principle of what constitutes information of value to the enemy, and the principle of how frankly all the rest of the news is going to be told. The public to whom the news belongs has to know the rules. If it is going to believe, it must know precisely what limitations are being placed on news. And it will be watching closely to see that the rules are being observed. These rules cannot be general and vague. They have to be stated carefully and honestly. The public should memorize them, so that it can understand the news, or—what is now a routine—the absence of news.

The rules and principles have now been formulated and published. The principles are clear and satisfactory. We are told the news policy is based "upon the firm conviction that the people of a democracy are entitled to know the facts, whether they are good or bad, cheerful or depressing. On the other hand, our people," it is stated, "will willingly forgo knowledge of those facts whose revelation is likely to help the enemy to harm us." This is eminently satisfactory, and so is the next point, which reads: "Where there is conflict between consideration of public information and military security, every attempt is made to provide such form of publication as will inform the public while reducing the military risk to a minimum."

"Under no circumstances," it is stated, "does the government withhold news from publication on the ground that the news is bad or depressing. When news is deliberately withheld, it is withheld for reasons of military security." In other words, when news is withheld it is being done by servants of the public acting to promote the security of the nation, which *is* the public. There is no Brahmin caste in power, dispensing these matters as it ordains. As a matter of fact, *all* news belongs to the public in a democracy, all military news included, but the public doesn't care to injure itself by hearing the military secrets which would reduce its security. It does insist only that its agents and servants play the game and tell everything else. On these principles, and these principles alone, can the public have faith in the government and can the government depend on the trust of the public.

HEADACHES OF THE CRIPPS MISSION TO INDIA

March 23, 1942

GENERAL SIKORSKI, the Polish Premier, arrived in Washington today, and I mention him for a frivolous reason. He is the author of a good war story which appeared in the London *New Statesman* and *Nation*. On his way to Moscow on his recent visit he stopped at Jerusalem, and there, he recounts, he talked to a rabbi about the war. The rabbi expressed the view that the war might be won either by natural means or by a miracle. "By what natural means?" asked the Premier. "Since our cause is just," said the rabbi, "it would be natural to expect the intervention of providence on our side." "Well," said General Sikorski, "if the intervention of providence is the natural way of having a victory, how would it be done by a miracle?" "Clearly," said the rabbi, "it would be miraculous if we won it ourselves, without Divine intervention." The story is pertinent to many things in the news, but to none more than the arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps in New Delhi, and the task he confronts in negotiating an acceptance of British plans for achieving Indian independence.

It would be naïve for anyone to expect as the result of the Cripps mission that a document should be signed that of itself gives India its independence. Independence isn't conferred by a document signed by some other government, at least not by that alone. A nation, to be independent, has to function independently. And to function independently it needs domestic coherence. Britain can sign a document which would promise certain things, but it would not be the document but the action which would constitute Britain's abandoning the responsibility of ruling India. The action that would count most would be to close up the India Office in London. India now is governed, as to certain large matters like defence and foreign affairs, by the British Government through the Secretary for India. The final responsibility rests with the British Government. Once the final responsibility is taken away from Parliament in London, India would deal with London through the Dominions Office. The king still would be retained, but if other Dominion precedent is followed, the king would not be advised on Indian affairs by the British Government but by the Indian Government. And then India would be as independent as Canada or Australia. There the king is the same person as the British king but he has a separate official identity for each of the Dominions. And by this kind of divided personality of the

king, the British achieve the unity of the Commonwealth. Perhaps I should explain that in the British and Dominion system the king always does what he is advised. He has no discretionary powers whatever. It should be borne in mind that the development of the British Commonwealth is the one invention in government of any note in the last twenty years. It gives the Dominions independence, and yet it associates them in a voluntary league which, though something new in foreign relations, and something highly abstract, at the same time works out into a quite practical brotherhood in time of crisis. If Prime Minister Churchill is ready to abolish the India Office, that is more than a *declaration* of independence. That is part of the substance. And if the Indians can set up a council to advise the viceroy, and it has the support of the main elements in Indian life, and in a short time it can be based upon a legislative system, the responsibility of advising the king will pass to representatives of the Indian people. It will be by the establishment of such procedures, not by any flourish on a document, that India will gain independence. When the Congress Party Committee meets, as it did to-day, and says it must have complete independence, this is what it has in mind. But it won't be independence by an act of Britain's alone. A regime must be set up which is capable of governing. For if India were to fall into chaos and civil war, it wouldn't be independent, it would only be independent of Britain. I have heard people say that India has a right to have civil war and chaos if it wants. But they should think one step further. If a civil war gives a majority a chance to wipe out a minority, then the minority is getting mighty little independence. And obviously what the democracies want, when they urge independence for India, is independence for all Indians, the minorities included. It is highly unlikely that India *will* fall into civil war or chaos. But it is worth stressing that the Indians do have a responsibility in achieving independence, certainly as much as the British. They must agree on apportioning power among themselves in a way that assures a functioning and tolerable government. And as India is obsessed by some of the most complex minority problems in the world, this promises to be difficult. Where the hitch may come is that the Indian groups will want to install a provisional government and have it take over full responsibility right away, and the British will want it to be in operation for a time to prove itself. It will probably be a system based on loose federation, with a viceroy's council serving as a real Cabinet. But if the viceroy is to take his instructions from the Cabinet—which is the other way of saying that the king is being advised—there must be more than a provisional government sup-

porting the Cabinet. The most Sir Stafford Cripps can hope to do now is to get a provisional system going. For the first time the Indians are prompted to settle internal differences by a motive of danger. They may accept a not quite independent provisional government to get along with the defence of India. *That* may be the miracle! It should be noted that Premier Tojo of Japan to-day promised India its freedom. These words from the lips of the Japanese Premier were not intended ironically; he was uttering a solemn pledge. But Indian leaders know that Japan never gave freedom to any foreign people. And the concept of modern democratic freedom, which is what the Indians are striving for, is as strange to a Japanese Premier as it would be to Adolf Hitler.

FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE

March 26, 1942

TO-MORROW is the anniversary of the day when the Yugoslav people overthrew the government which was submitting to Adolf Hitler and so forced the Nazis to fight their way through Yugoslavia in their campaign to crush Greece. At the time it was an isolated event, this action of the Yugoslav people, and its effect on the war as a whole could not be measured. It was deeply heartening to see the Yugoslav people accept the risk of military annihilation rather than lose their liberty. But as an isolated event it is as tragic as it was stirring, for the Yugoslav capacity for effective military resistance was not up to the task of holding the mechanized Nazi forces, and in their breathless tempo the Nazis did smash their way through to Albania and Macedonia. At the time the democratic world was deeply disappointed, and the British did not make the disappointment less bitter when they were unable more than to delay the Nazi conquest of Greece. But to-day these events fall into a pattern which a year ago was not seen. Now it is clear that the Yugoslav and Greek resistance upset Hitler's timetable. He did not begin his assault on Russia until June twenty-second. Because he began it later than he might otherwise have done, the great invasion of Russia came to a standstill at the gates of Moscow in December. So the Germans must try again this summer what they failed to achieve last fall, and in the meantime the United Nations are on the battlefield, in a war of such magnitude that Hitler's loss of time has become his major liability. If the United Nations win this war, historians will be sure to assign to the Yugoslav and Greek peoples an enduring credit for making an essential

contribution to victory. Thanks, too, to Yugoslavia and Greece, small nations have kept aglow their morale under excruciating difficulties. Their faith has been kept alive that there may be a world in which small nations will have peace and identity. Yugoslavia was unable to save Greece, but it has put up the liveliest guerrilla resistance, which has continued to this moment, and indeed is gaining rather than declining. How many Axis troops have been held in Yugoslavia, to fight the brave forces of the gifted General Mihailovitch, is not certain, but the number is substantial. And it is not saying too much to give the Yugoslav resistance credit for saving Turkey from invasion last year, and so for delaying the German drive across the Middle East. The time won from Hitler has enabled the British and Free French to hold and fortify Syria; it aided in the British suppression of Hitler's puppets in Iraq. And now if the Middle East does become the next battlefield of the war, the United Nations have a chance they would not have had last year to contain Hitler within the confines of Europe. So Yugoslavia, keeping up its resistance in its mountains, goes on making its contribution.

NORWEGIAN PASTORS. BAYONETS DO NOT MAKE A STATE

March 29, 1942

WHEN it comes to writing the history of this war, and to record how the victory was won, not all the glory, if the United Nations win, will go to soldiers, sailors, and aviators, but a good part will go to spiritual leaders. If Norway is set free, it will not be only liberation brought from outside, but the liberators will be greeted by free men who have refused to wear the Nazi strait jackets—and have maintained their integrity against oppressors under repugnant circumstances. The Lutheran pastors of Norway, and the Norwegian teachers, are at this moment engaged in a conflict with the Nazi regime of Major Vidkun Quisling that is one of the great battles of the war, though it is not being fought with bombs and guns. Last month the new Quisling government issued its first decree. The decree proclaimed that "every Norwegian boy and girl, aged ten to eighteen years, will from now on serve" in the Nazi youth organization. Two weeks later seven bishops met and drew up a pastoral letter protesting against the decree. They said it was compulsory mobilization, exposing youth to an influence "intolerable in relation to their parents' conscientious obligations. An intrusion of this kind," they warned, "will touch the people in their deepest and innermost life." At the same time

all Norwegian teachers were ordered to join a Nazi union so as "to bring all education into harmony with the New Order." More than nine thousand of the ten thousand six hundred teachers in Norway protested. They were told that refusal to enter the union was tantamount to resignation. They did not budge and the Nazis then ordered the schools to be closed for two months because of a shortage of fuel. The seven bishops, carrying forward their protest against the youth decree, sent their resignations to the government. They pointed out that their spiritual duties had been given them by ordination, and could not be taken away, and while they would continue to preach, they could not carry out administrative duties, since the state interfered with them. The Quisling regime thereupon suspended the Bishop of Oslo. Here Quisling himself took a hand and called the bishop to an interview attended by the chief of police and the minister of the interior. He accused the bishop of plotting against the Quisling party and finally shouted at him: "You triple traitor, you deserve to have your head chopped off." The bishop replied quietly, "Well, here I am." He and the Bishop of Trondheim and then the other five bishops were ordered to report twice daily to the police. As all were in Oslo together, they decided to report with all the emphasis possible. Donning their black coats and wearing their gold crosses, they marched through the streets of Oslo to the police station. Crowds gathered, followed and acclaimed them. And Quisling quickly had them sent back to their home towns. Seven ministers were found to take over the vacant bishoprics, but no one in Norway could ordain them. The Nazis tried to find a Danish or a Swedish bishop to take on the task, but so far as is known they failed in that too. How the parishioners of Norway feel is shown by an incident in Trondheim on February first. The bishop was ordered to turn over his pulpit that day to a pro-Nazi preacher in the Quisling movement. The bishop protested, but the Nazi cleric arrived, and the bishop postponed his own service till afternoon. Only a sparse congregation gathered to hear the Nazi. The police then arrived to prevent the congregation entering the cathedral for the afternoon service. A witness of this episode, who came out of Norway, is quoted as describing what happened. "A large crowd gathered for the late service. It was not an unruly mob, but consisted of thousands of Christians. We stood outside the cathedral, prevented by the police from entering God's house. We were freezing, but we would not leave the place. We had to find expression for what we felt. We were silent. Then I heard a voice start Luther's old hymn, 'A Mighty Fortress Is Our God.' We all sang as we stood facing the police, and the old song sounded mightier than I had

ever heard it. When the bishop came out of the church he asked us to leave without incident, and we did so."

It has been reported from Sweden that the great majority of pastors in Norway will follow the example of their bishops and resign, but this is not officially confirmed. But the leading religious organizations of Norway have endorsed the conduct and courage of the bishops. Within two months since Quisling has taken over the government the schools are closed, all the church's bishops have resigned, and the churches are faced with closing altogether. Bayonets do not make a state.

PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL CREATED

March 30, 1942

THE creation of a Pacific War Council was announced to-day by President Roosevelt, and it will hold its first meeting at the White House on Wednesday. Members of the council will be the United States, Great Britain, China, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, and India, if it accepts the British offer announced by Sir Stafford Cripps.

The creation of this Pacific Council is a big advance toward a more compact conduct of the United Nations war. And it elevates Washington to being the war capital of the United Nations so far as planning grand strategy is concerned. By saying Washington, one must think of the city rather than the government. The grand strategy is the product of consultation among representatives of some of the United Nations in Washington. The consultation takes place here. The impulse of ideas is first felt here, decisions then pass back to the other United Nations capitals for approval, they return to Washington for final adoption, and Washington gives the directives which once more go back to other capitals for fulfillment.

ARMY DAY. "THE RIGHT . . . TO BEAR ARMS"

April 5, 1942

THIS being the day before Army Day, it is worth remembering that Article Two of our Bill of Rights reads: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Our citizens' army of to-day should be recognized as representing a right, and a right which the founders of the country insisted on preserving. In the

long intervals of peace which have blessed the United States, the attitude toward bearing arms has undergone natural change. "In times of peace we do not maintain a vast standing army that might terrorize our neighbours and oppress our own people," said President Roosevelt in the proclamation dedicating Army Day this year to "our citizens' army." "We do not," he said, "like to rehearse interminably the cruel art of war. But whenever a tyrant from across the seas has threatened our liberties, our citizens have been ready to forge and use the weapons necessary for their defence." So it is good Americanism to look back to the Bill of Rights for the true meaning of our present army. Coming out of a season of happy pacifism, many young men obeyed their call to the colours with a lively sense of duty, which is to their full credit, but not with the sense of their democratic privilege, their right, not quite realizing that this country came into existence through the *right* to bear arms, and later preserved its unity through the exercise of that right, and that they are free men again exercising an original American right. They answered the call of their country, but they did more—they answered a call within themselves, even if it had so become part of their being that they may not have recognized it. America was set free by a citizens' army. It produced a citizens' army to survive the great test of the Civil War. A citizens' army was called into being in the First World War. To-day, with American liberties more sharply and powerfully challenged than in the last war, the citizens' army is similar, in its function and character, to the citizens' army which achieved our original independence.

In being brought into existence, it has been safeguarded by every democratic procedure. It was created by a law which was duly debated and passed, by representatives of the people, and is being financed by money duly appropriated by representatives of the people. No single voice called this army into being, as Hitler's voice raised the Nazi forces in Germany and Mussolini's the army in Italy. No oath of allegiance to a single leader is asked of it. The allegiance is to the people and to their charter of liberties. The revolutionary leaders knew that the right to fight for liberty must never be denied or infringed. And the men of the American Army to-day have not only their civic responsibility, they have the freedom, which is the other part of responsibility in a democracy. It is this characteristic of the citizens' army which keeps the celebration to-morrow from any taint of militarism and is the best safeguard we have that war restrictions are not going to mean the destruction of our democracy.

IF BY FALL 1942 THERE IS A RUSSIAN FRONT, GERMANY
WILL HAVE LOST THE WAR

April 6, 1942

IF by the end of this fall there still is a Russian front in Europe, Germany will have lost the war. If by the end of the fall the Russians should have been pushed back behind the Urals, and no new European front is opened and held by the United Nations, Germany will have command of Europe and Hitler's defeat will have become extremely difficult. In understanding the war one must square off to the fact that the Russian front is the most important battleground in this year of conflict.

Hitler's greatest hope of victory is to dispose of his enemies in one sector at a time without having to divide and weaken his forces. He knocked out Poland, then Norway, then the Western Front. He first accumulated the greatest striking power ever known in military history. But even after the collapse of France he was not at his maximum of strength. Another winter of production built him to a still higher level of power, and when he took on Russia last June he was at his peak. If, as he expected, he had overrun all of European Russia and the Caucasus last year, he would have been master of Europe. And all of his remaining forces could have been thrown against an army trying to gain a new foothold in Europe. He would have been virtually beyond conquest in Europe itself. The turning point of the war, insofar as it has turned, was in Russia's resistance to Hitler's maximum striking power. Hitler not only failed to destroy the Russian Army, he left for himself what appears the equally hard job of trying to destroy it this year. He is no longer at his peak. The Russians, who held him off, also are not at their peak. Both sides are weaker. Hitler still has tremendous striking power to throw against Russia. He has more tanks and more mechanized equipment than Russia. He still will be able to concentrate an almost irresistible power at a point or points of his own choosing. But this year's assignment is not the same as last year's. If the Russians, caught unprepared last year, were able to halt the Germans at the gates of Moscow, they may be able to absorb their blows this year, with the same general strategy of falling back slowly.

MILITARY EXPERTS CHANGE THEIR MINDS. RUSSIA FIGHTS BACK

May 4, 1942

THE confidence of the Russians about their chances against Hitler's armies this year continues to mark everything being written and said in Russia. This show of confidence is by no means simply a campaign to bolster home morale. The judgment of the highest military experts in this country and Britain has undergone a change during the winter. It will now come as a surprise to these experts if the Germans do as well this year in Russia as they did last.

So far the spring campaign in Russia has not produced much large-scale action. At the moment most of the front is in the grip of a thaw that makes operations next to impossible. According to a German broadcast, mud is impeding movement in a "hardly imaginable manner." "Every step," it is explained, "has to be wrested from the bottomless ground. Mountains of felled trees were sunk in the marshes to create a crust over the roads, but they disappeared. Soldiers often sank up to their chests in mud when the grass gave way under their feet."

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY—THIRTY CARGO SHIPS LAUNCHED

May 17, 1942

NEXT Friday is National Maritime Day and it will be observed by the launching of thirty cargo ships. This is an astonishing total, but more astonishing and more significant is the fact that this week the United States will begin producing ships at the rate of two a day, and the rate is expected to be raised to three a day before the end of the year. Ships have never been built so quickly in the history of the world. More ships have been built than have been sunk or damaged, and as damaged ships can be repaired, the U-boats are at least a little behind. This country, simply to draw even with the U-boats, has had to build ships faster than ever before in history and build them twice as fast as originally planned. But it is not enough to draw even with the U-boats. Without far more tonnage the war effort of the United Nations is necessarily restricted. More is being produced than can be shipped. And all military enterprises need shipping, from the delivery of fighter planes, tanks, and guns to the transport of troops. Every time a ship is used for a military purpose some economic need gets pinched, or some other military purpose. So Friday, National Maritime Day, cannot be elation day.

It represents the passing from the time of greatest danger into a period of catching up with our needs. But it will be well to remember, when the enterprise, skill, and devotion of the men and the management in the shipbuilding industry are described, it took just these qualities not to be beaten by the U-boat, and it will take them in increasing degree if the war is to be won.

GOERING ON THE RUSSIAN WINTER

May 24, 1942

I SHALL spend my time to-night on a single speech. It is the speech of Germany's number-two Nazi, Hermann Goering, given on the occasion of the first bestowal of a high decoration on a German workman, in recognition of his industrial services. Shortly before, Hitler had spoken in Berlin and had snarled at German workmen. He had voiced indignation that they should want summer vacations while Nazi troops were suffering on the Eastern Front. In that speech he announced that he would take still more peremptory powers to deal with the conduct of the war. It seems clear that Hitler's speech must have stirred up feelings and that Goering had to allay them. And the Nazis found they had better decorate their workers as well as snarl at them.

Goering's speech is no sincere tribute to German workers ; indeed it skips rather lightly over what they have achieved. The decorated labourer was passed over hastily ; he wasn't built up as the Nazis know how to build up a national hero. And Goering devoted his chief effort to ask for sacrifices by the home front commensurate with those on the Eastern Front last winter. Before quoting from it let me make two observations. The speech doesn't prove that Germany is cracking, though it does show that German morale is sagging. The other observation is that the speech was not meant for its effect abroad. It has been suggested that this speech might be designed to make the outside world think that things are going badly in Germany, and so lull it into false security, and a relaxation of its war effort. If the Germans really were united and happy, a speech like Goering's would outrage them. He was not exhorting his listeners because he wanted us to overhear him. He seems to be trying to meet sullen and even angry German thought.

After reading the full text of Hitler's speech I felt sure that one thing he was trying to justify was a record of great cruelty on the Eastern Front. He as much as said that the strain had been so great that human nature began to crack, and he had had to resort to the sternest measures. It sounded as though firing squads had been

used to quell mutiny. You will recall that Hitler was asking new powers, powers to do what, it seemed, he already had done. Now Goering's speech underscores the necessity, on the Eastern Front, for "hardness," as he called it, and goes to great lengths to explain that at heart the Fuehrer is a tender man. It is absurd to suppose that such a speech was for foreign ears. When Goering is called upon to vindicate his leader it is because doubts must be gnawing at German minds.

Goering had to explain why the war with Russia was necessary. He had to explain why the winter with its ugly doings had to be endured. He even had to explain that no matter how damaging the British air raids are, the British had suffered worse during the German air blitz. And finally he had to solace German farmers for their crop failures and induce them, in the face of further failure expected this year, to plough and plant anew.

Goering's description of the Russian winter is one of the remarkable passages of oratory produced by this war. I shall quote at length from it, but let me point out that it is an official German confirmation of much of the news about that front that came from Russian sources during the winter. To-day many persons show doubt of the truth of much of this news and say it must have been propaganda. Hermann Goering disagrees with them.

After telling about the victories in the summer and autumn he went on: "And now it had come, the defence of the front in the Russian winter. It was not a front in the sense in which we old World War soldiers knew it in stationary warfare, here a dugout, there a dugout, here a lightly fortified village, there a forest's edge. An endless space of many thousands of kilometres reached from the soldiers farthest north to those farthest south. Swamps, lakes, roaring rivers were situated in between, and now the landscape suddenly had become calm. The roaring streams were covered with ice, the swamps and lakes too. One single white cover of death extended over the infinite land. And while before natural obstacles still made it possible to hold some lines with weak forces, the Russians could now penetrate at night over frozen rivers, lakes, and swamps and succeed in getting behind our lines.

"One sad message followed another: the Russians were at our rear in the north, at our rear in the central sector, at our rear in the south. Partisan troops (he refers to guerrillas) blew up railroads, waited in ambush for our supply; inconceivably cold weather almost froze our troops. We had to get warm clothes for them as fast as possible, but this cold weather prevented the operation of the railroads also. Rails cracked because of the icy temperatures; locomotives could not proceed. For days the front was without supply,

without food, without clothes. For days the courageous infantryman was out there in snow and ice, his fingers numb. When he touched the barrel of a gun the skin of his hand stuck. Motors failed, they refused to start. Tanks drove in high snow and were immobilized. One thing was heaped upon another. If we had started to side-step and retreat," Goering asked, "where would the front have been? No dugout trenches were available. Villages for miles were in ruins and destroyed. There was nothing left. And still it was essential that the front be held." Here comes the passage vindicating the cruelty of Hitler. "I am extremely happy," said Goering, "that I could enjoy the presence of the Fuehrer in those hours, and could witness the onrush of all this news upon him. I may claim that I know the Fuehrer better than anyone else, perhaps, that above all I know the infinite kindness of his great heart, that I have experienced the indescribable, infinite suffering by the Fuehrer during these weeks, not for his own sake, but for his brave soldiers out there. He had compassion for them. He knew he was asking the impossible, and yet it had to be performed, he could not yield. Only one thing could save them there, extreme hardness. So we could experience the miracle that in a single man dwelt simultaneously infinite kindness and iron-hearted sternness. This hardness, however, is inherent in him, and comes from the love of his people. For he was aware that had he not asked the extreme and utmost of his soldiers now, perhaps all victories so far won might have been in vain."

Later in his speech Goering appealed to the home front: "I recall this horrible winter," he said, "so that you German workers and farmers and farmers' wives may understand that one *must* sometimes be hard, and that in certain cases hardness alone can lead to victory. Hardness is expected of you too. Believe me, it *is* hard when for reasons of security we must temporarily impose limitations of food. I know how very hard the farmers and farmers' wives are working to secure food, particularly hard because we have not been treated well by the elements. Three extremely hard winters have passed, and besides, planting time has not been favourable. Last year I was glad when it appeared we should have a record crop. But rain interfered with the harvest and diminished the yield to an alarming extent. I know despair is easy when, after having planted in the fall season, you now find in the spring that the greater part of the seed has not come up. We must plant and sow again, and in spite of all, we must harvest. No obstacle must stop you, though there may be more and more bad weather, and though workers, men and women, may be compelled to work away from their families, and work overtime to the point of exhaustion.

All this is hard, but that is why I have told you of the Russian winter. These programmes and requirements may be hard and very extensive and very great. They may require more than ten hours' work, if the Fuehrer has demanded it. Everyone must do his duty, and fight where fate and the order of the Fuehrer has placed him."

Goering then said something that suggests tales must be abroad in Germany: "Do not always believe all that is being told," he cautioned. "No one has been present at the events, after all. The nation refutes it all; it will abide by the war laws which have been passed." What events could have no eyewitnesses? Court-martials at the front? But the new laws also govern the home German with a tight tyranny, and Goering explained: "These laws were not promulgated to harass and to vex you. They have been decreed because they were necessary to insure victory. The individual may not understand them. Leadership, however, has the duty to recognize and look ahead and to take precautions so no real evil is inflicted upon the German people." . . . In closing let me recall to you that Hitler is in Berlin, and his food minister has just been removed!

DEDICATION DAY

May 30, 1942

MEMORIAL DAY was called Decoration Day when I was a boy in a small town in northern Ohio. And the parade always was a march of uniformed, elderly men to the cemetery to decorate the graves of their former comrades. In my early boyhood war was a thing of the past, and the war which those parades memorized was fading in the minds of elderly men. But it also was something else. However one felt about the Civil War, it had achieved the purpose for which it was fought. It preserved the Union, and in its course had brought freedom to the slaves. And like most Americans I grew up feeling that war belonged to ancient and nearly ancient days, and even the Spanish-American War did not much disturb the feeling. But to-day's Memorial Day, remembering as it does the fallen of World War Number One, and already a substantial number of the fallen in the present war, does not signalize man's success in creating conditions of enduring peace. For that reason, thoughts to-day could not look backward with comfortable contemplation to what has been achieved. If they turned back it was with perplexity and almost despair that a war of the magnitude of the First World War should have accomplished so little to vindicate men for having waged it. It was to have been the war to make the world safe for democracy. That was more than a slogan; it expressed the

needs and aspirations of millions of men and women without political independence. And indeed for a time the young democracies, newly planted in Europe, flourished in fair weather. But to-day it does not occur to anyone to describe the First World War, even though it did end in a clear-cut Allied victory, as having succeeded in making the world safe for democracy or as having achieved any other notable constructive purpose. So to-day there has to be a deep sense of inadequacy that so great a sacrifice should have bought so brief a pause of recuperation and progress. Thoughts to-day, remembering the fallen, were grateful to the heroism of individuals, and the willingness of men to suffer for what they hold to be the right. But the achievement by the living generations is not complete. Thoughts inevitably turn to the future—the Decoration Day of my boyhood to-day became Dedication Day.

SIGNPOSTS ON THE ROAD TO COLLAPSE

June 6, 1942

OUR news judgments about affairs inside Germany are both better than we think and worse than we realize. They are better than we think because we do have a general sense of the German situation, based on fragments of evidence. By that I mean that German conditions could not improve without our knowing about it, from the Germans themselves. And they could not grow drastically worse without the Germans giving it away. When the interned newspaper correspondents and diplomats returned from Europe they really did not have to reshape our ideas very much about German conditions. But I still say our judgments are worse than we realize. And that is true about conditions inside Germany, but only because it is true about everything. I sometimes wonder how dangerous it is that we know so little about what is going on, not only in Germany, but everywhere else, our own country included. We are slowly slipping into a mental adjustment to life without news. That may be due to requirements of wartime, and that one has no right to complain about. But its effect on thinking could be injurious. If we are not constantly reminding ourselves that we know very little, we will fall into the habit of reaching firm conclusions, just as though we knew a great deal. And more and more we are filling our minds with meaningless words. A correspondent abroad, or in Washington, reads a communiqué. It is brief and uses words chosen with a high skill to convey precisely what is meant to be conveyed. The correspondent sits down to his typewriter and expands that communiqué with punch adjectives. By the time he has ended he

often has puffed it up and made it vibrate with action and resound with thunder. He too is skilful. He doesn't fabricate anything. He just fills in. By the time what he has written registers on the reader's or the listener's mind, the effect is altogether different from anything that would have registered if the communiqué alone had been read or heard.

All of us want to exercise judgment, on what we are doing, on what our allies are doing, and on what our enemies are doing. Judgment is based on knowledge of essential facts, and is the power to relate those facts to other known facts. But without facts, we are not entitled to judgment. We have only opinions, hopes, and prejudices, and the danger is that we will mistake opinions, hopes, and prejudices for judgment. I propose no remedy for this, for the only remedy I can think of is to keep on reminding ourselves that we know so little.

But to come back to the situation in Germany, let me report on two judgments brought to my notice. One has to do with food. Here the fact is that the Germans are tiding themselves over a dangerous food shortage by the wholesale slaughter of pigs. They are doing this for two immediate reasons. One is that meat is needed. The other is that the feed given to pigs can be fed to humans, and that it has a higher caloric value when eaten by humans than when fed to pigs, which in turn are to be eaten as pork products. What is lost is the fats from the pork products, and that is a serious loss. It is a loss that will be felt later on. And since so many pigs are being slaughtered, later on there will be a loss in meat too. And what the Germans are doing is to tide themselves over the shortage of the moment at the cost of the future, and a not far-distant future at that. That is the outline of crisis. And it can be said, on careful testimony, that the food situation in Germany to-day is what might be called "early 1918." In early 1918 the German food shortage was growing so acute as to become a big factor in the thinking of the German High Command. It made its one stupendous effort in 1918 and then it sought for peace on the best possible terms. In the First World War the government also met an immediate food crisis by slaughtering pigs. This was ordered by the Kaiser's regime. And later, when the Nazis were campaigning for power, as you will remember, they had to fight not only the Weimar Republic but the dormant monarchist movement. And the appeal the Nazis made to the peasants was that they had been ruined by the Monarchist regime in killing off their pigs, which was true. The Nazis could not have come into power without the support of the peasants. And they might not have mustered this support without the use of this argument. Now the Nazis are forced to the same

emergency measures for which they denounced the Hohenzollerns. Walther Darre, Hitler's friend and Minister of Agriculture, has just been dismissed. His retirement came at the same time that Hermann Goering made a speech admitting the grave agricultural crisis, which he ascribed to the bad weather during last year's harvest, last fall's planting, and this spring. Darre has been one of the insiders of the Nazi movement. His retirement is a political act. He has been thrown overboard to lighten ship. He has been sacrificed to appease the peasants. And it is a measure of the difficulties of the Nazi regime that in their home dealings they now have to resort to sacrificing one of their own leaders.

The other judgment I wish to report has to do with the powers granted to Hitler at the last Reichstag meeting to deal with all Germans without regard to their "duly acquired rights." Attorney General Biddle, speaking at Chattanooga to-day, said that in this Germany entered the home stretch of a suicide trail and called it "the last ugly phase of the cycle of self-enslavement, the phase of complete undisguised despotism." The judgment of this suppression of rights can be still more concrete. It was not aimed so much at people in general as at the persons in local and provincial government, in the courts and in the civil service. There is in Germany such a thing as the state which functions self-propelled pretty much the same no matter who or what party is at the helm. This state is comprised of officialdom, and the officialdom has certain rights, such as permanence of office and promotions and vacations and assurance of pensions, which give it cohesion and form. The weakness of the Weimar Republic was that it could not uproot this state, for it was, of course, the same state, in many ways, as Germany had built up under years of monarchy. It changed somewhat under the Nazis, but here again not so much as outsiders may have thought. The real meaning of Hitler's new powers is that he now will have this officialdom at his mercy. The carefully established rights of many decades are abrogated. Officialdom has no other choice than to submit to Hitler and to a clear Nazi overlordship. The Hitler speech, as might be expected, has brought consternation to German officialdom, for it has made these men of the state apprehensive for their personal security and for their future. Hitler must have known this would be the consequence of seizing the new powers. But he also may have felt that he had to be prepared for a showdown inside Germany, and it is obvious that as he gradually weakens he must add to his power. So Germany internally shows two serious sources of weakness: the food shortage, and the stricken morale of the very persons who have held Germany together through all past crises. Added to the effect of British bombing, and,

when it comes, of American bombing, one has some of the components of approaching defeat. That is not saying that Germany is close to collapse. But it is the anticipation of collapse which makes governments change war policies or brings on palace revolutions. It was the anticipation of collapse which in 1918 drove Ludendorff to sue for peace, and Germany did not boil over till some time later. Those two judgments from Germany are no more than heralds of weakness. But the slaughter of German pigs, Darre's retirement, and Hitler's seizure of full power over German officialdom are signs of the times, and indeed signposts on the road to collapse.

PASTORAL LETTER

June 7, 1942

IF you were a Roman Catholic and a resident of Germany, and had attended services on Passion Sunday, last March twenty-second, you would have heard the reading of a pastoral letter, along with all German Catholics attending services that day. It is not a letter that would have brought you any news, for all Catholics in Germany know the price they are having to pay for their faith. But the reading of that letter would have stirred you deeply. The writing and the reading of that pastoral letter was a militant act. In a country terrorized by secret police, and dominated by a totalitarian party frankly dedicated to the destruction of formal Christianity, it took courage to accuse the government openly of breaking its solemn promise to the Catholic Church and to enumerate, as in a criminal indictment, the particulars of each breach. Wherever the Nazis rule, comes the same kind of a revolt. This is not the first revolt in Germany. The Protestant churches stood out against the state domination of their thinking, and leading opponents among Lutheran pastors were whisked off to concentration camps. In Norway the Protestant Church, under still more trying conditions, has dared to keep true to its faith, and its bishops have resigned and many of its pastors have been imprisoned. Now comes the news of the pastoral letter of the German Catholic Church in Germany. This letter is authentic testimony, and it deserves the widest circulation. "Promised and pledged was the liberty of creed and worship of the Catholic religion," says the letter. "In truth, pressure is frequently used on those who depend on state or party positions to force them to conceal or deny their Catholic religion or to compel them to abandon the church. Through numerous ordinances and laws, open worship of the Catholic religion has been restricted to such a degree

that it has disappeared almost entirely from public life. It appears as if the sign of Christ, which in the year 312 was gloriously carried from the Catacombs, is to be driven back to the Catacombs. Even worship within the Houses of God is frequently restricted and oppressed. Quite a number of places of worship, especially in the Ostmark, in the newly conquered territories, but also in the old Reich, have been closed by force and even used for profane purposes. Services in rented rooms have been prohibited despite urgent necessities. From time to time, religious instruction for children has been prohibited even in church-owned premises and has been punished. The rights of parents and church are being more and more restricted and have become ineffective. Juveniles in state youth organizations, in hostels and labour camps, often even in schools and country homes for evacuated children, are being influenced in an anti-Christian manner, and kept away from religious services. Catholic priests are watched constantly and suspiciously in their teaching and pastoral duties. Priests, without proof of any guilt, are banned from their dioceses and homes, even deprived of their freedom and punished for having fulfilled their priestly duties truthfully and scrupulously. It is unbearable that clergymen are being punished with expulsion from the country or internment in concentration camps without court procedure and any contact with the clergy. The holding of religious exercises is made almost impossible. The religious press has been destroyed almost completely. The reprinting of religious books, even catechisms, school Bibles, and diocesan prayer books is not permitted, while anti-Christian writings may be printed and distributed for mass circulation. The Catholic orders have been expelled from schools and are being curtailed in their other activities on an ever increasing scale. A large part of their property and institutions have been taken from them, and many are destined to perish. Consequently the German people will be in the future without the pastoral services of the priests of the orders, and the services of their nuns. "For months," the letter charges, "regardless of war misery, an anti-Christian wave of propaganda, fostered by party meetings and party pamphlets, has been carried through the country with the outspoken aim to suffocate the vigour of the Catholic Church in German lands. If possible they wish to destroy Christianity in Germany during the war, before the soldiers whose Christian faith gives them the strength for heroic battles and sacrifices, return home. The vast majority of the German people, whose deepest feelings are hurt by such attacks on Christianity, justly expect the immediate and frank rectification by the Reich government of the unjust oppression and hated struggle against Christianity and the Church." The Nazis

already have evoked some documents of protest that will long be recorded in the history of these days, and this pastoral letter is one of them.

FLAG DAY. EYES PEER TOWARD THE FUTURE. INVENTION OF
LEND-LEASE

June 14, 1942

WITH America's observance of its own Flag Day as the flag day of the United Nations came the climax of a time in which eyes have been peering toward the post-war world. In a war that has to be fought with so much indifference to human life, and which afflicts all members of the human family, where it strikes, such a time helps to preserve sanity and balance. During the early period of the war many people felt the need of more discussion of post-war aims. They wanted to know for what ends the war was being fought. But not until the Atlantic Charter emerged from the first meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill was a first code of conduct in the post-war world drawn up. The Atlantic Charter by itself did not fill the need, but it was the beginning.

The thinking about the post-war world has gone considerably beyond the phrases of the Atlantic Charter. Within the last weeks some notable official speeches have been made, beginning with Vice-President Wallace's and including the one delivered by Under Secretary Welles on Memorial Day. It is worth noting that Mr. Welles was making that speech at the moment when Foreign Commissar Molotov was a guest in the White House. The Russian guest had just arrived from London where he had signed the twenty-year pact with Great Britain, a treaty which gave definite shape and purpose to British and Russian co-operation in Europe after the war. He was here to come to agreements with the United States, so it was appropriate that America's aspirations as to the nature of the post-war world should be expressed at that moment.

This Russian visit was crucial. On its success in winning the co-operation of Russia, which depended on the confidence of Russian leaders, rested the whole hope of the United Nations going into their post-war task as a team. Either they would be pioneers in new relationships, which would preserve peace and lay foundations for growing prosperity, or they would be jealous rivals. And if they were to be rivals, the post-war world would be doomed in advance. As I have reported before, the desire has been revealed in Moscow to have a British guarantee for Russia's strategic frontiers, as they stood before the German attack a year ago. If there was to be no

post-war teamwork, this Russian desire was natural and indeed essential. But if the Russians could be convinced that there would be real teamwork in the peace, and that the democracies were genuine in their determination to build a safer and sounder world order, they could forgo strategic frontiers. The Russians have a right to their memories. They attended the floundering disarmament conferences at Geneva. They were members of the League when it betrayed Ethiopia. Mr. Litvinov went to the Brussels conference of 1937, the last time when it might have been possible to avert the coming war. He knew, and his government had not forgotten, that this conference had found itself unable to take international measures to restrain Japan. I am not saying that only the Russians know how Europe and America failed to win the last peace, for nobody knows it better than Americans and the British. But the Russians were being told about another post-war collaboration, and they wanted evidence of sincere purpose. So the prime success of Mr. Molotov's visit to London and Washington is that the Russians chose not to press their claim to strategic frontiers, and they signed the treaty with Britain and came to agreements with the United States.

The Atlantic Charter is the first great document of the post-war world. The master agreement for settling Lend-Lease obligations is the second. When the story of the war is simplified in later histories the invention of Lend-Lease is sure to rank as a stroke of genius. It at once cut all the red tape which would have made much of our help too late, and it short-circuited the emotional difficulties that rise from considerations of thine and mine. That was appreciated at the time of its adoption. What was not appreciated then was that the settlement of Lend-Lease obligations would open the opportunity to lay down economic principles, and so to avoid conflicts which muddled the post-war world after the last war. The principles have been drafted and now accepted by the leading recipients of Lend-Lease aid. Repayment to the United States is not to be allowed to burden trade. And the nations signing the master agreement have pledged themselves to reduce trade barriers, to bring economic assistance where it is needed, and to place the spread of prosperity ahead of narrower motives. So to-day, the first internationally celebrated United Nations Day, there is more than the name United Nations; there already is a definition of aims and the acceptance of common standards.

It may be objected that what has been done still is vague, abstract, and subject to loss without notice. So it is, for documents never are worth anything unless they express spirit and will. And the spirit and will might conceivably change. But they are not

likely to, for the simple reason that common people, the ones who are fighting the war, and paying its prices, have wanted these things to take shape, have wanted the promise of a better statesmanship after this war. And it is their will and spirit which in the main have demanded that this beginning be made. So these have been notable weeks. One may say that the moral power of the United Nations has begun to produce something to match their physical production.

OBSTACLES TO INDIAN INDEPENDENCE

July 13, 1942

THE cry for immediate independence for India is to be raised anew by the Congress party and backed by a fresh campaign of non-co-operation. This has been virtually decided by the Congress party's working committee after a six-day session with Mohandas Gandhi at his retreat at Wardha.

During the Cripps negotiations it was clear that a formidable obstacle to Indian independence was the inability of the Indians to work out their minority problems. But the British position suffers from two weaknesses: a promise of independence has never been given with a set date, and the British have not said they would grant dominion status earlier if the Indians themselves could agree upon the nature of a government to which the power could be transferred. It would have to be a government recognizing the position of the Moslem minority and other minorities, and it would have to take account of Britain's pledges in the past to the Indian princes, though that is not a major consideration. It appears as though Gandhi, with his sense of strategy, appreciates that the British *can* be pushed a step farther. The British may decide to take the stand that the Cripps offer was the last word, but it need not be. For with all good grace the British *could* set a date for independence. They could propose that if India had worked out a generally accepted constitution for a union, the power could be transferred to the new federation on that date. And if a constitution had not been worked out, independence could be granted the provinces and the states, and Indian defence as such could be taken over, say, by the United Nations until such time as union could be worked out. Such an offer would absolve Britain of any suspicion of hanging on in India by fostering the minority movements.

To-morrow is Bastille Day, which is the French counterpart of our own Independence Day. It is being celebrated in occupied France by an outburst of sabotage. Reports already are in of a

ferment of activity along the northern coast. The Germans, fearing a patriotic explosion, to-day issued a decree that grinds the iron heel into a prostrated land with incredible fury. They announced that if anyone suspected of outrages hereafter fails to give himself up on demand, all his male relatives, cousins included, will be shot, all his female relatives will be consigned to forced prison labour, and his children placed in a so-called educational institution.

THE CRISIS IN INDIA

July 30, 1942

THE crisis in India is just before the boiling point, which will not be reached, however, until the All-India Congress passes on Gandhi's programme of resistance to the British, and that will be a week from Saturday. Mr. Amery, Secretary for India in the British Government, to-day issued a solemn warning to the Congress party that the government in India will not, as he put it, flinch from its duty to take every possible step to meet the situation. But he declared that the government stands firmly by the broad intentions of its offer as outlined by Sir Stafford Cripps. "The Congress demand arises at a time," he said, "when in Russia, China, Libya, and other theatres of the war the situation calls for undivided energy, co-operation, and concentration of the resources of all the Allied powers. In this crisis and in the future after the war, India has a great part to play, and it is the earnest hope of the government that the Indian people will lend no countenance to a movement fraught with such disastrous consequences." From the entourage of Mr. Gandhi comes a hint to-day of a desire for the intervention of President Roosevelt. An unnamed "close friend" of the Indian leader said that a "few words by the President" could avert a great crisis. Mr. Azad, president of the Congress party, appealed to the United Nations to step in and settle the question of India's independence, which, he said, is no longer a matter between India and Britain, "but between India and the United Nations because of India's strategic position." Both these hints seem to point to a desire by the Congress party to have someone else's word for the promise of freedom than Britain's. And if that were all that it would take to keep the Congress party from throwing the country into a turmoil, it is not beyond imagination that if the Congress party appealed to the United Nations to underwrite the British guarantee some way to do so might be found. But if the hints mean that the Congress party is expecting the United Nations to intervene in a dispute with the British, or expecting President Roosevelt to do so,

on the ground that United Nations interests are at stake, they are showing much less than half of the picture of the situation. It is true that United Nations interests are at stake. But while it is conceivable that the United Nations could win the war without the support of the Indian Congress party, it is not conceivable that India would get its freedom without a United Nations victory. That being the true situation one might expect the Congress party to recognize it. And they should appreciate that that is how the situation appears to a large number of persons who ardently desire India's freedom. These will expect the Indians to be still more eager for a United Nations victory than the United Nations are expected to be for Indian independence.

KING HAAKON CELEBRATES HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY

August 3, 1942

HAAKON THE SEVENTH, King of Norway, is seventy years old to-day and has received congratulations from capitals of the United Nations, Washington included. But he can have received none that moved him so much as from his own people in occupied Norway. "There has been a clearly discernible growth in the home front's fight since April 1940," it reads in one passage. "To-day we plainly see that much of what has been done should have been done better or differently, but we have no reason to feel ashamed. In the course of the fighting the full importance of the battle has dawned on the Norwegian people, until to-day we stand welded together as one man—and around one man. The Norwegian home front will never give in. Other occupied countries may carry on their struggles for liberation along other lines. We have only this one. And on this day we thank our king for having found it." This tribute to King Haakon goes beyond the demands of courtesy and even affection. It acknowledges the decisive personal part the king took in rallying Norwegian resistance and opposing all temptations to compromise, of which there were many. He has been king for thirty-six years, the only king Norway has had since the union with Sweden was ended in 1905. He demonstrated that he was a democrat before he accepted the throne. The invitation came to him as Prince Carl of Denmark. He said he would not accept unless the people of Norway expressed their wish to have him do so in a plebiscite. Republican sentiment was running strong at the time, but the plebiscite resulted in a 73-per-cent majority for a constitutional monarchy with Prince Carl on the throne. There followed nearly thirty-five years of peace and development, and not till the king was sixty-

seven years old did he face his great test. With the German attack on Norway he left Oslo. The Germans sent demands and exhortations that the king and the government co-operate. They demanded that Quisling be named Prime Minister. The king made it clear that he was against compromise, though he always said he would accept the decision of parliament. But he made it clear that he preferred to abdicate rather than to submit to the invaders. Later, when France collapsed, some leading Norwegians, fearing the war was lost, mooted a plan to reach an understanding with the Germans, so as to avoid either a permanent German administration or a Quisling regime. It was suggested that the king abdicate on the ground that he no longer could exercise his functions. He answered in these words: "The liberty and independence of the Norwegian people are for me the first commandment of the Norwegian constitution and I consider I am best obeying this commandment and watching over the interest of the Norwegian people by adhering to the position which a free people gave me in 1905." King Haakon is always described as unostentatious and I can testify that he is both lively and democratic from a meeting I had with him in London a year ago. On that occasion he sat down, not behind the desk in the office where he received me, but pulled up a chair alongside mine, and he talked most intensely. He has an altogether engaging mannerism of laughing, which he does heartily, bursting into the conversation with quite youthful enthusiasm, and slapping his leg as he laughs, while his eyes sparkle so that one gets an impression of a person of great verve and buoyancy. He is straight, very tall, and has a lean, long face, and his moustache is darker than it is grey, so it is hard to realize that he is a man of seventy. He is more than a person of deep political values and of strong spiritual faith. He is a man of feeling and of cheer. And it is the combination of these qualities which must have endeared him to his people. Norwegians, especially the sailors who have made such a superb contribution to the war, know how informal he is because he often forgathers with them at their British meeting places and joins for hours in their talk.

My own experience of the king's democracy saved me from acute embarrassment. It happened that he was unable to receive me at the time that had been mentioned, and I waited for nearly an hour. If I stayed more than five or ten minutes longer I was going to be late for my next appointment which was with an extremely busy man. I knew it was the most stringent etiquette at any European court that a king or queen always is the one to terminate an interview. The visitor must never do so. I told my predicament to the king's aide just before I went in and asked him if he could find

some way to break off the interview if it lasted more than a quarter of an hour. "Why, no," he said, "don't let it worry you. Just explain the situation to the king. He will understand." As it turned out, the talk with the king was engrossing, and I so enjoyed him that I forgot the time, till more than half an hour had passed. And then I screwed up my courage to do what the aide had said I might. I will say for the king that it stopped him short, and he certainly was just a little astonished. But at once he was friendly about it as could be, said he was sorry I had to go and he urged me to see him when I next visited London. Which is not of any importance except that it is something no other king I ever heard of would have accepted in such grace, and it does in its minor way show that King Haakon has the major quality of democracy.

CHURCHILL VISITS MOSCOW. GRAND STRATEGY IN THE MAKING

August 17, 1942

WHEN Winston Churchill last week sat smoking his cigar across the table from Joseph Stalin, smoking his pipe, in the conference room of the Kremlin, that was news by anybody's yardstick. It was the first meeting ever held between the heads of the British and Russian people. It was timed to be of historic moment, since the Russians are bearing the heaviest Nazi blows, and public opinion, not only in Russia but in Britain, and to only a lesser extent in this country, is engrossed by the prospects for opening a second front in western Europe. The United States had a part in the conference, being represented in the first place by Averell Harriman. Admiral Standley, American Ambassador to Moscow, did not take part, though he did make a speech at the closing banquet. Mr. Harriman was not alone; he was accompanied by General Russell Maxwell, commanding the United States forces in the Middle East, and General Sidney Spalding, chief of Russian supplies of the Lend-Lease administration, and by Loy Henderson, chief of the Russian section of the State Department. The presence in Moscow of the commander of American forces in the Middle East should arrest attention, especially so because Mr. Churchill was attended by General Wavell and Air Marshal Tedder, who commands British air forces in the Middle East. General Wavell, though now commander in India, is Britain's great military authority on the Middle East. In addition, Mr. Churchill's party included Sir Alan Brooke, chief of staff, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Under Secretary of the Foreign Office. The first thought that springs to mind is that a

conference between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin at this time must inevitably settle the question of opening a second front this year. But the personnel of the conference leads to a fresh field for speculation. Only one British officer was there qualified to talk about a second front in western Europe, Sir Alan Brooke, while three active officers, one of them American and two of them British, were there whose advice would be valuable primarily on matters affecting the Middle East. And as the German drive across the Caucasus progresses, the Russian front and the Middle Eastern front are almost merged. So it is legitimate to conclude that at least one subject under consideration at the conference was helping Russia by supplies and men in the Caucasus. This speculation has the support of a further fact. All the visitors to Moscow arrived from Cairo via Iran and not direct from London. So Mr. Churchill and Mr. Harriman had been in Egypt, they then flew to Iran, which is the vital supply line to Russia, and they brought Middle East experts with them. Obviously they themselves had been in conference in Egypt before they went on to Moscow. And just as obviously they were not discoursing on a second front in Europe. That does not of itself rule out the opening of a second front in western Europe, but it does seem to rule out this front having been the chief topic of the Moscow conversations.

A BRIEF HISTORIC MOMENT. FACTORS OF FINAL VICTORY *August 27, 1942*

THE descriptive adjectives and the solemn, thought-arresting nouns about the war are already rickety, so that the phase of the war now upon us cannot be reared up in our consciousness into its true magnitude. No one of us has ever come upon a brief historic moment—brief because it will have run its course in two or three months—that will mean so much to him and herself, and mean so much to the next decade of the human race. The gigantic struggle in Russia, the impending crucial battle in Egypt, and the sharp test of strength around the Solomon Islands are all decisive, by which is meant that each will decide far more than victory or defeat for the actual forces engaged. They will decide not the outcome of the war itself, for that time has not come, but they will decide factors that, in turn, will go to determine the final victory. To be saying this to-night, on the twenty-seventh of August, is to be telling something obvious and indeed long familiar. It has been obvious and familiar ever since the start of this year, so much so that much of the meaning has evaporated from the concept. Last February it

was clear enough what kind of a year this was to be. It was the final year in which Hitler had supremacy on the land and in the air, the year in which he had to strike his overwhelming blows, since next year he could not hope to overwhelm. The culmination of Hitler's campaign must come in the next sixty to ninety days, for after that the winter will not permit the aiming of overwhelming blows.

So far the Hitler campaign has developed in Russia about what might have been foreseen last February. He could amass far greater mechanized power than the Russians; he was bound to bend back the Russian lines. Industrially he was able to throw more machines and more munitions into the fighting than the Russians. They had lost much of their plant materials and were not able to obtain supplies without limit from Britain and the United States. Hitler had the superiority, and all that could not be foreseen late last winter was just how he would use it. He might, as in the summer before, attack all along the line, or he might concentrate all his offensive strength in one region. He chose for concentration, and his progress has been rapid, though it appears to have been less rapid than it needs to be if he is to achieve all his main objectives for the year. And in his advance he has not been able to duplicate the feats of last year in surrounding and chopping up huge units of the Russian Army. The Russians have not suffered the piecemeal annihilations of last year. Marshal Timoshenko developed a tactic of withdrawal which kept his main forces intact. And he did so without yielding ground at a disastrous rate. To-day the Nazi campaign in Russia presents two great offensives: the one against Stalingrad, which is close to its climax, and the sensational drive across the Caucasus. The Caucasus campaign is secondary to the one against Stalingrad, in that if the Russians hold Stalingrad and can beat off the Germans, the invaders of the Caucasus are in danger. But the German strength before Stalingrad is terrific, and though Russian resistance to-day has slowed down one and stopped the other of two German spearheads, it would take optimism to predict that the Germans will be beaten off by the defenders in this sector. Premier Stalin told a meeting in Moscow: "History has perhaps never known so gigantic a battle," and he described the military situation as "very serious."

To-day, however, the Russians have revealed the unfolding of a strong counter-offensive in the Rzhev sector, west of Moscow. The campaign here is already fifteen days old. It caught the Germans flat-footed, and the Russian advance at the outset was as much as twenty-five miles a day. Then heavy rains slowed it down, and the Germans began stiffening their resistance. The Russians say that

the German dead in this campaign already number forty-five thousand. The Russians to-day have been fighting from house to house in Rzhev, and they are preparing to invest a large German garrison south-east of the town at Gzhatsk, in a drive to gain control of the Rzhev-Vyazma railroad. The question that cries for answer is whether this is a counter-offensive on a scale that will force the Nazi high command to shift troops from Stalingrad, so as to keep the Russians from rolling back the German lines. Some optimists in the London press loudly say that it will. London military authorities are more cautious. One comment from Moscow to-day was that the Rzhev offensive was not to be judged for its effect on the Stalingrad situation, but on its own immediate merits. It is reducing a vital and advanced salient, from which the Germans in due course could be expected to launch an offensive against Moscow. So we have in Russia the two great German offensives grinding forward, with not enough power yet shown to beat them. And there is the Russian counter offensive to the north of this sector which is something to inflame the imagination, but which as yet is not to be counted as strong enough to save Stalingrad, if that is its intent. That is the Russian dimension of the scene.

But the Russian dimension is only part of it. Of itself, it does not constitute the overwhelming success which Hitler must achieve in the next two or three months. In Russia alone, Hitler could drive back the Red Army, but he could not knock it out of the war. At the present rate that army can be in there slugging again next spring, and with the opening of a second front Hitler's opportunities to overwhelm would be closed. I said a moment ago that the charge across the Caucasus is secondary to the drive on Stalingrad, but only if Stalingrad should be held and the Germans beaten back. If Stalingrad should go, then the Caucasus would be merged in the battle for the Middle East, and there it is that Hitler would try to bring to a climax the year of striking overwhelming blows. The greater battle of the Middle East would not be in the Caucasus itself but in Egypt, and here the fighting is expected to explode at any minute. The magnitude of the war is not in the Russian dimension, but in the Russian plus the Middle East dimension. It is in both dimensions that Hitler laid his plans for this, his last year of supremacy. And so now the Battle of Egypt must take its due place along with the Battle of Stalingrad. If Stalingrad should be lost, Hitler would have part of what he needs. If Egypt, too, should be lost, he then could round out his year's triumph. If Stalingrad goes, and Egypt is held, the year will end indecisively for him. So the prospects in Egypt become of an importance not to be exaggerated. And here it is not justifiable to deal in rosy optimism.

Rommel has received two full divisions as reinforcements, and replacements for all his losses. The United Nations forces have been strengthened too, but hardly to the same amount. Their supply job is ten times as hard as that of the Axis. The British have just changed command. They can hardly be in superb readiness for an offensive. And they now are in that stage of desert warfare where a retreat does mean something, it means decisive defeat. Previously the battle could swing back and forth over a long field without space deciding anything. Now if the British fall back it is on Alexandria, and there Rommel could cash in on his victory. The Middle Eastern dimension of Hitler's last great effort would have brought him success. The Caucasus would be lost, the United Nations influence in Iraq and Iran would crumble, the doorway to the Indian Ocean would slowly swing back, and all North Africa would fall without serious challenge to the Axis. Hitler would have replenished his resources of oil and minerals, but far more important, would come into control of vast sections of the earth from which he could not be driven by any power the United Nations have as yet been able to conjure up, even on the drawing boards. There are the stakes, and in the next ninety days we ought to know whether they are to be achieved. The day that the Battle of Egypt starts will begin the most anxious period since that brief time in July 1940 when Hitler, having felled France, then failed to undertake the easy invasion of Britain. What the preparedness is in Egypt in terms of equipment and supplies is of course a secret. The men of the Eighth Army, according to American correspondents with them, are quite ready.

Now to look at the issues involved in the Solomon Islands battle. Here as in Russia and the Middle East more is involved than a struggle between fighting forces. The immediate issue obviously is whether we can keep our marines on the islands. They drove out the Japanese and the Japanese have tried to drive them out. The Japanese first landed seven hundred men, a kind of reconnaissance in force, to find out how strong the Americans were, then they came, in strength, backed up with a formidable naval power. And it is the naval power which makes this conflict appear so decisive. No one not in the secret can speak about this feature of the battle with authority. One needs to know how large the Japanese naval force is which has been supporting the counter-attack. It consisted of at least two aircraft carriers and then battle-ships, cruisers, and attendant craft. And one needs to know the strength and losses so far of American naval forces. But it is implicit in what has been officially disclosed that naval supremacy in the Pacific is being affected and perhaps decided in this battle.

THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR. TRIBUTE TO POLISH
RESISTANCE*August 31, 1942*

IN three quarters of an hour the war will be three years old. It began with the bombardment of the Westerplatte, outside Danzig, at four forty-five the morning of September first, which would be at ten forty-five on the night of August thirty-first, our time. If there is anyone, eminent or humble, who on that night had the prescience to foresee in any detail the state of the world to-night, his predictions have escaped circulation. Certainly the leaders of Britain and France did not, and neither did Adolf Hitler, the man who set forth to impose his will on the human race. One of the solaces which is offered by a tragic anniversary like to-night's is in recognizing that Hitler's prodigious preparations and his vaulting ambition were unable to lead him to the point where he could call a halt, consolidate his sensational gains, and enable the German nation to profit from them. Not that he has spent his powers by any means, but in the three years he has raised up against his vast might powers that are beginning to equal and soon will surpass his own. Germany is not close to defeat, and before the collapse of German strength can be expected a heroic ordeal lies ahead of the generation of young men of to-day, particularly those of Britain and the United States. But it is realistic to take heart from the knowledge that the United Nations are finishing the transition from weakness to strength, from unpreparedness to power, and, what is still more necessary, from unawareness of great danger to muscular aggressive thinking.

It also must count as a solace that the war has lasted three years, for peace before now, whatever its terms, would have been a Hitler victory. For if he were to have been beaten sooner, the thinking and doing of the British, French, and ourselves would have had to have been different since 1933 when Hitler came into power. And if it had been, then, probably, there would have been no war. The three years, all of them, were needed to create from peaceable peoples the strength to overwhelm the overwhelder. The fourth year of the war will see the beginning of this process.

The war began with the German attack on Poland. And on this third anniversary it is appropriate to pay tribute to the Polish nation, first of all for having resisted, three years ago, and then for having gone on resisting. It is as clear as sunlight now that if Poland had not resisted it would have ceased to have national or individual freedom. But it was not quite so clear three years ago

this summer. Some people, unschooled in the Nazi strategy and taking words at their face value, asked, "Why fight for Danzig?" The man who asked that most effectively in France was Jacques Doriot. To-day he is the Frenchman closest to the Nazi regime, which one might call a demonstration of the elemental logic of logic.

In fighting the German war machine the Poles risked everything material and lost almost everything material. Most of the Polish leaders knew what the risks were and they chose them in preference to submission, which is well to remember, because submission might have been plausibly explained. That is the first debt of the United Nations to Poland. In the Polish campaign the Germans lost a hundred thousand dead and the first part of their vast surplus of supplies. The Polish contribution, however, did not end there. Poland has gone on fighting. The measure of Poland's military effort to-day may not be sufficiently realized. The Poles maintain an army corps with a motorized division in England. This runs up to more than thirty thousand men. The sailors of the Polish Navy are manning more warships to-day than in 1939. All told, the Polish armed forces come to about two hundred thousand, which ranks them next to the British of the United Nations in Europe, and fifth after Russia, China, the United States, and Great Britain. Poland has never provided Germany with a local Quisling, though the Germans have desperately tried to find one. And the Polish nation has suffered a campaign of brutal repression not meted out to any other people, except the Jews. The Germans have killed off most of the potential leaders of Poland; they have cut down Polish rations to one fourth of the calories needed for a healthy existence. They have shot, hanged, or murdered some four hundred thousand Poles, and though these are listed as civilian deaths, they should count as casualties in the national battle of resistance. A million Poles have been sent into servitude in Germany; another seven hundred thousand have been uprooted from their homes and sent to other Polish districts for enforced labour. Probably fifty thousand Poles have died of starvation. The fact that the Poles bear up under such treatment not only testifies to their undaunted spirit, but it is a daily contribution to the United Nations, and it is made at a greater sacrifice, indeed, than the price paid by the Polish Army three years ago. So the debt of the United Nations to Poland is more than doubled. One can be sure it will be duly recognized when the era is entered for payment of this category of war debts.

HITLER CHANGES HIS TUNE—NEW TITLE, "VICTORY THROUGH DEFENCE"

September 30, 1942

As I was reading through to-night the complete text of Hitler's speech delivered in Berlin to-day, the thought occurred to me what the effect would be on this country and Great Britain if the same sort of speech had been laid before them as coming from one of their own leaders. The heavy satire, the abuse, the deliberate distortion of known truths about the enemy, the complete absence of candour in admitting that things promised last year had not been fulfilled—and in general the mixture of snarling and boasting which pervaded whole sections of the speech, would have thrown the democracies into consternation if they had been in the text of a speech by Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Churchill. And so one impression that the speech makes is not only what it says but what it reveals of the state of mind of the people of Germany to whom it was addressed. For it was offered to them as reality, and at least a good many of them will so accept it. And that shows how successful the Nazis have been in their control, not only of economic conditions, but in their control of the minds of the Germans. First they created a vacuum by suppressing individual judgment and then they filled it as they pleased. Otherwise a speech such as Hitler's to-day could not be made without causing much uneasiness. And it would be puzzling if it did not cause quite a bit as it is.

Last year, when Hitler opened the winter relief drive, which is what he was doing to-day, he said: "Russia is already beaten and will never lift its head again." And on the celebration of Heroes' Day, on March fifteenth this year, he said: "The Bolsheviks who could not defeat German troops and their allies in one winter will be annihilatingly defeated by us in the coming summer." These are his own promises, yet Hitler stood to-day even higher in his own estimation than when last he spoke. He was twitting the Allies for the Dieppe raid and their talk of opening a second front. "I do not want to say," he declared, "that we are not preparing ourselves for a second front. If Herr Churchill says he wants to leave it to the Germans to brood in their fear where and when it will be opened, I can only say, Herr Churchill, you have never frightened me. But you are right, we have to brood. Because, if I had an adversary of scope, of military scope, then I could figure out where he will attack. But if you have military idiots in front of you, one cannot know where they will attack. This may be the most foolish undertaking, and the only disagreeable thing is that with these insane

and drunken people you never know what they will do. Therefore we must prepare everywhere now. But wherever he may choose the next place, he will be lucky if he remains on land for nine hours." This indeed is an odd line to be taking. For Hitler knows, even if the German people don't, that the nine-hour Dieppe raid was no attempt to open a second front. And he surely must know, too, that whatever else the raid achieved or failed to achieve, it did demonstrate that a landing can be made, and that when made as a permanent landing it will not be abandoned in nine hours. So when the second front is opened, and stays opened, Hitler will have made another unfulfilled promise, indeed an unnecessary one. And even if Dr. Goebbels does provide him a well-propagandized public, these unfulfilled boasts must be eating away at German credulity.

What struck me as most interesting about the content of the speech was a hint of future German planning. Hitler was telling what the objectives for this year had been. And you will note that as he now lists them the annihilation of the Bolsheviks, promised last March, is not among them. "We laid down a very simple programme for this year," he declared. "To hold, under any circumstance, what had to be held, that is to have the others assail us where we did not intend to advance. Thus, to hold and to wait to see who ever will get tired first." That is an illuminating phrase. And if you link it with another sentence out of a different context, it becomes still more so. It was in a passage in which he was heaping scorn on the British, but he introduced this flashing question: "Why have you declared war upon us? You are not so far from us." Out of these two passages one can build a likely prediction of Hitler's intentions: to wait to see who gets tired first and then to address his enemies, "Why are you fighting us? We really are not so different."

Hitler's other objective for this year, as he now formulates it, was to attack wherever the attack was necessary under all circumstances. In other words, he was assuring the home folks that there had been no profligate slaughter of German youth. So he had only a limited programme for the year. First, to protect the dominating position the Germans had on the Black Sea. That called for the battles of Sevastopol and Kerch. Then it was necessary to eliminate a dent which was formed at Volkhov—that is on the Leningrad front—and it is news that this was one of the crucial actions of the year. And the next task, said Hitler, was the preparation to break through to the Don. He did mention the great Russian offensive around Kharkov, not as a quiver of a power which last year he said could never rise again, but as a large operative aim which ended with the complete annihilation of more than seventy-five divisions of

the Russian Army. And after this whopper he passed on to say what it was the Germans were after in their drive to the south-east. The aims here, he said, were to take away from the enemy large wheatlands, and nests of coal which may be coked, to reach their oil fields and then to capture them, or at least to isolate them. That phrase—"or at least to isolate them"—reads far different from the annihilation promised in March and the destruction that already had been dealt last October. Hitler gave as his final objective the task of reorganizing the gigantic space which the Nazis have occupied and to secure it for the maintenance of all Europe. And this too fits into the plan already outlined, of outwaiting the enemy and finally asking, "What are you fighting for?"

Hitler dwelt at length on the railways that have been built, the thousands of bridges that have been restored, the roads that have been laid. "You will," he said, "know that colossal things have been achieved even if it has seemed that nothing has been done." Let it be recorded that Hitler got his biggest hand from a passage that had nothing to do with these explanations and promises. He got it when he promised to renew the bombing of Britain. And in so doing he swore that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt will begin to whine and blubber because the end will be more terrible than has been the beginning. That indicated what matter was stirring the Germans most. It is true Hitler promised final victory. But it was not the victory of annihilation he has promised before. It was a victory carefully veiled by defence, by the consolidation of the gains made. He virtually was saying, "When we take Stalingrad"—and he promised it would be taken—"we have gone about far enough." And one may comment in fairness that if any German gifted with prophecy would have told Hitler a year ago that on the thirtieth of September this year *he* would be delivering just this speech Hitler probably would have had him shot for a traitor. It is of course known to everyone on the Allied side who understands the war that the Germans have occupied vast and rich territory and that they have won innumerable battles. But it also is remembered that they occupied vast and rich territories by 1918 and had great victories behind them. If Hitler were going to win the war, he had to win it this year. And his speech, in which he was unable to say that he had won it or to promise that it was on the very verge of being won, becomes historic for what it does *not* say. And beyond that it is fascinating for the tortured bombast with which this omission is concealed.

HITLER TEACHES GERMANS HOW TO ACT LIKE THE MASTER RACE

October 15, 1942

GERMANY has imported large numbers of foreigners to keep their war economy running. That is a big economic fact. But it is also a big human fact. What is it like for a foreigner working in Germany? And what is it like for Germans to have so many foreign workers in their midst? An interesting document comes to hand to-day, a notice posted in the Saar Palatinate, a region in western Germany, signed by the commander of the security police which gives the German people instructions how to treat Russian workers moved into that district from occupied Russia. The date of the notice was July thirteenth this year, and it was cabled to the *Christian Science Monitor*. It reads: "German workers! In order to increase German production and get some useful advantage from the populations of the occupied territories whom we feed, it has been found necessary to introduce workers from the Soviet territories, excluding the former Baltic countries, Lithuania, Esthonia, and Latvia, into the German production apparatus. Hence you will soon find people from the Soviet Union next to you doing the same work. In your relations with these people you must constantly try to remember that they are members of a people which exists on an inestimably lower cultural level than Germans. Furthermore, they have been raised in an ideology completely foreign to ours. The result of this lack of culture and this foreign education are known to you in the experience of our soldiers in their fight against Bolsheviki. You must draw the following conclusions for your relations with these Soviet Union war workers. One, you must always play the boss toward them. They have only been delivered to you to help in the heavy work and increase production, and they must be handled justly but severely. Two, all personal relations are prohibited. Comradeship with these people is impossible. You are expected always to remember that you must consider yourselves superior to the Russians and make it a matter of pride to maintain the necessary distance. Whoever despite these warnings insists on offending against these commands places himself outside the German community and must expect severe measures against his person. Three, do not permit yourself to be misled out of false sympathy into granting these Russians even the slightest comfort or advantage. Labour from Russia, the instructions say, 'must be treated and fed according to the rules laid down by the authorities of the Reich. Any other concessions to them are

forbidden.' Four, you must get the extreme limit of work out of these labourers from Russia, just as out of yourself. Don't tolerate loafing and shirking. Report everything of this kind to the security police in charge of guarding the Russians. Five, take care that the Russians do nothing to damage the factory or its products. Whoever does not report the least suspicion makes himself co-guilty." History records and treasures the documents proclaiming the extension and guarantees of human freedom and does not compile a black book for handy reference in future times to the evils against which men have fought successfully. If there were such a black book, this document would have pride of place in it. But dreadful as it is, from the standpoint of the Russian workers moved to the Palatinate, the document also has its ludicrous side. For it shows the German police teaching the Germans how to behave like a master race, and actually threatens them with severe measures against their persons if they relapse into ordinary human kindness. This is in line with the complaints by the Nazi press in Berlin about the treatment of indentured Russian domestic servants. It denounces Berlin housewives for their sentimental admiration of the supposed beauty and fine character of the Russian girls, and it particularly warns the menfolk of Berlin against having their heads turned and being made fools of by what is called "the eternal enemy of our people." Russian servants planted in German homes are paid different rates in different districts. Girls under eighteen get around two-fifty a month, as against twenty-eight dollars paid to girls of Germanic race from occupied countries. Russian women over eighteen are paid about five dollars a month. Under official regulations they are allowed no vacations and are not allowed to leave the household except on errands. They have no claim to free time, but a housewife is permitted to grant three hours a week for good behaviour, though not after eight o'clock in the evening.

NAVY DAY

October 27, 1942

THERE are different kinds of Navy Days, just as there are different kinds of Fourth of Julys. Some Navy Days are joyful and jubilant celebrations with no accent on tragedy and sacrifice. So are some Fourth of Julys. To-day we have a more serious Navy Day than any in our history. But remember what the second or third of our Fourth of Julys must have been like, for then the brave words of the Declaration of Independence had brought defeat, hardship, and grave uncertainty in their train. To-day the navy is under its

supreme test, and there can be no mood of celebration. It is fighting a war on many seas. Though our attention is focused on the struggle for the Solomons, that is only a fraction of the navy's duty, though it is a vital fraction, and one that will have its bearing on the developments of the war as a whole. But thoughts to-day about the navy need to spread over a vast range where American ships and American naval aircraft are on constant duty. The quality of the navy, as expressed in the spirit and unflinching devotion of its men, is the foundation of the safety of every one of us. So Navy Day should be a day of giving thanks to these men. "We have a long and agonizing road ahead of us," said Secretary Knox in a speech to-night. "The men in the Solomons can tell you about that. The relentless vice of war will squeeze us tighter and tighter. The price in blood and treasure will be staggering. We shall suffer cruel losses. The months ahead will measure our greatness as a people. The best that each of us can do will be just enough. But we know that we will measure up to our destiny, that we will meet the crisis of life or death with firmness and decision, that we will keep our contract with the enslaved masses of the world, for the Yanks are coming—to their everlasting rendezvous with freedom."

THREE ANNIVERSARIES

October 28, 1942

THIS is a day of three anniversaries. The Czech Republic was founded twenty-four years ago to-day. Twenty years ago the Black Shirts made their march on Rome. And two years ago Italy attacked Greece. The founding of the Czech Republic was an act of faith and enlightenment representing the constructive forces liberated by World War Number One. The establishment of Fascism in Italy only four years later was the warning light of danger, falling across the path on which Europe hoped to move forward. It took longer for Italian Fascism to plunge into war than some of us in Europe at that time expected. I know that in London, nineteen years ago, I used to lunch often with the commercial attaché of the Italian Embassy, and we would debate Fascism. I owe him a good dinner, which I imagine he would be very glad to eat to-day, if he's still alive, and which would be in payment of a bet I made him that Fascism would lead Italy into war within five years. It needed no special wisdom to see that Fascism had only the one inevitable culmination of war, but I overestimated the speed with which Mussolini would be able to marshal his

country and raise and train his armies. He waited for nearly thirteen years, when he launched his assault on Abyssinia. Nineteen months later he had intervened, under the cloak of non-intervention, in the so-called civil war in Spain. After these undertakings, which were quite sizable for those times, he and the Italians wanted no more war for a while. And though in May 1939 the alliance was made with Germany—Hitler promised Mussolini there would be no war before 1944 and gave him a definite release from any obligation to fight the war against Britain and France which ensued. Mussolini did intervene after the fall of France. He did it in a sudden panic that the war was ending and he would have nothing to say about the future of Europe. That was in the days when the fall of Britain was expected to follow the fall of France as a kind of helpless echo.

All of Mussolini's war ventures have turned out to be disastrous. He did conquer Abyssinia. But he lost it and hundreds of thousands of troops. He added his little push to the downfall of France, but he did not get anything out of it, not an inch of the soil of Corsica, not Nice or Savoy. Then in the autumn of that year he attacked Greece and found himself mired in a war with a brave little nation which tied up his vaunted forces in a long-drawn-out defence, so that he had to be saved by the invasion of Greece by Germany. Now he finds himself relegated to obscurity, his country occupied by a German army and even his own police dominated by the Gestapo. The observance of the March on Rome to-day found Mussolini having to exchange greetings with the German labour boss, Dr. Ley, and making only a brief speech. What could Il Duce find to say to-day to his people as they reviewed the record and charted the destiny of his dictatorship? According to the only reports available, he said that his Abyssinian war had been, in reality, a war against Britain, and that his Spanish war had been a war against Bolshevism. And what of Italy's war to-day? Il Duce appears not to have mentioned that, but the *Corriere della Sera*, probably at his orders, made his defence for him. "This contest," it wrote, "was not wanted by Italy, and Mussolini did all he could to avoid bringing the Italians into it." Even a Fascist newspaper should not expect Italian memories to be so short as to forget how Mussolini frantically attacked a beaten France.

Mussolini's bluster, as is so often the case, hides a character of the most anxious indecision. He never has been sure of himself. He didn't even lead the March on Rome twenty years ago. He waited in Milan to see what the outcome would be, and when he found his Fascists had not been shooed away, as they might have been, he arrived in Rome in a comfortable sleeping car. He dared

the conquest of Abyssinia only when he found that by threatening to fight Britain and France, if interfered with, he frightened the leadership of those countries. He attacked France determined to get something for nothing. He expected to bribe his way into Greece. To-day he sees his fleet shut up in its harbours and watches anxiously the progress of the Egyptian battle, knowing that if Rommel does not save him there, the Allies will likely be landing on Italian soil within a year. Already Italian cities are crumbling under British bombs. He knows that the Italian people are dismayed and weary of war, for they have been at it for seven years. They feel their weakness keenly. They are sick of the German occupation. They do not take it in good grace that they have only 480 grammes of meat a month to a ration of 1,200 in Germany, 350 grammes of fat to 825 in Germany, 150 grammes of bread a day while the Germans get 350, and 50 grammes of sugar a month to a German ration of 900. When Goering announced that the Germans would not starve, meaning that occupied Europe had to supply the master race, the Italians knew their lot and their station. There was no pomp and ceremony in to-day's celebration, yet Mussolini knew what the people were thinking and dreading. The twenty years of Italian Fascism seems long to us, and infinitely longer to the Italians. But they will not look long in the history books. This is close to the end of a brief interregnum.

Warm words for Greece and Czechoslovakia were spoken in Washington to-day. President Roosevelt, in a cable to President Beneš, sent a message of the deep and lasting friendship of the United States to the people of Czechoslovakia. Under Secretary Sumner Welles, speaking about Greece, declared that, "When our common victory has been won, the free and independent people of Hellas will once more assume their proud and rightful place in the family of nations."

SURVEY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S NEWS POLICY

October 29, 1942

THE results of a nationwide survey of the government's news policy are quoted to-day, and show an almost alarming distrust of it throughout the country. For instance, to the statement that there is a general public impression that much interesting information which has no real military value is withheld from the public, nearly 85 per cent agreed and only 15 per cent thought not. Exactly the same number, about 85 per cent, thought that information is edited and timed to protect the public from itself. And only about

35 per cent thought this was beneficial. Without wishing to enter into the controversy, either on the side of the critics of the government's news policy, or in defence of the policy, it does seem appropriate to report some of my own impressions in Washington. They are necessarily confused impressions. I find it much too difficult for a person dealing with news to check up on what he hears. Obviously he hears a good deal. It is too difficult for him to find out even a general situation, with enough detail of the background about it to know what line to take in reporting it. But when one comes to grips with these problems personally, it is frequently to learn that there are quite good reasons why his work is difficult.

It must be appreciated that there are many persons in the war and navy departments who want to give news as fully as possible, and as quickly as possible, and who really understand what news is, and how important it is for war morale. They are ceaselessly working to get it released. Let me say that when the war began, such people had not made much progress with the traditionalists, those who shrank from candour as they would from sin. Let me also say that they have made great headway since then. And the appointment of Elmer Davis to the OWI has produced admirable gains. It is my impression that the news policy of the fighting services is much better than the public impression of it. There are specific incidents which have awakened the distrust of the public. One of them has to do with the loss of the three cruisers in the Solomons, another is the withholding of the facts about the fate of some of Doolittle's men in the Tokyo raid. On the basis of the facts which the public does know, it appears that a *prima-facie* case can be made out against the news policy in these two instances. But here, and I speak again from my personal impression, the whole story would be differently judged by the public if it were known, and the story cannot be judiciously told at this time.

There are things in the news policy that I don't like. For instance, I don't like the habit of lumping the numbers of the ships or planes of the enemy that are sunk *or* damaged, as though this gave the right picture of a situation. A ship that is damaged can fight again. A ship that is sunk, as a rule can't. And while it is interesting to be told how many ships of the Japanese Navy have been sunk or damaged, and the number makes a tremendous total, the truth is nothing like so tremendous. Personally I wish someone with full knowledge and full authority would report at intervals to the public how the war is going, and do it in strategic terms. Particularly when a situation is in the past and can be talked about safely, it should be disclosed why a given decision was made, what

elements went into the consideration of it and what problems were involved, what mistakes developed. You will recognize here a formula used by Winston Churchill on many occasions. One reason his speeches have been so important is that one gets in them an insight into the thinking of British military leadership, amply and authoritatively disclosed. Mr. Churchill is a great historian as well as a prime minister, and he has a talent for this kind of thing. What this country needs most in the way of news, in my opinion, is not so much detail about the exploits of this and that individual, and certainly not news that would enlighten the enemy to our detriment, but candour and instruction about the fundamental problems of the war. We all need to be strategists, we all feel it is *our* war, and we are forced to follow it from day to day with only the slightest grasp of the elements of the problems our military and naval leaders have to cope with. When situations are ended they should be discussed with full detail, the chips falling wherever they fall. And if it were done more frequently the public would not miss so much the spot news around which the controversy now centres.

But to come back to the news situation in Washington to-day, let me repeat it is much better than it was, and it is a great deal better than the public believes. It can be better still, and there is reason to think it will be. But I might add that this is a problem that never can be solved to the general satisfaction. The administration of any deficiency is always unpopular. Not all the news of the war either in its broad outline or in its detail, can be released for the gratification of the most legitimate public interest. Some news must be withheld for the sake of security. As matters now are managed between the OWI and the army and navy, there is no disagreement about what constitutes national security. So I should say that the public has become most critical of its news policy at a time when that policy is better than it ever has been. But I hold to my opinion that in the nature of things it never can be utterly good.

MAN-POWER

November 2, 1942

I AM not going to survey to-day's war news in this broadcast, but wish to devote all my time to a discussion of one aspect of the problem of man-power. One of the consequences of running the country by administrative order is that decisions have to be made behind the scenes without public national discussion, even if they affect and may shape the destiny of the nation. Just at this time

such decisions are being made, and while the public is not permitted to participate in them, it is at least entitled to look on with some understanding of what is at stake. It is no exaggeration to say that these weeks are the most important for the future, of any this generation has ever experienced. We are in effect deciding the kind of war we are going to fight, and in deciding this we may be deciding our relations with the rest of the world, and indeed the kind of civilization in which we are going to live. And let me say that these weighty words are not being used thoughtlessly. To look at the worst possibility first—and I hope the unlikely one—we might find that the choice had been made against an effective United Nations war. And if that were to be true, we might be saddled with a militaristic future, with a huge army, either facing an interminable war or a peace of compromise with European fascists. The decisions are not being made in these terms. Nobody is advocating a future of this kind. Nevertheless we might get it, unless decisions now under discussion in Washington fall the right way. The decisions, I repeat, do not deal directly with the great future. They have to do with the use of American man-power. They have to do with the size of the army. They also have to do with the effect which the training of the army will have on American education, a special aspect which I hope to discuss in a later broadcast.

Let me outline some of the elements that go into the decision now being reached. Let us look at it first from the standpoint of the military leaders. They have been given the responsibility to fight the war, and they see this in two ways: the responsibility to beat the enemy, and the responsibility to safeguard American security no matter what happens abroad. If you or I were generals we should have to think in these terms. We should have to say, "We cannot be sure that our Allies are going to remain in the conflict, and if they should fall out, we must be in a position to save ourselves in our own hemisphere." Hence we should advocate a large land army, capable of defending the United States. If the decision were to be left altogether to us as generals, that would be a routine decision. And that is what the military leadership has been advocating. Let me add that there are secondary elements that bolster up this point of view. Military leaders want to do their own leading. Our Americans are like this, and if you and I were generals we should be like this. They feel that American lives and American equipment should be in charge of responsible American leaders only. They naturally think that they can fight with them better than our Allies. And they would prefer to wait until American power had been created and trained, instead of

skimping on the size of an American army, and giving up materials, or lending certain branches of our fighting forces to be used by our Allies. That, I repeat, is a natural military point of view and not in the least reprehensible.

But let us look at the consequences of such a policy if it were to be fully carried out. If we are to train a large army we have to have the equipment for it. At the same time we have Allies who are now fighting our common enemy. Without our planes, tanks, and guns they will not be able to fight as well. Indeed it is at least possible that without our supplies they may not be able to hold off our common enemy. It is possible that they could be knocked out of the war. Now, if there were such a surplus of supplies that we could give our fighting Allies what they need, and at the same time equip a large army which would be available for any contingency, there would, of course, be no problem. But there is no such surplus, not yet. Hence it matters a great deal what the size of the American Army is to be, for that obviously determines the amount of aid that we can give to our Allies now. If we start building up a large army now, we must limit *now* the amount of help we give our Allies. Just as a piece of logic, it is undeniable that if we choose for a large army now, we may help bring about the defeat of our Allies. And if we did that, we should find ourselves fighting the war more or less alone. The military answer to that is that if the Nazis conquer all of Europe we still must prepare to defend our own shores. This point of view may be perfectly sound if viewed apart. But I think it is right to say that it would be many times more difficult for the Nazis to threaten seriously the United States than for the United States to save Britain and so keep our base in Europe, and to keep the Russians fighting. And in saving our base in Europe we should also be helping to save the remaining British bases from which we have to fight the Nazis if we are to beat them in Europe. Now, again in justification of the generals, let me say that it is not their job to make political decisions. And it is not their job to weigh the political implications of their military decisions. We are a civilian state. We have civilians in key places. A civilian is commander-in-chief, a civilian is Secretary of War, a civilian is Secretary of the Navy. Our production is under the control of a civilian, and the head of our Man-power Commission is a civilian. That being so, it is natural to ask why there is any need to discuss the problem. One answer is that the problem of man-power is not being solved primarily in the light of a common United Nations strategy. We have no master plan. And in its absence the various elements of our wartime life are free to compete for

the available man-power supply. The army asks what it wants, not with regard for its effect on Britain and Russia and China, but for having an army of the size the generals feel needed to fulfil their obligations as they naturally conceive them. The navy asks for what it wants. War production asks for what it wants. In addition we must decide how to keep men on the farms so as to have a sufficient food supply. And while there is a certain amount of consultation between all the conflicting interests, the problem is not being decided first of all on the basis of the nature of a war that we have agreed with our Allies to fight. It puts it correctly, I believe, to say that we are drifting into a policy of fighting not a United Nations war, but a United States war in association with other countries.

If we arrive at such a policy, the consequences may be so great that words can hardly encompass them. We could be losing the United Nations war and find ourselves fighting alone. If we do, it is more than likely that we shall have to make peace with the Nazis at least because we cannot attack them, and because they will not attack us. They will dominate the greater part of the world and we shall not be able to wrest that domination from them. Why should they fight us? They will command the bases of the world, and the better part of its raw materials. We should confront them with a huge land army which we cannot use. And that huge army would be the supreme influence in our national life. That is hardly what most Americans would care to contemplate. That is not how they conceive the war. That is not an outcome that they would tolerate if they had anything to say about it. If the war is not going to end in the defeat of the Nazis, there will be no progress toward a new world, built upon new foundations and guaranteeing to future generations the security which we have not enjoyed.

Let me read to you a few remarks appended to the Tolson Committee Report on Man-power by Congressman George H. Bender of Ohio. "The demand by the military for a huge army," he writes, "is based in part on the assumption that one or more of our Allies will collapse in the coming year. Upon this assumption, it is then argued that we can rely only on ourselves, therefore let's have a huge army of thirteen million men. And to equip such an army even with training weapons would require practically all our present war production. Therefore these advocates of a huge army move logically to the next point, the reduction or stoppage of Lend-Lease shipments to our Allies. When it is pointed out to these advocates of a thirteen-million-man army that our Allies may collapse if we stop Lend-Lease shipments, they have no answer.

The international implications of army demands for man-power are seldom understood. But they are as important as the need to consider man-power requirements of industry and agriculture. This war is far too important to be left wholly in the hands of the military. It requires every one of us. It requires an over-all viewpoint."

Congressman Bender speaks of an army demand for thirteen million men, and since then Secretary Stimson has placed the figure at seven and a half million by the end of 1943, which, with other services counted in, means an armed force of around nine million. Certainly nine million is better than thirteen. But no one has explained publicly the need for an army of even this size in terms of the war next year. Secretary Stimson said that there will be three and a quarter million ground-combat forces. How are they or the quarter part of them to be transported to the various fronts and supplied there by the maximum shipping that we know will be available next year?

Here is a vital figure. It takes six times as much tonnage to ship a complete army and its fighting equipment to any overseas front and to maintain it there as it does to ship the fighting equipment alone. If we insist on waiting till we can do the fighting ourselves, we will use six times as much tonnage as if we send the fighting equipment to be used by our Allies. The Russians are now fighting the Nazis. The British are now fighting them actively in Egypt. The Chinese have man-power by the millions, and they are now fighting the Japanese and can fight them on land perhaps more effectively than we can fight them by capturing stepping-stones in the Pacific. These are truisms of the war. They are the factors that need to be weighed in determining the size of our armed forces, the nature of our war production and the distribution of our man-power. What kind of war we decide to fight is not merely a military decision. It is a political decision of the most stupendous nature. To repeat what Congressman Bender said—and he was studying the problem from the vantage point of an investigating committee—this decision "requires every one of us. It requires an over-all point of view."

LIBERAL EDUCATION IN WARTIME

November 5, 1942

In a broadcast I made on the first of January this year, looking ahead to the effect the war was going to have on the American people, I said that if it brings heavy Axis blows and a certain

measure of Axis successes, and calls on Americans to reduce their standard of life at the same time, much patience, much clear thinking, and a high degree of faith will be needed. Shortages will have to be borne with resignation; good things like education will have to be cut down, and the wide range of non-essentials in home life will have to be narrowed down almost to the vanishing point. Let me confess that I was quite wrong as to when this was going to happen. I thought it would come to pass this year. And it hasn't. It has taken longer to organize the country on a war footing than I had foreseen. But it will happen next year. But I want to report on one passage of the prediction, the effect of the war on education. You will have some intimations of it. But probably not enough, because the man-power problem, as I have said before, is not being publicly discussed, and the public so far has no chance at all to take part in guiding the policy. Indeed there seems to be no master plan of the war to which the man-power problem can be referred, and our distribution of man-power is being decided on a basis of compromise between the competing elements in our national life. Thus the army, the navy, industry, agriculture, all need men if the war is to be won. But it still is not clear what kind of war it is to be, how large the army really needs to be, and so how many men are needed to win it. In this competition for man-power one basic factor is not being given any weight to speak of, and that is the needs of America after the war. It is not part and parcel of the man-power study that we are fighting the war to provide us a peace, and that America at peace needs men and women trained for industry, science, leadership, and that without them it will come out definitely impaired. And here is where the effect of the use of man-power touches the colleges, and their future. I say touches, but I should better say sideswipes them. And I should better say, too, the liberal colleges. For our technical schools probably will not be much damaged.

Liberal education has been part of America from the earliest days of the colonies. We are the first nation which ever determined to provide a free education to its children, and we have sent a larger proportion of our young people to higher schools than any other nation in the world. We are what we are, in part, because of the place of liberal education in our civilization. Nobody denies that to-day, certainly not the men who are working at the man-power problem for the army and navy. They, however, are quite properly laying their hands on the young men they need for the armed services, and are quite properly concerned in giving them the preparation they need for the armed services and nothing else.

It is not their job to be planning the culture and civilization of a post-war America. I can say they are doing their particular tasks with conscience and ability. And they are quite aware of the impact their policies will have on American colleges. They are at all pains to use the colleges as they exist wherever possible. They are going to use the portions of existing faculties that fit into military and naval preparation. But it is undeniable that in the draft of eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds they are stripping the colleges of more than two-thirds of their men students in these age groups. Let me, as an aside, say that personally I think they are right in wanting eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds in the fighting services, for young men do make the best combat troops. And for my part I would not want the use of them restricted by any artificial ruling.

Both the army and navy expect to place in the colleges a vast number of young men for special preparation for military or naval service. The number is not yet announced, but it will be more perhaps than two-thirds of all the men in freshman classes last year. The army and navy will pay for their preparation, and the navy will give quite an education, as well as training. The services are going to select these men on a democratic basis, which means without consideration of the student's ability to pay, and with consideration solely of his individual qualifications. This means that some persons who would not have had any education are going to get a partial one. It means, too, that many schools will be able to carry on, and will find they can adapt part of their faculties to the curriculum laid down by the armed forces. But that means, too, that the education or training given these young men fits them primarily and almost exclusively to be fighters and the leaders of fighters. That, I think, is as it should be. It is not the job of the army and navy, faced with war, to do anything else. As to particular groups of students, the doctors and dentists will be allowed to finish their educations. So will engineers and technical persons needed in the armed forces. Certain sciences will not be so favoured. There will be no law students whatever, not out of the physically-fit men students. There will be no able-bodied young men specializing in civil government, in economics, political science, sociology, all the skills that will be needed in maintaining our health as a democracy after the war. All right, if that is what the war costs, that is what it costs.

But is it what the war needs to cost? That is a question I am unable to answer, and I know nobody who can. We seem to have no master plan which sets our man-power schedule on the basis of an agreed United States policy.

Therefore we do not know whether we need to take this and that group, including the eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, to make soldiers of them all. Perhaps we do. If we do, we should take them. I only say it would be folly to take them all if we don't need them all.

But, assuming that we do need them, is it necessary to crush liberal education, which this programme does? Here an answer is given in Washington that 25 to 33 per cent of the young men will not meet physical requirements and so can go on with their educations. And then there are the women. That is, the immediate post-war world will have to depend more than it ever has before on the leadership of women, and on men who are physically substandard. As far as it concerns the women, that is almost a sensational statement, but if that is what the war means, it has to be accepted. And by that statement the women, and the men who fail to pass physical examination, should be included in any plan for education in wartime. And if they were assured an education, most of the liberal colleges would be able to carry on and they would be saved for a peacetime civilization. Then there would be no impairment of our education facilities; there would, at the most, be a shift in the personnel of our college graduates, with far greater dependence on women.

In addition, the men in the armed forces, as soon as the war ends, could be given an education of sorts even before they are demobilized, and a good many of them could be rushed back to the colleges to receive as good training for civilian life as they had for military life. That all adds up to a fascinating and in the main a satisfactory programme. But let me break the news to you that this is not the programme being drafted in Washington to-day. Nobody is speaking for post-war America, for peacetime civilization.

Nobody is making sure that the liberal colleges can do the work which in a sense is now more important than ever before. For the training of civilians for peacetime life would need public money, and that would have to be voted by Congress. And if there were a plan to re-educate fighters into civilians after the armistice, that also would need money. I am not saying that some civilian policy is not going to emerge from the situation. But I can assure you it is not part and parcel of the approach to the problem of manpower for army, navy, and industry to-day. There have been proposals for the federal subsidy of colleges. That might be the first step toward government-dominated educations. A better solution would be the subsidy of students. It would be wise to start now to train the women for the important responsibilities they will have

to bear, and the men found unfit for military service. They too can be chosen on a democratic basis. It should be possible to give them scholarships combined with war work, so that they make a contribution to the country at the same time that the country makes a contribution to them. This is no insoluble problem, no more so than training men for fighting. But somebody has to be doing it, and doing it as part of any wise over-all administration of man-power. The war does come first, but that doesn't mean that other education must be neglected. Second things still come second, and the future of peacetime America is worth farsighted treatment. It needs it now, before it is too late.

A GLIMPSE INTO HITLER'S MIND

November 9, 1942

THERE is so much to say about the news of North Africa it is hard to know where to begin. But I think I shall start with a mind, and the mind of one man, and the one man is Adolf Hitler. The human mind is one of the most absorbing of all studies, just how it happens to think what it thinks, just how it works under stress, and what it discloses of the truth even when it is telling a lie. Hitler made a speech before his old Nazi colleagues in Munich last night. It was an occasion when the hair comes down easily, and Hitler's self-censorship wasn't working with normal watchfulness. And last night Hitler was under peculiar strain. He had had the news of the American landing in North Africa. The war had entered a new phase. What was it that popped into Hitler's mind to tell his old colleagues? Oh yes, he fulminated and promised to meet the new Allied move with a counterstroke of his own. He hinted darkly at new frightfulness developed by German inventive genius. And then he made the all-revealing comment. In the last war, he said, the Kaiser had fled from Germany and left it to its fate. But he, Adolf Hitler, would never do that. No indeed, Adolf Hitler would not run away, he would stay and fight it out.

Now wasn't that a revealing idea to present itself in the mind of Adolf Hitler yesterday? He already was facing a temptation to run away and was rejecting it. He had had the news a few hours before that opened a new road. He saw with his swift intuition to the end of that road. So as he stood before his Nazi colleagues he pledged that he, Adolf Hitler, would never run away like the Kaiser. It is the most promising commentary on the American landing in Africa that could have been supplied from any person in the whole world.

A point to stress about the landing in Africa is that it is a joint operation. It is the creative work of the combined American and British chiefs of staff working in Washington. In the hue and cry for unified command, here is the product of collaboration of the closest and most intimate kind. Let us get it in perspective. It is the greatest amphibious military operation ever undertaken in modern history. Perhaps the figures published about its magnitude, which are not official, are an exaggeration at this moment. But the triumph of its preparation and the perfect execution and the timing are a work of art beyond praise. Just how many months have gone into the study and labour of getting it ready is not disclosed, but it was a good many. So it was going forward behind the scenes all the time that the campaign for the second front was rising to its strident clamour. One needs now ask himself which is the better way to use these forces, in Africa, where they are providing a permanent strategic base at not too large cost, or to have sacrificed them, as many of or most of them would have been sacrificed if they had opened a second front on the continent of Europe. The Russians are bound to feel some relief now, though it will not be as great as from a new front on the continent of Europe. A sacrificial second front might have been short-lived in its relief. But the African landings are a permanently expanding contribution.

ARMISTICE DAY. CARLSON'S RAIDERS

November 11, 1942

THIS is Armistice Day. The very mention of the word armistice is a reminder of great joy that swept the world twenty-four years ago to-day, and a reminder that joy was a delusion, since the world to-day fights, groans, and hungers for another armistice day, one that will bring joy that will not be a delusion. Looking at it with a little perspective, one can see that what happened after the last armistice had to happen, not because there are evil men and women, but because there was not enough wisdom twenty-four years ago. So the question to-day about the armistice to come is whether men and women are wiser than they were and will know what to do with the peace when they achieve it. This may not appear to be an appropriate moment to talk about that, for our minds are absorbed with great dramatic events like the African campaign and the fighting in the south Pacific. They are caught up in the confusion of domestic policies. But Armistice Day is a day when one is entitled to think of the truth behind the actualities of the moment. We are fighting a war, and to win the war is

our first task. But we are fighting this war because peace broke down and we had not thought through the problems of maintaining peace. What we are fighting for, then, is not only to bring the war to an end, but to bring it to an end which does not confront us with its early recurrence. We are fighting for a second chance to do what we failed to do twenty-four years ago. We are fighting for a durable peace, and if we are not wiser than before we shall not get it. Twenty-four years ago we hoped that we could have peace without accepting any great responsibility for it. It was no crime to think that or to try out the thought. If it had been possible, so much the better. But as the peace crumbled around us we naturally thought less of the lack in our own contribution to it, but saw mostly the evil of the men who were wrecking it. They were evil, all right. Now they have flooded the world with the woe of their iniquity. Even so they would have far less scope to work their evil if the peace had been strong, which it could have been had we borne a full part of the responsibility for it. And in a sense we must reverse the song "Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition," so that we pass the ammunition and don't forget to praise the Lord. And by praising the Lord I mean understanding the inadequacy of our wisdom in the past, so as to add to it, as well as the evil against which we are fighting.

If you think there is any contradiction in this, listen to the story of Evans Carlson. He is a marine. The marines are tough, but there is a special branch of the marines which is especially tough. These men are called Carlson's Raiders. I wonder how many of you met their commander, Evans Carlson, a year or two before the war. He addressed many meetings around the country about conditions in China. He had learned about China the hard way, having trudged thousands of miles of it on foot when he was Marine Intelligence Officer there. He was no great shakes as a speaker. He was rather ungainly. His clothes hung awkwardly on him. Wheedling audiences wasn't his line. He was unpolished; he hadn't a mote of histrionic talent. All he had was a personality so sincere that it filled a room, so that he awoke confidence, and made friends, not by his gifts but with his character. Evans Carlson knew something about guerrilla fighting from having watched the Chinese at it. And when we got into the war he disappeared from the roster of speakers on behalf of China, and his friends heard from him in southern California, where he was assigned to the organization of his raiders, only he couldn't tell his friends what he was doing. The first that most of them heard was when Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson led the marines who made the Makin Island landing, for which they have been since decorated. Now they are on Guadal-

canal. Carlson's Raiders have learned to combine guerrilla fighting, as perfected by the Chinese, with the Indian fighting of our own history, and to conduct it on the two dimensions of amphibious warfare. They are a peculiarly American brand of commandos, and I repeat that they are tougher than marines, if there can be such a thing. Tillman Durdin, in last Sunday's *New York Times*, wrote from the south Pacific about Carlson's Raiders. And I want to quote a few sentences. "Carlson's aim," he states, "was to build a thoroughly American and thoroughly democratic organization. He wanted to develop the utmost individual initiative and responsibility. He abolished officer privilege. There is no officers' mess among the raiders. The officers wear the same clothes and carry the same equipment as the men and live exactly like them. Discipline is firm but informal, based on knowledge, reason, and individual volition. Carlson especially wants his men to know why they are fighting and what they are fighting for. This is threshed out in group meetings at which he frequently makes a short talk emphasizing American ideals of democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion. Meetings are often forums at which everything from the world strategy of the war to the limitation of individual incomes is discussed. His forums are often devoted to free discussion of problems affecting the whole unit, and his men bring forward a good many ideas. Problems are threshed out too; orders are explained. These meetings usually include entertainment programmes with amateur dramatics, orchestra performances, and group singing. The raiders have a number of songs of their own, some lustily ribald. One is a march tune called 'Carlson's Raiders.'"

So it *can* be done. War can be fought by sharpening the intelligence, by increasing, rather than diminishing, the democratic fellowship with human beings. And while there are many other groups here and abroad sincerely and faithfully serving with all their enthusiasm to bring into being a better America and a peaceful world, there is none more inspiring than these tough raiders under Evans Carlson. They are going to whip the craftiest and sturdiest of the enemy, and do it all the more ably by knowing why they are fighting and the kind of world they want. They are a steady invitation to all civilian Americans to think as hard and live as hard for true democracy as they are doing it in Guadalcanal. Such men will win us a genuine armistice day if the civilians back home don't lag behind in their thinking.

HOW A BUREAUCRACY FUNCTIONS

November 25, 1942

ANYONE in Washington following developments here soon becomes aware that many problems as seen from the inside are totally different from the way they appear from the outside. Presumably that always is true of a huge bureaucracy. Each set of men, working within their compartment, carrying out their duties, inevitably comes into competition with some other set of men, for both sets work under directives which cannot define matters too closely, and there always is a borderland for honest disagreement. Often the original directives prove to be inadequate to supply the basis for a compromise. Often the kind of organization proves to be incapable of performing the needed task. And there always is a tendency, when competition sets in, to add to the structure of the organization by putting some new person, or new office, over the conflicting offices. But even when this is done the new person will find himself in conflict with someone else, and the tendency once more is to add still another harmonizing office at the top. In the meantime individuals in the administration take the rap for delays which are due to defects in directives and organization. And as in all human affairs, persons with drive and ambition and the ability to take advantage of conflict exploit the confusion to promote themselves and add to their own powers. The news about these administrative conflicts gets printed, but it makes dull reading for the reason that the reader never knows anything about bureaucratic structure and doesn't care to learn. But the conflicts can be of tremendous importance. Just now a basic issue is involved in whether the administration of war production shall be under clear civilian control or shall pass to the army. Put in such simple terms, it should be fairly easy to decide in favour of a good civilian control, since the United States is a civilian republic with a tradition of civilians directing affairs even in wartime. And any citizen who stops to think about it, no matter how emotionally favourable he may be to the army, will prefer it that way as being part of what we call the American way of life.

The difficulties of administration within our own borders are, however, only part of the strain and struggle that characterize Washington. The joint operations of the war with the British, not to mention other governments of the United Nations, suffer from lack of thoroughly good organization. But these administrative problems have a way of working themselves to a solution within the bureaucracy, by the sheer need of doing things better.

It is of public interest to report that the problems are moving toward a solution.

SHIPPING FIRST, AIRCRAFT SECOND

November 30, 1942

THE question of the size of the American Army has been settled for the present. And it was disposed of not by a head-on collision within the Washington administration between advocates of a large army and those opposed to it. It has been disposed of by a decision which has ranked shipping first and aircraft second in our production programme. If these are to have that rank, and there is a limit to total production, as there is, then the equipment of a ground army would come third, and it simply becomes impossible to equip an army, a large part of which is not going to be used or ready to use next year. The emphasis is to be on bringing the utmost possible pressure on the enemy from American production in 1943, and that will be, first of all, airplanes. This decision has caused much of the competition in Washington. It also opens the doors to a closer co-ordination of the productive programmes of Britain and America for the common purpose of meeting the accepted strategic requirements. A master blueprint of the war has certainly not been conceived, but a kind of one has certainly evolved. And, being there, production can be adjusted to meet its requirements.

PERSPECTIVE ON THE FIRST YEAR OF AMERICA AT WAR

December 7, 1942

I WONDER if it has struck you as it has me to-day how hard it is to get America's first year of war into clear perspective. What have we done really well? What have we done really badly? Obviously what we did really badly was to be caught by surprise at Pearl Harbour. And that, at least, has been made unpleasantly vivid and telling in the Pearl Harbour release of the Navy Department. Are there merits on the achievement side of the ledger to offset it? We are entitled to say gratefully, indeed there are. As a democracy, which has lived along without dedication to the art of war, and must always begin late, and always be found unready, we have lived through a really remarkable year. For one thing, we have formed a sound public opinion about the war, with people on the whole quite clearly understanding that it has to be won, that win-

ning it is going to be a very costly process, that there is no short cut to victory, and no road of compromise to early peace. Whatever comment can be made about public opinion, no truthful complaint is possible that the silent fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters who comprise the bulk of this nation do not know what the war is about and are not ready to bear their share to have it won. This solid core deserves good leadership, and this year has demonstrated that our war leadership can be farsighted, incisive, imaginative, and bold. It has not been above criticism, but it has been proved better than much of the criticism to which it has been subjected. These two, a sound public opinion and an able leadership, are what a democracy should expect of itself in supreme crisis. But on the achievement side of the ledger are two items which almost deserve to be called miracles. They are the creation of the American Army and the expansion of American industry. It is true part of the army was created last year before we actually went to war. Even so we have now nearly five million men under arms. They are being given superb equipment and superb training. Not only that, this army has been built out of the so-called soft American boys. We have had no youth movements, no drilling of children, no total indoctrination, none of the political ecstasy needed to build an army in a Fascist state. Our young men have gone from their altogether peaceful lives and learned to become competent soldiers in record time, in months compared with the years needed by the Fascist timetable. Personally I think more attention could be paid to their indoctrination in the traditions and values of democracy than the army has found time to give them. It would make them still better soldiers, and after the war still better citizens. But achieving this army, on the scale and of the quality that has been reached, is something that will never be forgotten in American history.

Our first year of war has brought our army to Africa, and we ended the year on a note that was as high and confident as Pearl Harbour was low and dismayed. We all see that if the Axis is driven out of Africa we shall be able to get at the continent, presumably starting with Italy. And then the warfare can be taken to Hitler, at fronts of our choosing, and the beginning of the end is in sight. It is noteworthy that our army no sooner had landed in Africa than a temporary deal was made with Darlan of Vichy. This was explained by President Roosevelt as a temporary expedient. However, other factors in the international picture appear somewhat Darlanesque. For one thing, the safety of our expeditionary force in Africa needs the good favour of Franco. And Franco is no friend, he is an opportunist, as is Darlan. Then comes along the acceptance

of Otto of Hapsburg to head a committee recruiting an Austrian legion in this country. And these three factors, whether they are related or not, appear to make a pattern, and an unpleasant one. Next, if we hope to get Italy out of the war, peace would have to be made with persons now in Italy, now enjoying political prestige there, and they would hardly be ideologically of our democratic brotherhood, or they would not be in Fascist Italy, alive and enjoying prestige. The logic of these matters would seem to point toward Germany, and if one were a slave of logic one might wonder if in Germany, too, we should be ready to make peace with what might be called the wrong people. I hasten to say that I do not accept the logic at all. I don't think there is a pattern. I don't think there is the least connection between the arrangement with Darlan and with Otto of Hapsburg. And I curb my logic by thinking of two men, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, for I am convinced that they never would make peace with Germany in a way to leave that country a permanent or potential menace. But I do believe that the war aims and war plans of the United Nations as to Germany should be more clearly defined this coming year. We say we shall fight until Hitler is destroyed. I wish it might be phrased more fully, that we fight until the Hitler regime is destroyed and the German Army is beaten. And if that is the objective, all the minor difficulties of getting at Hitler, the expedients of Darlan and Franco and an Italian Badoglio or Humbert, will be purged and purified by the final and the only true victory. For if the German Army is defeated, the minor Fascist dictatorships that lean on Hitler and his army will be swept away.

We are going to be told one day that the Nazis and the German Army are not identical. On some minor respects they are not. But it would be a grave error to say that the German Army has been only the agent of Hitler and his regime, and not that Hitler and his regime have been the agents of the German Army. There is no point in trying to settle which is which, the agent and the principal. There can be no lasting peace without the defeat of the German Army. And having said that about the German Army, I extend it to include the Japanese Army and Navy.

To-day we start our second year of war. In this year, the optimists tell us, the war in Europe may end. It may. But if it ends with the defeat of the German Army that indeed will be a miracle. I am under no misapprehension, the German Army can only be beaten at heavy cost. But I am sure that the cost of not beating the German Army will be far, far heavier.

YUGOSLAVIA—SYMBOL OF POST-WAR EUROPE, NEED FOR UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENT

December 17, 1942

WITH the American army in North Africa planning to go somewhere else when the Axis is driven out of Tunisia, Yugoslavia is not so far from being an acute American interest, to use the word interest in its diplomatic sense. But it needs to become more than a diplomatic interest, it is something for everyone to be interested in who is thinking not only about winning the war, but winning the peace. Just now Yugoslavia is being discussed in terms of General Mihailovitch. He is charged with being pro-Axis. He is hotly defended against this charge. But Mihailovitch's miraculous feat in resisting the Nazis in the mountains of Serbia now turn out to have been, in part, the work of the so-called Partisan forces of Yugoslavia. The Partisans are sponsored and aided by elements in Russia, and there is a communist motive in it, though the Partisans are not preponderantly communist. The Partisans and Mihailovitch have not devoted themselves exclusively to fighting the Axis. A great deal of light is thrown on the subject by Louis Adamic in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Here is a story of confusion, of contradiction, of woe beyond words, and of political overtones of a portentous kind. It is a story in which one trips on the roots of old feuds and prejudices within Yugoslavia. It is a story in which the great powers of the past have played selfish and unconstructive roles. But there is no escaping from it. For this is not Yugoslavia alone, this is a symbol of the Europe in which peace must be made. And it must be made by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States working together, or it will not be made. And the story is a reminder that if the peace is to be made it will have to be worked out in its elements before the terms of even a preliminary treaty are drafted.

The situation is so confused that it is forbidding. But it must not be allowed to forbid attention and study. For in the main this is not the consequence of Yugoslavian weaknesses, but of the absence of a clear United Nations agreement. And though this agreement is not easy to come by, it will be easier to come by than to try to end this war with a sound peace if it is not come by. Here is another instance, along with the Darlan episode, of the need for much closer co-operation on the political front between the Allies. Political co-operation is hard to provide, as hard, certainly, as military co-operation. And though much has been done to provide it, and able workers are busy on it, they cannot succeed too quickly or too well to meet the need.

WE ARE AT WAR TO RE-ESTABLISH PEACE. THE NEED FOR
COURAGE

December 24, 1942

SINCE this is Christmas Eve, may I give each of you my Christmas greetings. To-night I am not going to talk about the war. Instead I want to talk about peace. No evening of the year could be more appropriate for such a subject, and the fact that we are at war does not make it less appropriate but more so. For we are not at war for war's sake, but for the sole purpose of re-establishing peace. Let me begin by saying something which some of you will have heard me say before. Peace is not just not being at war. And we shall never understand what it takes to preserve peace if that is as far as we think. We should see that war is the breakdown of peace. Then we shall see that if we do not build a better peace than we had before this war, we are sure to have another war. And if that happens, we shall not have won the war no matter how gloriously we may win the military victory. So in wartime we should do well to devote ourselves quite as much to a study of peace as to the study of war. This study should begin with an understanding of how the peace we enjoyed broke down, for unless we understand that, we shall not know how to build a more durable peace. We should be able to make that study now, in this time when the cost of war is so very great and so very personal, and do it without prejudice and without self-justification. It is pleasant to be able to blame others, and it is simple to fight a war with a profound sense of the right of our cause. We all are tempted to ascribe our being at war only to evil men, like Hitler and the militarists of Japan. The evil men and their evil purposes are undeniable. And they must be defeated, otherwise we shall live in slavery to them. But we shall do well to remember that evil men and evil purposes were not present at the end of the last war, not with the power to threaten us. They were beaten in that war. We had a fresh start. We made a peace. And that is the peace which slowly broke down. It was in its breakdown that the evil men and evil purposes were given their opportunity and were able to increase their power. If the peace had been more wisely worked at, it would not have given evil forces their scope. Now they have it, and it's so great that it has stirred almost the whole world to the most destructive war of all time. We must by all means fight the evil men and the evil forces. But beating them will not be enough. We must make a peace which does not permit the play of evil forces. In other words we must do better in the coming peace than we did before. In other words, in fighting the war we are learning the inadequacy

of our wisdom after the last war. We must recognize that the wise time to prevent the rise of evil forces is before they rise. We must recognize evil to be the product of conditions, not an independent force on its own, ever present, ever incalculable, and ever unconquerable.

If there is a crime wave in a sordid part of some city, and a study is made of the living conditions, it usually is found that better housing is needed, better schools and wiser teaching, better social relations between that part of the city and the more favoured sections. If people are intelligent they are not content to send a huge police force into that district to shoot up all the lawbreakers. They only do that until the lawbreakers get under control. But then they acknowledge that the crime wave really has its source in the inadequacy of the social dealings with that particular district. Either they do this or they resign themselves to a continuous crime wave, and a continuous recourse simply to the overpowering force of the police. In the same way we can lament that Hitler and Tojo are wicked men and that they make a terrible demand on us to save our country and our civilization. And having done them in, we may do nothing to change the conditions which produce them. Then we shall have more Hitlers and more Tojos in the future and we shall have hardly enough space in our cemeteries for the monuments to our fallen soldiers. Peace, I must emphasize, is a matter of the most urgent self-interest—self-interest to every individual in the nation and to the nation as a whole. It outranks in importance any other issue. Peace isn't what is distantly called an ideal. It is a practical matter; that is, a matter of practice. One must build peace. For peace isn't just not being at war; it is applying intelligence to keep evil forces from getting command in the world. It is planning for that purpose. It is accepting responsibility, as we do in our daily civic lives. I say this not to persuade you, for I am sure that the vast majority of Americans understand this quite well and believe it quite fervently. I am sure that they know that there can be no civic peace in which any individual sets out to be the judge of his own cause. And I am sure that they are able to carry over this truth to international relations and agree that there can be no peace in which a nation insists on being the judge of its own cause. For war is simply a nation trying to impose its judgment and other nations refusing to be imposed upon. We have justice in domestic affairs—an approximation of it—and an acceptance of its principles. Inside the nation we are free individuals, but only on the floor of justice, in which we are not free each to judge his own cause. In the same way nations must limit their individuality—or sovereignty—and accept the procedures

of law. Granted, nations have refused to limit their sovereignty in the past. But in the past they could afford not to. They lived in a world of space and distance. Our earth has shrunk. To-day when a nation becomes the judge of its own cause it may shake the entire globe.

What stopped us making a more durable peace after the last war was primarily our devotion to the idea of sovereignty. It is a hard concept to give up. But we are learning that it is a far harder concept to maintain.

One obstacle to thinking about the peace in the midst of the war is that we all have premonitions that it isn't going to be good enough to suit us. That is the dread we have from the last war. Many of us were shocked and dismayed by the Treaty of Versailles. I think that just now we as a nation are being dismayed by fears that the next peace also will be disappointing. We don't label the fears openly. But we do all ask ourselves, don't we, how are we ever to make a satisfactory peace with our varied assortment of allies? There are so many conflicting interests, so many traditional hostilities, we know in our bones that they aren't going to be harmonized in the peace treaty when it is written. In wartime, fired as we must be with a crusading zeal, we get carried away with a vision of a new earth, luminous and white in its perfection. And anything less is going to make the cost of war appear exorbitant. But as practical persons we also know we are not going to get this luminous and pure millennium. And we are deeply troubled about what we are going to get. As members of a democracy, we should not find it too difficult to be rid of our fears and guard ourselves against disillusionment. For we should face the fact that the peace is going to be a compromise. Not a compromise between good and evil, but between conflicting goods. For that is the way, as a democracy, we rule our domestic affairs. Democracy is a process of taking steps toward a goal. We have been at work making a better society for more than a hundred and fifty years. We haven't finished the job. We haven't yet made a reality of the visions seen by the Revolutionary leaders, the authors of the Declaration of Independence, and the draftsmen of the Constitution. What they gave us was not a perfect world, but the freedom to continue with the unfinished business of making it better. And that is the freedom for which we are fighting this war. We are not fighting for a perfect peace treaty, but for the freedom to begin to straighten out the affairs of the world by better methods than violence. The affairs of many nations are going to be harder to govern by discussion and by compromise than the affairs of a single democratic nation. But what we really want, if we are good Americans, is that

the nations shall have the privilege of justice and law, supported by mutual responsibility, so that study, discussion, debate, and ultimate compromise shall lead the new world steadily toward a more stable condition. We are not even going to get rid of the violence all at a single bound. There will be quite a police job to be done in the immediate years after this war. It isn't going to be an appetizing job either, for we shall just be beginning to lay down the principles and accepting the legal procedures of the new relationships. Some time will elapse before the police can pursue their duties on the highways of the world with the same obscurity that we like to have them do it in our civic life.

After the last war we rejected an opportunity to take what was useful in the Versailles treaty and the League, and begin the uphill work of bettering what was not useful in that treaty and the League. We were disappointed, and we drew back. And we shall be disappointed and draw back again if we allow ourselves to expect more than our good sense tells us will be possible to get. We shall do well to state our war aim first of all in the abstract, that is to be determined to work for peace after the war is over, determined to create the opportunity for the building of peace. We cannot be fighting for a specific and blueprinted millennium. We know we cannot get it. We know that other interests exist in the world, as authentic and as honourable as ours. We know that we must set our interests alongside theirs, and reach an agreement with them by the democratic device of compromise. We know that above all we must establish a world relationship in which evil forces are not allowed to rise to such power as to engulf us. If we are going to escape disillusionment, this is the time to face the reality of the compromises ahead. They should not be too hard for us to face, for we know how our own democracy works: we take our steps, we make our mistakes, we retrace our steps, and not yet have we achieved a society in which everybody has what he thinks he is entitled to. But we have seen the road ahead and kept on plodding. The road ahead for a world order now opens. We must enter it with the faith, patience, forbearance, and vigour which were needed in the making of America. It is for the privilege of dealing with reality, in the way of reality, that we are fighting for victory. It will be victory to do the slow work of the future at its deliberate pace. It takes more courage to hold a sober view than an ecstatic one. That is what we shall need.

WAR IN TERMS OF TRANSPORTATION—U-BOAT MENACE

December 30, 1942

EVERY now and again it is important to see the war not in terms of military events, man-power, and production, but in the measure of transportation. In terms of military events it is favourable to the United Nations, for the fact that since October the Axis has been forced to the defensive on all fronts. In terms of man-power and production the war is growing continually and steadily more favourable to our side. But the situation as to transportation is not improving at the same rate.

The number-one trouble continues to be the U-boat. It is no vagary of news fashions that we have stopped thinking and talking about the U-boat menace. We have stopped because the news policy of Great Britain in particular, which has been followed by the United States, has stopped revealing all the facts about shipping losses. The policy has not been frank for nearly eighteen months, when the British decided to forgo monthly announcements of lost tonnage. They then said they would issue summaries from time to time. But since then there has been chiefly silence. Presumably there is reason for not announcing losses, in that the information would be of value to the enemy in confirming facts about which he cannot be altogether certain. But the little good this concealment accomplishes is counterbalanced by the effect it has on the public here and in Britain. For without a keen appreciation of the shipping crisis—and it continues to be a crisis—public opinion cannot appraise the war intelligently. There is revealed to-day a figure of shipping losses which contradicts the popular impression that the situation has improved considerably since the worst times last spring. United Nations shipping losses are disclosed at a figure of about a million dead-weight tons a month at present. Since sinkings have virtually ceased in the neighbourhood of our own shores, these losses are in other regions. But it doesn't much matter where they are, so far as their effect on United Nations shipping strength is concerned, for our shipping is operated as a pool. A million tons of losses a month are not so much as United Nations shipping production in a month. So it isn't that we are losing the war on the U-boat. But we are not winning it fast enough. To put the fact another way, we need a continually growing surplus over present shipping tonnage to handle the expansion of American forces in Africa and, as we hope, ultimately in Europe. So the U-boat crisis is putting a brake on our military enterprise, and as the Nazis know this quite well, there is no point in our own public not knowing it too.

A SURVEY OF THE PAST YEAR

December 31, 1942

THIS is a natural evening to look back at the past year and to peer ahead into the year to come. Nineteen forty-two has been a more gratifying year than we had a right to expect on last New Year's Eve. It was clear that it was going to be a year of catching up. We had only just become a belligerent and we had a stupendous task of converting our life to a war basis. The Allies were behind in production, they still had to bring the offensives of the Axis to a halt, and to produce force of their own which could start the long and gruelling campaigns that should push the enemy back. The year in the Pacific started with a sequence of defeats. In Europe one awaited the new German advance into Russia, and it took more faith than calculation to believe that by to-night the Germans would not be in Moscow, Stalingrad, and Leningrad, and have completed their occupation of European Russia. No one could guarantee that Rommel would not drive through to Cairo and Suez, and that the Fascists of Europe would not join hands with the Japanese, and so have thrown their encirclement over two continents, with Africa, too, in their domain. Nineteen forty-two was the year in which the Axis had to win the war if it was going to win it. It was the last year in which the Allies would be inferior in men, weapons, and war materials. By to-night we have cruised past the shoals and reefs of these menaces. We end the year in a spirit of confidence, perhaps a shade too easygoing in our acceptance of our improved position.

We are better off than we knew we were going to be, because of great achievements. Some of these are unsung and unrecognized, such as the achievements of the individual men on ships and in battles, and some of them are not adequately acknowledged, as the work of the Navy in the Midway and Solomons battles, and the success of the British Eighth Army in standing off Rommel and then driving him back in the war's most spectacular retreat. Above all, stands the feat of the Russians. They not only bore the shock of the German offensives, but they actually added to their strength and vitality so as to bring this year's offensives to a stop inside Stalingrad and then launch their counteroffensives. This has been the outstanding contribution to the United Nations war in this year.

For many months the Allies gave ground. It could not have been otherwise, and the question was not whether to retreat but where the retreat could be stopped. But the Japanese came to the limit of

their reach, and so did the armies of Hitler. And by the end of the year the Axis was on the defensive.

The most spectacular event of the year was the landing in Africa. That act brought many men and much material to Morocco and Algiers, but it brought more; it brought dark foreboding to the Axis and high hope to the oppressed peoples of occupied Europe. It may not have been the turning point of the war, speaking in military terms. Probably it was less so than the defence of Stalin-grad. But the landing in Africa was the swinging of a sword in the light, where no sword or light had been before. It was a promise and a materialization. It was America, the name of a faraway country, transformed into men and tanks and planes, it was this America collaborating with Great Britain in an intricate operation of most amazing difficulties. Between them they were annihilating space, and the Axis would be beaten if space could be so effectively destroyed.

So in this year of nineteen forty-two we have lost less than had been reasonably expected and grew strong more quickly than reasonably could have been hoped. And the Axis showed signs, not of exhaustion, but of inability to maintain the rate of expanding power which the global war called for. They have disappointed themselves. We have surprised ourselves. And it is in this spirit that we go into nineteen forty-three. Last year was our year of catching up; next year will be our year of forging ahead. We shall begin to have the superiority, first in the air, then, as the months advance, on the ground, if not in numbers, then in weapons. And behind our fliers and sailors and soldiers will be an industrial plant the like of which the Axis cannot duplicate, and which had not even been dreamed of in the past. It would be interesting to speculate about the course of this coming year, to predict a campaign in this or that country, to foresee the likely countermoves, and try to fill in the box score in advance. My own sense of the future, if I may speak subjectively, is somewhat fatalistic. We are now caught up in the stream of doing, and the stream is stronger than any individuals of to-day. For what is in this stream is our past—all of it, both strong and weak—and, coming now to the test, we ourselves cannot be sure how we as a nation shall perform. For better or for worse, we are committed. An individual cannot foresee before his hour comes how he will act. A general, in the heat of a campaign, is submitted to the acid of the unknowable, and it eats away what is weak in his judgment and his character. And in the same way a nation goes to war with the stamina bred through generations, with the inventiveness of courageous spirits, with the capacity for work, with the ability to sacrifice, not any of them

developed on the spur of the moment, but filling the reservoir of its accumulated character as a nation. No doubt sometimes you have wondered whether the strong in us was going to be enough, and the weak in us was going to be too much, for us to triumph in this war and in the peace to come. Well, we can't be sure. We are what we are, and we aren't going to be better now. And it is what we already have become that will carry us to the point we are destined to reach.

But if we can't be sure, we can have deep satisfaction in appraising what has been done in this past year of our testing time. Living as I do in Washington, and seeing government at close hand, I hear a great deal about the inefficiency, the conflicts, the bottlenecks, the this and that of the experiences of one person or another. And these all make a lot of news, which I also have to read. It happens that I have spent a large part of my life as a foreign correspondent, which means that I have watched several governments at close hand. Perhaps I have become immune to a certain kind of tale about how badly a government is doing things. When I was in London last year I found myself several times with persons who were moaning and groaning about the dreadful way things were being done by the British Government. And I said, "Wait a minute, let me tell you about things in Washington." Whereupon the Englishmen looked startled and said, "For goodness' sake, don't. Let us at least have the comfort that government somewhere else is better."

Wherever there is government you can be sure there is friction, ferment, fever, frustration, and a high heat of personal fury. It is so in Berlin and in Moscow, not only in London and Washington. I am not saying that things couldn't be better in Washington, or that efforts should not be insistent on making them better. But I do say that the measure of progress is not the temper of critical observers who watch Washington. Washington and the nation are like a ship, and one could go from one part to another and find everywhere that the work isn't all going smoothly, that relations are not as they should be, that this corner is in need of overhaul, that morale of some individuals is low, and so on. And after such a roundtrip an observer might be tempted to say, this ship is doomed. But the answer is not how the ship seems on the inside, but what the day's run has been, and what is the progress on the voyage. The ship of America has moved remarkably this past year, and the prospect for a triumphant voyage is bright. That may not be the daily story in your newspapers, or the topic of your congressman's last speech. Well, judge for yourselves, take a look at the chart. See where you were a year ago to-night, what you were

thinking and fearing about the voyage. Then look at the chart and see where you are to-night. And carry the lines of progress forward and see where they point for the year to come. Most of the news in your papers about Washington has been true enough. Washington *is* full of friction and conflict. But I don't think it would matter much who was running the government, or with what personnel; Washington would still be full of friction and conflict, for that is the nature of any government I have been close to. The friction and conflict and criticism are all part of the process. They are not what matters most. What matters most is the voyage.

The truth is that beside friction and conflict there is something in great volume and high quality in Washington which doesn't make news, and so it isn't recognized enough. It is the loyalty and hard work of the persons who are here. If there is a harder-working city in the world than Washington, I never heard of it. That is a generalization, but I think it holds despite the exceptions. Men and women of ability toil long hours. They have to work harder, I grant you, because government work always is frustrating. Nor is it well compensated, and certainly it does not bring much reward in praise and personal honour. The same hard work has been done not only in Washington, but wherever war work has been in hand. The fervour and public spirit of industrial management in this war has been, as a whole, a flowering of citizenship and ability of the highest order. The devotion of American workers in industry and on the farms has been steady and deep, and not enough gratitude has been expressed for that.

I have said before that two most remarkable achievements this year have been the building of the American Army and the expansion of American war production. Any year that records them both is a great year in American history. Neither has been done without mistakes and delays, but they are there to see. And the army is in Africa to-day, the marines are on Guadalcanal, the navy is active in all corners of the world, our planes are ranging over the Pacific, over Burma, China, and the homelands of the European axis. This is the fruit of tireless effort and of a leadership that has been both sound and imaginative. A year ago we had little inkling of it. And to-night, before we go into another year which is bound to bristle with incessant criticism like the old one, we can quite truthfully and gratefully think back over nineteen forty-two and take heart from it. It looks very much as though, being what we are, we are going to fulfil our destiny and not fall short of it.

LEND-LEASE, HOW IT WORKS

January 12, 1943

AMONG the investigations to be made by the new Congress will be one of the Lend-Lease administration. Obviously any administration spending so much money should be checked up. And there would be no point in calling attention to a routine check-up if it were going to be a routine check-up. Perhaps it will be only that. If so, what I am going to say is superfluous. But there are persons who object to the basic idea of Lend-Lease. Others object to persons having to do with the distribution of Lend-Lease. Others object to the possibility that Lend-Lease aid is not going to be changed into a financial debt that will fall due after the war.

If it is granted that we are in a war in which our future freedom is at stake, there really is little to be said against the principles of Lend-Lease. We are fighting as a member of a coalition. Lend-Lease is a means of keeping our associates fed and equipped so that they can fight. It would, of course, be an argument against Lend-Lease if those whom we are aiding are not making their full contribution to the war. That, however, is not to be the motive of an investigation. And it could not be, for their contribution is a matter of public knowledge and deep public gratitude. We do have some differences with our associates. But as to the British, everyone knows that they held off the Germans in 1940, that they survived a winter of Hitler's and Goering's blitzes, that they have built up an air force that to-day is equal to the Luftwaffe, that they drove Italy out of most of its empire, and now have driven Rommel close to Tripoli, not to mention their silent, tireless task of keeping command of the seas. If it had not been for the British, we should not have the generous promise of victory which now so encourages us. The German attack on Russia found that country ready and able to enter the war on a scale that has weakened the Germans more than any other warfare they have undertaken, so that the Russian contribution to the final victory looms magnificently large. Certainly no one will criticize the Lend-Lease aid for China, save to lament that it is so small, or to the Fighting French, or others in the long list of associates in the common effort. If anyone cares to argue against Lend-Lease as a means to a common victory he really puts himself in the position of advocating that America win the war by itself. For example, if he should say, "Don't send butter to Russia," he would be saying, "Don't strengthen the Russian soldier to fight the Nazis, but strengthen only our own boys. Let them whip the Nazis." That may be a valiant idea, but it will hardly strike anyone

as sound who has relatives in the armed forces who are going to have to fight the Nazis. They will want their relations to have all the help they can get. They would be quite ready to go without butter if it meant keeping healthy Russian soldiers at the front. Obviously it is the most elementary and enlightened kind of self-interest to give all we can spare of our supplies to keep our Allies equipped for the war. And what saves us from being selfish in the narrow sense of the word is that we also are intent on contributing our maximum share to the fighting.

The basis of Lend-Lease is that the United Nations are all making a maximum effort and, in that sense, are sharing equally in bearing the burden of the war. The Russians, for example, are giving lives where we are giving materials, but that discrepancy is not our fault or their virtue. That is due to space and time. But certainly we are not going to try to enter the lives and the materials in the same set of books after the war, so as to enter into a ten-year debate with the Russians over war debts. At least that is not what anyone wants if he knows that every Russian soldier is doing a job which, if not done by him, would have to be done by one of our own soldiers.

I hear in Washington that the public, with shortages coming on, is going to blame Lend-Lease, and that housewives are going to leave the shops, having been unable to buy what they want, and feel resentment at the thought that the food is going to our Allies. I don't believe it. I don't believe that any considerable number of American housewives has any desire to see American soldiers fighting the war by themselves. A housewife can see as well as anyone the connection between rationing in this country and saving American lives by aiding our Allies.

But housewives, too, should know that Lend-Lease makes very little difference to the American dinner table. In the year ended June thirtieth only one pound in every two hundred pounds of our beef and veal went abroad under Lend-Lease. No lamb or mutton was shipped abroad. One pound in seven and a half of pork, one pound in five of canned fish, one egg out of every dozen, and what is the equivalent of one quart of milk out of every twenty-five went abroad in milk products. One out of every two hundred pounds of corn products was shipped abroad by Lend-Lease, one in every hundred pounds of wheat and wheat products, and one in every hundred pounds of sugar. This is the share of what we sent. But as we increased our production in most of these headings, it is probable that we actually had more for American meal-times than in the year before the war. True there will be shortages; true the housewife will not be able to buy so much. But the chief

reason will be that the army and navy have taken the food for men in our own armed forces. Even if housewives don't like it, they aren't going to grumble on that score.

Another feature of Lend-Lease, not often enough expounded, is its being a two-way system. We get as well as give. When it started, and we had few men abroad, we gave a great deal more than we could expect to receive. That is changing. For example, we get a good deal now from the British. Two thirds of the civilian and military labour for military works and services in the United Kingdom is being employed on work for the American Army. We are getting hospitals, barracks, officers' accommodations, air-fields, repair depots and their maintenance. The reciprocity in New Zealand and Australia is large. But even if it were less, it wouldn't alter the soundness of the principle involved. If this war is serious, if our life as a free nation really is at stake, and in saving it we are making a combined effort, all that needs investigation insofar as principles are concerned is whether use is being made of what we are sending abroad. But I doubt whether we shall ask our associates in this war to parade before us their millions of casualties, their ravaged lands, and their wrecked cities.

Whether or not there has been what is called boondoggling in Lend-Lease, as some people suspect, is another matter. Of course, if the administration of Lend-Lease has been frivolous or dishonourable, that would call for abrupt correction. But that would not change the value of self-help in Lend-Lease. If it has been shabbily done—of which there is no known evidence—we have not helped ourselves well. We shall not have given what our Allies most needed when they most needed it, and it will take more American lives to make up the deficit.

A POLITICAL HEADACHE. DARLAN ASSASSINATION

January 14, 1943

THE great expeditionary force to North Africa, once the cause of profound joy through a large part of the world, has become a serious political headache. Part of the pain, heaven knows, has a physical cause. But part of it is due to a lamentable misunderstanding about the whole basis of the Allied operations in North Africa. A common assumption is that General Eisenhower is the boss in North Africa, hence he is ultimately responsible for everything that happens there. He is thought to be the one not freeing the political prisoners, suppressing news, and bringing in the scum of Vichy. General Eisenhower might have made himself boss in

North Africa had he continued to fight the French until he conquered them, had he ousted them, and had he set up his own military authority in both French Algiers and in the French protectorate of Morocco. General Eisenhower presumably could have undertaken this conquest had he judged it wise to do so, for it is not likely that he would have been given command of this expedition with his hands tied in advance. It has been reported that he was given two directives between which he had to choose, being governed by conditions as he found them. One directive authorized him to "occupy" North Africa, which would have entailed, as I said, conquering the country, driving out its administration, and replacing it with his own. The other alternative was to deal with the administration in North Africa which he found there. If he chose to act on this directive, he would come to terms with that administration, and, having done so, he would not be head of an occupying army but would be head of an army of allies, dealing with that administration as its ally. General Eisenhower acted on the second alternative, and in doing so he presumably saved himself from having to spend months in conquering North Africa. And that gave him these months to be used in preparing to oust the Axis from North Africa. It may be there are arguments for General Eisenhower acting on the other alternative and taking over the actual government in North Africa himself. If he had done so, he would at any rate have been in fact responsible for everything happening under his own administration. Now he is being held responsible while in fact he had little or no responsibility for it whatever, since what is objected to is the personnel and the policy of the administration which he chose not to oust. So those who criticize the use of Admiral Darlan in the first place must be clear about it that if Darlan had not been used the alternative seemed to be to fight till the French were ousted, to devote months to the task, and to make our entry into Hitler's war a campaign not against Axis troops, but against Frenchmen. I should add, however, that there are persons with knowledge of the facts who believe that for the briefest few hours General Eisenhower might have used some other Frenchman, instead of Darlan, and, having Darlan a prisoner, kept him a prisoner, and yet have united North Africa in short order. So far as I know, no suitable person was on the spot, and that speculation must remain a speculation. The reality is that Darlan was there, he was ready and eager to co-operate, and he did have the authority to bring the fighting to an early end.

And it happens that Darlan, whatever his motives, proved to be exceptionally compliant. We had no authority over him in a

legal sense. But when suggestions were made to him he responded promptly. More than once he found that his own orders were not being carried out. For the administration in North Africa is a garden full of political weeds. Some of them were planted by reactionaries of the Third Republic, others by the Vichy regime, while the seeds of some were dropped by elements close to the Axis.

When Darlan was assassinated, General Giraud took his place. But he did not become any more General Eisenhower's man than Admiral Darlan. If anything, he was without Darlan's personal motives for making himself congenial to us. Besides, he was green at the job, and he hesitated to plunge in and make drastic changes. And so far as his own politics are concerned, he has the outlook of an ultraconservative French general, and the complexion of the administration he rules over probably does not startle him as it would a lifelong worker in one of the more democratic parties in the French chamber.

It must be recognized, too, that General Giraud found himself in a position of great importance and power. We are in a military campaign; we want to get at the Axis. He could dispose over troops, and he sent troops to the front which are equal in number to the British and the Americans at the front. We are not in a position to tell General Giraud what to do. We can ask, as one can ask a friendly associate. We do ask. General Giraud responds like a friendly associate. But we can't tell him how to run his affairs.

The trial of the assassin of Darlan is still a mystery. It may seem to the outside world that the censor serving General Eisenhower is sitting on the facts. Nothing could be further from the truth. We simply don't know the ins and outs of the assassination. We weren't in on the trial any more than we had the responsibility to protect the life of Darlan. The trial was conducted by the French administration as an internal affair. The public is beginning to get scraps of information about it. Now it is reported that royalists are involved. There are plenty of royalists in Northern Africa. Remember, the French deputies in Algiers, who sat in the French chamber, were pretty far to the right, most of them. The French local administration even before Vichy was ultraconservative. It is among such that French royalists found listening ears.

That, then, is the background in North Africa. And against this background one must place the news that is in the forefront these days. First there is the problem of the relations between De Gaulle and Giraud. So long as there is a French administration with which we are associated as an ally, one thing we must be careful

about, and that is to keep it from becoming a formal government of France. For if it should become a French government and have an army (which we have equipped), it might exercise undue influence on France itself after it is liberated. It is next to impossible to believe that the political elements present in North Africa to-day ever could be whittled at, and pared away so as to become a political regime that would suit the French people in a liberated France. A natural desire would be to see De Gaulle and Giraud get together. De Gaulle spokesmen say that if they do, the Vichyites will have to be ousted, and the regime must be brought into some form of legitimist succession to, or continuation of, the Third Republic. That is impressive as a theory, but it is not sure that the reactionaries in North Africa who are the remnants of that Third Republic, even if led by De Gaulle and Giraud, would constitute a regime consistent with the aspirations of the French in France. Possibly these doubts are not justified. But the fact is that if there were to be a purge and a reorganization of the French administration, that in itself is a kind of revolution. It would mean the passing of power from a purely local administration to a political entity much more national in character. The Fighting French have given assurances that they do not wish a government set up in North Africa, to be recognized as such. If it were not a government, it still could hardly fail to have the aspiration to become one. That in itself may not be a valid argument against it. And an early meeting between De Gaulle and Giraud was again promised to-day in a dispatch from Algiers, quoting the new British Minister there, Harold Macmillan, who said an agreement would be quickly reached. Removal of some of the Vichyites was believed to have been awaiting settlement of a bigger issue, which was not disclosed. Formation of a changed regime based on a De Gaulle and Giraud agreement, however, bears on the future of France, and so should not be urged without a full sense of what it entails.

There are, broadly speaking, five possible courses we can take. We can go on as we are. Probably this is dangerous, for there are explosive elements in North Africa. For example, if the French themselves should bring in Peyrouton, former Minister of the Interior in Vichy, it might lead to a destructive outbreak. Further, the British have strong views on the North African situation, and some heed must be paid to their judgment.

A second possibility is that we should take over the administration in North Africa ourselves, and become an army of occupation. This has ideological and military objections. It probably would postpone the campaign against Tunisia, and it might blow up a great deal of political dynamite. A third course is to accept

the lesser revolution of letting the power pass to an organization headed by De Gaulle and Giraud, based though it would be on ultraconservative elements in North Africa. A fourth course is mentioned, a form of trusteeship in which the sovereignty in North Africa would be held in trust by some of the United Nations working through hand-picked French officials in North Africa. This sounds excellent, but there are legal obstacles, for there is no legal entity which could exercise the trusteeship. One would have to be created for the purpose. A fifth course is that we might institute negotiations with General Giraud, as a friend and associate, in which we could persuade him to carry through some of the reforms so greatly needed, particularly as to odoriferous personnel in his regime. What the prospects would be for this course no one not on the spot can say. One of the great difficulties, however, is that a portion of the public in this country and in Great Britain insists on seeing what is happening in North Africa as the product of ideology in our State Department, as though sinister people had been planning all along to line us up with the forces of evil. We did what we did to avoid war with the French and to make it possible to wage war against the Axis. Now we must extricate ourselves from the secondary consequences of our primary choice. I have stated five possible courses we can follow. In all are difficulties; in some are acute dangers. There is no simple way out. It isn't that if we just get our ideology straight, everything will fall into line. Nobody but a rank reactionary can like some of the elements we have dealt with in North Africa and continue to deal with. But political dislikes do not of themselves make sound policy.

A RED-LETTER DAY. RAISING THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD

January 18, 1943

THE Eighteenth of January has turned out to be a red-letter day. On this day the Russians have raised the siege of Leningrad, thus bringing relief to Russia's second largest city, which has endured more than any metropolis in this war. On this day, too, they have taken the important railroad station of Kamensk on the Moscow-Rostov Railroad. It is a red-letter day in Tripolitania, where General Montgomery's advanced units are less than ninety miles from Tripoli. And in the war in the skies, this day is notable for bringing news of the second heavy raid on Berlin, while London was again deafened by anti-air fire, and particularly in the suburbs heard the crash of a few bombs. Out in the south-west Pacific a series

of heavy raids were made on Japanese air bases in the northern Solomon Islands, after Guadalcanal has seen a significant land victory by regular American Army forces in the capture of Mount Austin, which dominates Henderson Field.

Raising the siege of Leningrad, as well as the capture of Kamensk, was announced in special Moscow communiqués late this afternoon. The Russians captured Schlusselburg, the fortress twenty-three miles east of Leningrad, and troops striking from the Volkhov area, due south of Leningrad, fought through the strongest fortifications to join the Leningrad garrison, thus ending the blockade of the city. More than thirteen thousand Germans were killed in the first stage of the offensive. When Leningrad was first attacked sixteen months ago its warehouses held forty-two months' supply of food, according to a vivid account of the city's wartime life in the current issue of *Newsweek*. But the warehouses were set on fire, and within a brief time the people were on short rations. Soldiers and defence workers had a bowl of soup and just under a pound of bread a day. The rest of the inhabitants got a quarter of a pound of bread. *Newsweek* says: "Nearly a million and a half—just about half the normal population—died of hunger and disease in the first year of the siege." Epidemics were a constant danger, and the city council armed hundreds of thousands with brooms and shovels to clear dirty streets, yards, and garbage cans. When German shells put the water system out of order water was brought from Lake Ladoga on sleds drawn by men.

Last spring Leningrad went in for what we call victory gardens but what for them counted as survival gardens. Twenty thousand acres of streets, squares, and empty lots were planted with potatoes and cabbages. Two hundred and seventy thousand individuals were given private lots to attend; the city itself planted communal gardens. Leningrad was under constant artillery fire, and it was repeatedly bombed from the air. But the city kept its morale, and kept it on a high level. Two orchestras continued to play regularly; three theatres and twenty-three movies did not close their doors for a day. The Baltic Fleet Theatre gave three thousand performances in thirteen months. Sometimes the temperature in the halls fell five and ten degrees below freezing, but the people of Leningrad had learned that they were not nourished by bread alone, particularly if there was not much bread. Ninety thousand school children studied in wrecked schools, private homes, and air-raid shelters; sometimes when it was so cold the ink froze. During bombardments teachers took time out to repair damaged school walls and windows. Day in and day out they

cleaned the buildings, hauled water from the lake, and went hunting for fuel. In hospitals operations were performed in cold rooms, shaken by the explosion of shells outside. Some of Leningrad's biggest factories were moved out in time to the Urals, but other factories remained, to repair and even manufacture the weapons of defence. Most of the workers were women; most of them lived at the factories. Leningrad was not altogether shut out from the world the whole time. During the few winter months when the ice on Lake Ladoga formed three or four feet thick a railroad could be laid across it and bring in supplies, and alongside the railroad were highways for trucks and sleds. These life lines were guarded by a faithful air umbrella and by heavily armed high-speed sleds with airplane propellers mounted on the rear.

The saga of besieged Leningrad is still to be written. Foreign correspondents were not permitted to visit the city, and the story has not been told in full in the Soviet press. Enough of it is known, however, to mark it as truly deserving the name epic, for it is not only a record of military heroism but of community greatness. The community determined to survive, and for sixteen months it held on, while half its members, spent by disease, hunger, and cold and the carnage of modern warfare, were carried to their graves. No doubt many, many individuals could have survived the ordeal by their own inner strength, but Leningrad's endurance must count as a mass achievement. To-day it had its culmination. We do not know how the people of Leningrad viewed their chances of relief, but they could not have been too sanguine. They held out not for a day set in their calendars, they held out. Now they are taken back into the larger community of their homeland. The Russians may win victories of greater strategic significance, but they will never win one that will bring more poignant human gratification to Russia itself and to all people associated with Russia in the war.

CASABLANCA. GRAND STRATEGY IN THE MAKING

January 27, 1943

A DAY of reflection has now passed since release of the news of the Casablanca conference. This reflection has produced two kinds of comment. One expresses profound appreciation for the promise of well-planned action. The other expresses disappointment over the nature of the announcements made. After the first flush of general disappointment, specific disappointments came to the forefront. The first is the failure of the conference to have produced complete agreement between Generals Giraud and De

Gaulle. Obviously, since this was not produced, it could not be announced. But this is not disappointment over the conference, but over the toughness of the French wrangle. And since the negotiations between the two French leaders are still in progress it is premature. The fact that General De Gaulle went to meet General Giraud, and surely was most heartily and pressingly encouraged to come to an agreement with him, is the outstanding fact so far. He could have chosen to remain in London. Refusal to agree would have been far easier from that distance, which he well knew. A further point of disappointment was that Premier Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek did not attend the conference. The simplest explanation is not always the truest one, but it takes only an elementary knowledge of what the direction of great military offensives requires of leadership to know that Premier Stalin could not leave Moscow at this time. The burden rests on him personally even more than it does on Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt. If he had been able to come, presumably Chiang Kai-shek also would have been invited. But without Stalin there, the conference could not signalize the establishment of a United Nations war council. And for Chiang to leave his country to take part in a conference dedicated preponderantly to the strategy to be followed in Europe would not have been appropriate. It is assumed that the conference did what Chiang wanted—it increased the percentage of war production to be used in the Pacific war—and his presence was not needed to produce this result. The absence of Premier Stalin is being interpreted as refusal on his part to come, based on political grounds. That is looking for a sinister reason when the obvious explanation is satisfactory. And his absence and the wording of the communiqué which did fail to disclose exchanges of views with Moscow are interpreted as showing an absence of two-way communication with Moscow. But common sense should rule out this assumption. The conference was chiefly devoted to the strategy of the war this year. The British and Americans, according to the communiqué, had the prime object of relieving the burden now resting on the Russian armies. But surely they had long-range plans, and these surely involve co-ordination with Russian plans. A simple question would be, if we do this, can we rely on you doing that? The war against Hitler will be presenting him with two fronts, and the two fronts will have to work together. If it should turn out that the American and British staffs drew up their plans in complete ignorance of Russian plans, and simply came to the conclusion that they would bring relief to the Russians regardless of what the Russians have in mind, the criticism will be fair that the Russians were left out. But this is

about as unlikely as anything to be imagined. On the contrary, the decisions of grand strategy involve dozens of bristling military and political questions, for no matter where the Americans and British strike next, after Tunisia, they run into politics. And the concurrence of Russia must have been essential to laying out the strategy. It may be sound to regret that a United Nations war council has not yet been formed. But such a council needs preparation and a certain amount of ripening. More was done to prepare for it, in Casablanca, we are told, than the communiqué even faintly hinted. So the meeting with Stalin and Chiang may still come to pass. But its failure to come to pass this time is of itself no evidence of unsurmountable difficulties.

Before leaving the question of disappointment over the known results of the conference, one more word can be said. It is to stress the gulf that lies between war leadership and the public. No bridge can be built for this gulf. The public cannot be told how war is waged, how the war machines function, what details must be dealt with in planning, what decisions must be made all along the line before the actual battle bursts. And after it begins, the many duties of leadership are still more difficult to expound and transmit. The public discusses chiefly the consequences of policy. Leadership weighs and chooses war policy. There always is a time lag between the two. Making policy in a coalition war is far more complex than if only a single government is involved. So the importance of the Casablanca meeting is partly in its having overcome difficulties that otherwise could not have been mastered. It is easy to catch the note of excitement on the part of the President and the Prime Minister over what they had done. They knew that the conference was important for its concrete achievements. But, knowing it, they were unable to explain how and why. The preoccupations of the man in the driver's seat can't very well be explained in gestures to the passengers in the back seat. No doubt about it, this is the situation, and it is not one to be remedied. Now and again the public can be given a glimpse into the problems of war leadership, and most people are imaginative and reasonable enough to know that the current debate in a democracy in wartime generally deals with the secondary issues, oftener than not without all basic information about them. Such debate is of utmost use, and a democracy in which it were suspended would lack vitality. But it still is true that the history of the war, when it comes to be seen in perspective, will not read too much like the editorial pages or the news commentaries, or the congressional and parliamentary debates of the same periods. War history was made at Casablanca. It will be in the history books.

And by the time it is written it will not resemble much the hundreds and thousands of words spoken and printed about that conference. It was pointedly indicated in Washington to-day that chapters of the conference have not been disclosed.

GOVERNMENT REPORT ON LEND-LEASE

January 28, 1943

Two weeks ago I spoke about the amount of food sent abroad under Lend-Lease and gave figures about it for the year that ended in June. To-night I shall quote from the new report of the Lend-Lease administration the figures for the entire year of 1942, for they show an increase over the previous figures. My broadcast two weeks ago brought in some interesting letters. I had said that I was sure that housewives would not complain about certain food shortages if they understood what the food means in terms of fighting the war. I remarked that I was sure they would approve of sending butter for a Russian soldier, rather than leaving the fighting to be done by an American soldier in his place. I received only a single letter disagreeing with that. But I had many that showed bewilderment about the figures I had given. If the amount of food sent abroad under Lend-Lease and provided our own armed forces was so small, how could I explain the food shortages in certain districts? That question was repeatedly asked. I had said that more food was going to our own armed forces than to our Allies. That being so, I was asked to explain why the army was using so much more food than these same men consumed before they entered the army. Now the answers to these two questions give a basic picture of the food problem in wartime America. Lend-Lease and our armed forces together took about one eighth of our total food supply in 1942. Of this, the armed forces took 56 per cent, something over half, and Lend-Lease 44 per cent, something under half. To give the figures in another way, we sent abroad under Lend-Lease about $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of our total food production, and provided our armed forces about 7 per cent of our total production. But the total production in 1942 was 10 per cent greater than in the year before and 20 per cent greater than in the normal peacetime year of 1939. So this drain on the total production for war purposes did not decrease the normal volume of food available for the public. The figures, of course, are of total food production, not of each item, and more of some items have gone to the armed forces and abroad than others. Even so, the chief cause of food shortages is not the war programme. It is much

more the increased buying power of a part of the public, which is being spent on certain kinds of food. War workers, drawing larger pay, are eating more. They are eating better kinds of food. Some of them have beef on their tables which previously they could only occasionally afford. A rise in income in the lower brackets always leads to a sharper rise in the amount spent on food than on any other division of the home budget.

Some of my correspondents complained that they had fixed incomes. They were not earning more because of the war. And prices had gone up and scarcity had developed in the items to which they had been accustomed. If this was not due to Lend-Lease and the armed forces, to what was it due? The answer is, to those in our economy whose incomes have gone up. They are the ones who primarily are responsible for the difficulties being borne by those whose incomes have not gone up. They are affected in some measure by Lend-Lease and the armed forces, but nothing like so much as they may imagine, and in view of the great increase of food production over last year and 1939, the effect is not direct. Here, obviously, is a perplexing social problem. People with fixed incomes are bound to suffer when prices are rising, for a rise in prices really is the same as a cut in their incomes. On top of that, they suffer because they can't buy food that now goes to persons formerly unable to buy it, who now enjoy much larger wages. How to meet this problem is a question for the administration and Congress. But the answer is not the curtailment of Lend-Lease, or the reduction of the food for the armed forces, as these are not the root of the difficulty. One must realize that an increase in wages is spent first of all on food, and that is another way of saying that the wage earners did not have a satisfactory food supply before their wages went up, a truth that is widely substantiated by all research into the American standard of living in the lower income brackets. This thought leads to the answer of the second question, why the armed forces need to spend so much more on food than these same men consumed before the war. The men ate before the war; why should they need an increased part of our food production? Counting them at four and a half million, which is $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total population, they were getting 7 per cent of the food last year. In other words, the men are eating better. They are not being pampered, but they are getting more nourishment. Some of them did not get nourishing enough food before they entered the services, some did not get food to sustain the arduous physical life now required of them. The fact is that the soldier's meal, in money terms, costs about two and a half times as much as the cost of the average American

meal in peacetimes. Presumably there is a little waste and perhaps some inevitable extravagance in feeding the armed forces, but it is not significant. The outstanding fact is that rank-and-file Americans who now are getting an adequate diet in the service of the country did not, as a group, get an adequate diet before. And unless there is a good deal of social construction after the war, they may return to a life in which they do not enjoy an adequate diet. True, it is a better diet than almost any other country has been able to offer, but still it is not adequate.

But I have not yet given the more recent figures on what part of our food has been going abroad under Lend-Lease. For the whole of the past year it is one pound of beef in one thousand, one pound of veal, lamb, and mutton in five hundred. For pork the share is much larger, one pound in ten. One can of canned vegetables of every hundred, and two cans of canned fruit went abroad under Lend-Lease, one pound of butter in every hundred, one pound of cheese in every four, but of all dairy products the equivalent of one quart of milk in every twenty-five. One egg of every ten and of corn products one pound in every hundred and fifty, were taken by Lend-Lease. That is the record for the entire year.

This coming year the shipments abroad and the demands of the armed forces both will increase. The army will be much larger, the needs of our Allies, particularly Russia, will rise, and there may be liberated countries to look out for. The share of our total production taken by all these demands will be probably one quarter. So Secretary Wickard said in Chicago yesterday. The increase over last year is from one eighth to one fourth of total production. One detail about Lend-Lease, we are now sending more food to Russia than to Britain, and all that we send to Russia goes exclusively to the Russian Army. The food could, of course, be kept at home. But if we are determined to defeat the Axis armies, keeping the food at home would merely mean more fighting for American troops, at greater loss to the American nation. We are familiar with the slogan "Food Is a Weapon." In supplying it to Russian troops it is still more than a weapon, it is a soldier. In supplying it to Britain it is both soldiers and war workers, for Britain is devoting a greater proportion of its adult man power directly to the war than any other country we know about. But it is well we bear in mind that we probably shall not supply our Allies and our own armed forces together this year more than a quarter of our food, whereas we already had increased our food production last year one fifth as against 1939.

TWENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF FASCIST MILITIA. GOERING GOES
IN FOR HISTORICAL DISTORTION*February 1, 1943*

THIS being the twentieth birthday of the Fascist Militia, it called for a speech by Mussolini. He duly appeared before the militia and put on the best face for the occasion. In all fairness no one could say that Mussolini made much of a speech. Bear in mind that Tripoli had just been lost, the last of the Italian Empire. Mussolini had long since lost Ethiopia, which was his only contribution to that empire. Now the possessions accumulated by the Italian nation in seventy-five years have all gone. It was hardly a birthday atmosphere, and the best Mussolini could produce was a statement answering the "unconditional surrender" text of the Casablanca conference. His answer was, he said, to the "mad criminal publicity dilemma of Casablanca," and the answer read: "We and our comrades of the Axis and of the Tripartite Pact shall never surrender; we shall hold out as long as we are able to take up arms and fight." He did not say, as Axis leaders have said so often before, that he "looked forward confidently to the inevitable victory." If you or I were Italians listening to that address, it wouldn't give us much hope for an Axis victory.

Fascist officials have been explaining that in losing Tripoli the Axis has gained Tunisia, which is a far stronger bridgehead. But Italians see that the bridgehead is manned for the greater part by German troops. And the Italians have memories. They look back to the days of the armistice with France, when Italy asked for Tunisia and was waved aside by Hitler. If Italy had held the bridgehead of Tunisia, it might have done something from there for the defence of Tripoli. It might also have taken measures to make the Allied landing in North Africa more difficult. But Hitler said no, for reasons the Italians did not understand then and understand still less to-day. So they are not blaming Mussolini alone for the loss of Tripoli, they are blaming Hitler. What they blame Mussolini for particularly is for not asserting himself. They see that the pseudo-strong man not only was not strong in the face of the enemy, he was virtually subservient to his ally. And they arrive at their own opinion about Fascism, so it is reported. Fascism has left Italy not only greatly weakened by the Ethiopian War, the Spanish War, and now the World War; it has left it reduced territorially to its smallest size in seventy-five years.

In contrast with Germany, Italy's celebration left nothing at all to be thankful for. All the same Mussolini made the speech and

donned his best smile, while Hitler issued a proclamation and passed the buck in the speechmaking to Hermann Goering.

One or two points in Goering's speech will remain fresh for some time. The most important is that he heaped all the responsibility on Hitler. He did it as though with ecstatic satisfaction. Everything that has happened has been Hitler's doing. He alone made the decisions. Goering did not say he alone made the mistakes, but that is the context of the speech for anyone capable of going deeper than the gloze of flamboyant praise and piety. The obvious aim of the speech was to frighten Europe about Bolshevism, and this was done to the point of highlighting the dangers on the Eastern Front in a way which must have disturbed the Germans deeply. Goering's appeal to Europe to recognize Germany as its protector from Bolshevism required two picturesque distortions. To begin with, in order to appeal to Europe, Goering had to discover Europe. By that I mean he had to discover it as an entity which possesses a civilization. This the Nazis have never done before, for the gist of their doctrine has been their right to rule Europe and to impose upon it the blessings of the Nazi supremacy. But Goering did discover Europe, and he appealed to it to have gratitude to Germany for serving it, an appeal which can hardly make much of an impression on Europe at this late hour. The other distortion is historical. Goering likened the trapped divisions at Stalingrad to the Greeks at Thermopylae. Perhaps the classics also were destroyed when the Nazis burned their books, and Goering did not have access to a reference work. But the Greeks at Thermopylae were fighting an invader on their own soil. It was the Nazis who invaded Russia—breaking a pact of non-aggression to do so—and they are nearly twelve hundred miles beyond their own frontier at Stalingrad.

NAZIS CELEBRATE DEFEAT. DE GAULLE AND GIRAUD BURY
THE HATCHET. AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE FRANCE NATIONAL
UNITY

February 3, 1943

THE fall of Stalingrad is being celebrated in Germany with ostentatious mourning and an outpouring of high-pitched patriotic rhetoric. For three days theatres, movies, and places of amusement are to be closed. The radios are playing funeral marches and the song "*Ich hat' ein Kamerad*" ("I Had a Comrade"). The defeat is being exploited as something unequalled for heroism perhaps in all history. Thus the Germans, having a defeat on their books, are

making the most of it. They are not concealing it, not trying to minimize it. They espouse it as a major achievement, and one might almost expect Hitler, who personally ordained the death of these men, to come forward asking to share in the ovation being given them. It is a strange quirk in the Nazi propaganda technique, but it is clear that the Nazis are set on making the defeat into something the stricken German populace will not resent. It remains to be seen how well they succeed.

A recession in the bitter antagonism against the American policy in North Africa was noticeable to-day. The tribute paid by General Giraud to General De Gaulle, in an interview published in the London *News Chronicle* and read to his press conference by President Roosevelt yesterday, has been followed to-day by remarks in the House of Commons by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. General Giraud approved Britain's recognition of General De Gaulle and recognized that his was the only voice speaking for France in two years. Secretary Eden explained something to the British Parliament which needs explaining to some elements in this country too. It is that General Giraud's administration in North Africa is not a French government, properly so called, nor a provisional government, nor even a prospective government. It is, he said, for the time being responsible for the administration of certain parts of the French Empire. He also stressed that there is no difference of policy in the problem of the French between Britain and the United States. The prime responsibility, he pointed out, lies upon Frenchmen, and the prime responsibility of Britain and America is to see that everything possible is done by the French administration on the scene to promote the Allied war effort.

What might by now become clear is that the attempt is being made to provide the French with a unified foreign policy, and in this way to create the envelope of national unity which was destroyed in the critical months before the war and whose loss had much to do with the downfall of France. France somehow must be reconstituted. It consists of fragments. They are more or less the same fragments which constituted it before the war. These fragments are the highly intense and self-centred factions.* The same kinds of fragments make up democratic life in other countries. They may not be so violent and intransigent in their character as they were in France. But democratic countries, which live by division as a normal process, can stand a good deal of factionalism. What they cannot stand is the loss of national unity in foreign affairs. A nation which carries its factionalism over to foreign policy reduces its national defences. And this France did.

France is going to be reconstituted, and the first task is to give it the union which would have held it together before—namely, an agreed foreign policy. That is provided, no doubt in much too elementary a way, in the thesis accepted by General Giraud and General De Gaulle in their recent conference. The two factions are united in the determination to defeat the enemy and to liberate France from its occupation. In this way the faction of the reactionaries in North Africa is being brought into the war effort. For of the million Frenchmen there, by far the greater part are extreme conservatives, to the point of being almost out of sympathy with democracy as we understand the term. It is the political complexion of these Frenchmen which has aroused all the antagonism, particularly among the French of the more liberal and radical bent. They still feel violently about them. But if France is going to be reconstituted, it will be with all elements, or it will be by the elimination of some elements. No doubt the French who feel violently think elimination would be better, and one hears that civil war in France is going to eliminate in full fury when the opportunity presents itself. Those who criticize the arrangement to enlist the service of reactionaries in northern France in the war effort may not mean to, but they really argue in favour of eliminating them, as though the Allied Expeditionary Force should have taken on that assignment. If they are not going to be eliminated, then they must be brought back into some form of national effort. Perhaps, in time, by persuasion and influence, both British and American efforts can reduce the inflammations in the two leading factions—now represented by General Giraud and General De Gaulle. They may find they can work together, as they already plan to do. So when the time comes to establish a French government representing the people of France themselves, there may be so much of a decline of factionalism as to give that government a hope of longevity, undisturbed by civil war. To work for that would appear to be a realistic policy. Not to work for it would necessitate choosing which factions are to triumph over which, and that, while emotionally satisfactory to the side which finds itself on top, could not be called constructive procedure.

France must be considered the Humpty Dumpty of this war, even to the point that not all the Allied horses and all the Allied men can put Humpty Dumpty together again. But it can be done by the French themselves, and the unified foreign policy, now formulated, is the beginning. It is the containing shell of the egg, but onlookers must be prepared to see France put together of more or less the same pieces which constituted it before. Some ideas will have changed. French aspirations may appear different

after the tragedy of the war and occupation. But the elements are essentially the same, and France, in being reborn, will be made of the same individuals who made the old France and having the same general distinctions.

If American co-operation with reactionary Frenchmen in North Africa were to count as our own ideological line, both at home and abroad, that would be something else. But the essential corollary of American policy in North Africa has been that the administration there is not a government and is not to become a government. And that has been seen clearly to be the prerequisite to our helping the real France—which is now occupied by the enemy—to an unmortgaged opportunity to express itself after its liberation.

MEANING OF ABANDONMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA

February 16, 1943

AMERICA is about to enter upon what might be called a Chinese preoccupation, due to the fact that Madame Chiang Kai-shek is to appear upon the political stage and will command it for some time to come. It can be assumed that Madame Chiang will receive as hearty a welcome as this country has ever given a woman in its history because she is for the moment the representative of the people of China, for whom the American people feel the deepest and liveliest sympathy.

Our relations with China are considerably healthier because of the formal relinquishment of the rights of extraterritoriality in China by both the United States and Great Britain. That action has cleared away more historical underbrush than the public may appreciate. Most people think of the end of the extraterritorial system in China in terms of legal privileges enjoyed by individuals and corporations and visualize the change as centring principally in such places as Shanghai. But it is Manchuria which will feel most markedly the end of the system, for Manchuria has been the chief centre for the play of forces operating on the basis of unequal treaties. Let me say, first, that people have no historic reason for thinking of Manchuria as being somehow outside of China. The term Manchuria does not even exist in the Manchu language, the Manchus having been a small tribe forming part of the ancient population there. The population of Manchuria is 95 per cent Chinese. And Manchuria is really part of the north-eastern provinces of China. However, this region saw developed a great international racket based on unequal treaties. The chief antagonists competing

for power there were Russia and Japan, and through the treaties that granted extraterritorial rights they proceeded to build their railroads and spread their influence in ways which kept the Chinese from holding up their own end or establishing the reality of their sovereignty. Finally the Japanese seized what they dominated, set up their puppet regime, and invested huge sums in creating a Japanese industrial colony. When Japan is driven from this territory there will be no extraterritorial privileges to give the Japanese any sovereign claims as to possession of railways, mines, factories, and other enterprises. Nor will there be any difficulty in bringing Russia into line, for it is Russia who set the example of relinquishing extraterritoriality in China, having done so by declaration in 1919, and then by formal treaty a few years later. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria the Russians sold out their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway, and no other country has any specially protected rights in this region. When Japan is cleared out there is no legal problem about the Chinese regaining complete command of a part of their country. And the implicit guarantee of this, in the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, is the most important political gain that China can point to from its association with the United Nations. The Chinese have consistently refused to bargain with Japan on the compromise of Japan's staying in Manchuria. The United States has as consistently refused to recognize Japan's conquest of Manchuria. The ratification of our treaty abandoning extraterritorial rights in China clears the legal air over Manchuria too.

SIZE OF THE ARMY

February 17, 1943

I WANT to talk for a few minutes on the issue now much discussed in Washington, the size of the army. It is an issue I spoke about on November second, at a time when it appeared as though no general plan had been laid down for fighting the war, when doubts were entertained about the ability of Russia and Britain to stay in the war, and when it seemed we might unintentionally be carried into a course by which we devoted so much of our industrial output to our own armed forces that we could not give the aid to our Allies needed to press the war in this year of 1943. I expressed the situation by saying that we were drifting into a policy of fighting not a United Nations war, but a United States war in association with other countries. At that time the size of the army had not been fixed, and intimations had been heard that

it was to be thirteen million men. And one reason its size had not been fixed was that the nature and programme of the war had not taken form. We did not know where the weight of production was to fall this year, whether it would concentrate on equipment for ground forces or the greater emphasis would be on planes. Greater emphasis on planes would mean that the Axis would be hit hard this year. More emphasis on tanks and artillery would mean that we would not fight heavily against the Axis until our army was equipped and trained. At that time there was doubt in some quarters about the wisdom of maintaining Lend-Lease aid on a truly formidable scale.

Since that time the whole basic position, as I described it, has changed. First of all there is a plan. It is a master plan in every way, perhaps, except that it probably is not to be found written down between the two covers of any secret government publication. But it is a master plan in all its bearings. We are hitting the Axis this year, we have set the production programme so as to give the most significant aid to our Allies and to bring our own hard-hitting weapons to bear on the Axis, and there is no faint possibility of our holding back from a United Nations war and hoarding our military equipment for the use of our own forces at some distant date. The size of the army has been set at 7,500,000 men, which, with officers, brings it to 8,200,000. This figure has been arrived at not by seizing it from the blue, but by measuring the military task of the master plan. This is what we shall need to do the job in hand. There is a task this year, there is one the year after. There may be a task the year after that. All these tasks have to be foreseen, planned for, trained for, produced for. To-day the criticism one hears in Washington is that this army is still too large. If you follow this criticism you will notice it does not specify that the army is too large in relation to the adopted military programme. Nobody says, "I have seen the master plan, or programme, or whatever you call it, and it is too ambitious, for the Axis can be beaten by less." Nor does anyone say, "I have seen the plan, and it doesn't require for its fulfilment the size of the army now being raised." Indeed it would be impossible to say this, since it is a publicly known fact that the German and satellite armies have more divisions with which to defend Europe than the Russians, British, minor allies, and the United States, as we are now planning, can muster. For it must be borne in mind that we must disperse forces all over the globe, while the Germans and their satellites are right there near their battlefields. What the critics of the size of the army do say is that it will produce serious dislocations in our domestic life. They say it will make it difficult to

sow and harvest the food we need, to keep our munitions plants and essential civilian operations going. They criticize the size of the army from the standpoint of its effect, and not as to the need for it. But to reduce the size of the army simply to escape from its effects would be to let domestic dislocations fix our grand strategy for us. While it would be reasonable to say that without a plan so large an army would be a dismal and dangerous mistake, it is quite different to criticize the size of the army after a programme has been drawn up and commitments under it have been made. Then to reduce the army would be to reduce the programme and imperil the commitments.

The one criticism of the army plans, made in terms of the plans themselves, is that the army is too big ever to be transported abroad by any shipping that conceivably would be available. But there is no intention of sending 8,200,000 men abroad. Secretary Stimson once explained that the army of 7,500,000—that is, without counting officers—would produce 2,225,000 ground-combat forces. The rest are made up of the air force, artillery, engineers, and various branches, and of the services of supply. The farther away the army has to fight, the larger must be the services of supply. Just what the intentions are as to the numbers to be transported abroad is, of course, a military secret. But it need be no secret that the size of the army has been fixed with the most thorough appreciation of the shipping factor. Available shipping is not a static factor, it is variable. It doesn't depend altogether on the number of ships or on the number of sinkings. It depends, too, on the routes that become available and on the time it takes to turn ships around. It must be presumed that the army plans allow for an improvement in the shipping situation. If they don't, they should. For it would be tragic negligence to find the U-boats being decisively beaten and not to have men trained and equipped and ready to ship. It can be said that the army plans are based not by any means on the expectation of a miracle, but on reasonable optimism about shipping.

WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY. THE DANGER OF FACTIONALISM

February 22, 1943

THIS being Washington's Birthday, it is appropriate to point out that what troubled George Washington more than anything in his presidency was factionalism. The Republic in his first term was more threatened by factionalism than by any issue which of itself produced factionalism. I know I didn't appreciate this, in

more than a superficial way, until recently, and I confess that, as a result, I had not warmed personally to Washington. The factionalism that was acute in his time, and might have destroyed the Republic altogether, held over into the history books, and I was on the side of Jefferson as against Hamilton, and couldn't quite forgive Washington for not siding openly with Jefferson, so that what I felt was the right should prevail. But to-day Washington looks greater to me than he did when, in the tranquillity of an unendangered America, I read about his times. For to-day America is not endangered, and to-day America is having a renewal of factionalism that promises to be as acute as it was in Washington's first term. And to-day there is no George Washington to curb it. For to-day the factionalism is against the President and his administration. And in a sense the only curb on it that can be exercised is by public opinion. George Washington could work on Jefferson to collaborate with Hamilton. He could work on Hamilton to collaborate with Jefferson. He could try to keep them both in his administration, not minding that the things the two men stood for were basically antagonistic; but because the Republic could not live if they permitted the basic antagonism to go too far, they had to continue in the administration and carry on the work of the Republic. They had to do that first, if the Republic was to survive. This was Washington's theory and his policy. So Washington became the guardian of the Republic, and it was an ungrateful task. The partisans of Jefferson were enraged with him; so were the partisans of Hamilton. And Washington, seeing clearly the first service of all, performed it, with a wealth of patience, dignity and patriotism.

The paradox of the Republic always has been that it cannot live without factionalism, but it could perish if the factionalism were to be carried too far. National unity is not a condition in which everybody thinks the same thing at the same time. It is a condition in which men and women know the value and contribution of disagreement but are mature enough to know the point beyond which disagreement cannot be carried in safety. Usually the disagreement can be carried to the limit, for usually the Republic is not in danger. Carrying the disagreement to the limit means changing administrations and letting the political storms howl at their full force. But in a time of danger to the Republic from the outside, the effect of a too intense factionalism could be fatal.

Just now this country, to look at it abstractly, has been going through two experiences. It has begun to lose the sense of national danger in the World War due to the improvement in the war strength of the United Nations. And it has correspondingly

increased the internal factionalism, as though more outer safety made the inner conflict more safe. Certain elements in Congress and elsewhere have been having something like a Halloween, which would be beyond criticism in normal times, since it is the way things normally happen in a political republic. But it is to be questioned whether our outer safety has increased so much that the inner conflict can be afforded. We still have the war to win, and we still can lose the victory, even though we may not actually lose the military war. And if we are going to win the victory it will take a much greater effort than is now being put forth, which means far heavier burdens. No one could say that Congress is devoting itself exclusively to producing this greater effort or discussing only the wisest way to adjust those burdens. It is really conducting the nation's political business as though there was quite a safe world and a safe future for the nation. There is nothing morally wrong in this. But it might prove to be less responsible than the times call for. As I said, there is no George Washington to keep this factionalism within bounds, and the one influence capable of doing it is public opinion. It probably will be recorded of this year that public opinion, as a rule, has been sober, moderate, and courageous, and with a degree of steadiness that has made its influence tell in time on Congress. Just now public opinion is itself disturbed, because of the agitation in Congress and in Washington. The factionalism is not only here, it is widespread. But the public has a profound sense of the war and its gravity that will increase as more and more of the men in the armed forces get into the battle, and as the dislocations caused by the war affect everyone more sharply. The public is bound to be more concerned with the crisis of civilization itself than with any crisis of party. "The common and continued mischiefs of the spirit of party," Washington said in his farewell address, "are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the administration. It agitates the community, with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, and kindles the animosity of one part against the other." And speaking of the spirit of party, he said there would always be a danger of excess, hence "the effort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume." These words have not been out of date in any phase of our history. They are vividly appropriate in a time like to-day, which, for its magnitude of crisis, is more serious than anything even Washington could have foreseen.

HITLER'S NAZI BIRTHDAY PROCLAMATION CONTRASTED WITH
STALIN'S "ORDER OF THE DAY"*February 24, 1943*

WHILE Adolf Hitler did not appear in person at Munich for the birthday celebration of the Nazi party, observed to-day in the Hofbrauhaus, he was present in a document, a proclamation read in his name, which was as valid and authentic as though he had been there himself. Only Hitler could have written it, and it shows him behaving in the expected psychopathic way. His setbacks have not humbled him. He is meeting reverses by puffing himself up still more. "I am," he said, "entitled to believe that providence has slated me to fulfil my mission. Because without its grace I could not have assumed power in spite of so many obstacles, and come finally to this fight, crowned by more victories than world history has ever seen, but also burdened with cares which would perhaps destroy weaker characters." This is how he described to the Nazi party its present mission: "It is to rouse the German nation," he said, "incessantly make plain its greatest danger—namely the Jew—strengthen its holy faith in its power to pour energy into the weak, and to destroy ruthlessly all saboteurs; to bring enlightenment where enlightenment is readily accepted; to meet terrorism with ten times greater terrorism, and to exterminate traitors regardless of who they may be, or under what guise they try to effect their treacherous devices." Having thus promised Germany the harshest of repressive rule, he broke still worse news to Europe. "We shall not hesitate for one second," he proclaimed, "to demand the contribution to this fateful struggle of those countries which are responsible for the outbreak of this war. We shall consider it as a matter of course not to spare foreign lives at a time which is demanding great sacrifice of our own lives. You will, in the indissoluble community of faith, together with our Allies, carry through the mobilization of the spiritual and material values of Europe to an extent never before experienced on this continent in the several thousand years of its history." Thus an unprecedented mobilization of all Europe, imposed under pain of death, is to accompany the total mobilization of the German people. It is a grim message for Europe, for it is the official affirmation and confirmation of the news already reaching lands like France and Norway, that all their labour power—men and women alike—is to be conscripted for the service of Germany. Europeans have had it unhappily enough, being prisoners in their vast concentration camp. Now they are to be prisoners at hard labour, under jailers ready to shoot to kill if they falter. No, defeat has not

humbled or mellowed this fanatic, nor is it likely to. It can overthrow him but not cure him.

Hitler's proclamation is in strong contrast with the order of the day of Premier Stalin, which is now being avidly discussed. Mr. Stalin quite undeservedly has the reputation of being inscrutable, and when an inscrutable man says anything it always is scrutinized with feverish anxiety. The sentence which has caused the most fears is the one in which he told the army that "it was not created for the purpose of the conquest of foreign countries." This, coupled with the remark that there is no second front in Europe, is being interpreted, by the feverish, as a threat that after the Germans are driven out of Russia the Soviet Government will make peace. But it is not necessary to come to any such conclusion. Premier Stalin was addressing the Russian Army on a great and historic occasion. It makes good sense that he should leave no doubt in the minds of its members that they are fighting not for conquest, but for a nobler aim. For this army knows that it has been fighting an army of conquest. Moreover, it is true, and a basic foundation of Soviet foreign policy, that Soviet Russia has not desired conquest, and its zealous preoccupation has been to make Russia secure from its enemies, whoever they might be, and not to conquer other peoples. To repeat this truth on the Red Army anniversary is so natural that not to say it would be almost unnatural. Obviously Premier Stalin knew that what he said would ring through the world, so he had an opportunity to say words which would help Russia. What is the most intense propaganda campaign in the world to-day? It is the Axis campaign against Bolshevism. Goebbels is trying to ram new regimentation down German throats with the threat of a conquering Bolshevism. The whole foreign apparatus of the Axis, diplomatic, press, and radio, is dedicated to arousing this fear. So what would be more natural than to give the assurance to Europe, and particularly to the Germans, that this Red Army, which was celebrating its twenty-fifth birthday, never has had and has not now the purpose of conquest? If it is a healthful thought to keep in the minds of the soldiers themselves, it is healthful, too, to leave in other minds, particularly the minds of the Germans. One can be sure that Stalin is much more acutely aware of Germany than he is of public opinion in this country and Great Britain. He is confronted with this continental agitation against him and his countrymen, and it is farfetched to construe this particular statement into something supersubtle, skilfully chosen to bring pressure on Washington and London to embark on war measures they are not willing to undertake.

Moreover, Premier Stalin knows the Allied plans and he knows the Allied timetable. He probably doesn't like them. If Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt were in Stalin's shoes, they wouldn't like them either. For here is a moment in the war the like of which will not come again soon. The Russians have the Germans in full retreat and have inflicted tremendous losses on them. The Russian winter offensive can last only a few weeks longer, then comes the mud, and operations must be curtailed. And then the Germans will have a chance to reorganize their forces, perhaps even to launch the new eastern offensive which Goebbels and other Nazi spokesmen are promising. This is the ideal moment for opening a second front. But it was presumably not promised for this time at Casablanca, for you will recall how Mr. Churchill, in his speech about Casablanca, fully discussed the problem of the U-boat, which was his truthful extenuation for delay. Since Mr. Stalin is bound not to like that Britain and the United States are unable to open a second front at this moment, and is vividly aware of the fact that this inability makes the going harder for Russia, why should he not say so? He usually says what he thinks. And in addressing the Red Army he can hardly help saying so to the army, to fill it with a sense of its performance by the reminder that it is carrying the load alone.

It is worth recalling that the Soviet Government is pledged not to make separate peace. It made this pledge in becoming a signatory to the Atlantic Charter. That is a pledge not to be brushed lightly aside. It is a matter of great importance to the leaders of the Soviet Government to keep their word. Whatever may be charged against that government, it cannot be accused of a history of perfidy. And it would not have occurred to Premier Stalin to repeat a pledge already made, simply because his failure to reiterate it were going to be construed by some anxious people as an indication that he is getting ready to break it.

The order of the day is not the first occasion Premier Stalin has taken to speak about the absence of a second front and to point out quite clearly that the Russians are carrying the load alone. Whatever else may be in his mind, he also is saying this for the record. He is saying it to be remembered by public opinion here and in Britain. For the day of peace negotiations is coming, and the measure of the Russian contribution to the defeat of the Axis should count heavily at the peace negotiations. Historically it is the duty of the Soviet regime to speak like this for the record. It must be clear to the peace conference what Russia has done, and what others were unable to do, while Russia was doing it. If, in saying these things for the record, Premier Stalin makes his Allies uneasy,

and they work harder, act more quickly, tighten up their organizations and their belts, that makes it all the more worth while to speak as he did. But to seek beyond these effects, and these self-evident motives, for sinister allusions to a coming breach of faith and honour is of itself failure in good will, and somehow makes the appreciation of the Russian victories somewhat less genuine.

RUMOURS OF A PEACE OFFENSIVE

March 1, 1943

JUST now the air is filled with rumours and suspicions about peace, also with differences about frontiers. To-day, for instance, comes the news that Von Ribbentrop, Nazi Foreign Minister, has been talking with Mussolini in Rome. That at once is seized upon as a sign that there really is some chance of Italy getting out of the war, and that the Nazis are troubled about it. Then as to Germany, two startling theories are put forward as to what it might try to do to escape unconditional surrender. One is that peace might be sought with an offer to get rid of certain Nazi leaders to be followed by reconciliation with the Catholic and Protestant churches, which would be a peace directed against Russia. The other theory is that the left wing of the Nazi party, which has always been radical, politically and economically, might stage a so-called communist revolt in Germany and demand protection from the Russians, and try in this way to save something of Germany's conquests and influence. Such a peace would be directed against the West. These are not known plans. They are purely theories. Indeed they may be deliberately encouraged with the idea of spreading mischief, since to some extent they are both predicated on the impossibility of the Soviet Union working together with Britain and the United States after the war. The postulate appears to be that the United Nations are misnamed, that they are not united now and cannot be after the war. Russia's intentions after the war are spoken of not in terms of what anyone in the Soviet regime has said about them, but in language tending to divide the Allies. Much attention is turned to Russia's declared desire to have secure military frontiers after the war, since this would mean that the Baltic States would be absorbed in the Soviet Union. Just now Russia is having a public debate with the Poles, the Poles having come out for their prewar frontiers, the Russians saying that they must let the Ukrainians and White Russians in what was eastern Poland unite with their racial brothers in the USSR. The Russians want a line much like the Curzon line, drawn by Lord Curzon after the last war. Aside from

the frontier problems, however, Russian peace aims, as stated by them, are moderate, and a fresh statement of them was circulated by the Soviet Embassy in Washington to-day. It is by Alexander Gorkin, secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. "Our first aim," he said, "is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German-Fascist yoke. We have not and cannot have any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavic or other enslaved nations of Europe who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny and then to leave them to organize their lives and their own lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations."

LUFTWAFFE REAPS THE WHIRLWIND—TENTH ANNIVERSARY

March 2, 1943

It is more than merely interesting that last night's air raid on Berlin coincided with the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Luftwaffe. The concept of the Nazi air force, when it was started, was that it should serve first of all as a weapon to win bloodless victories. It was to cow the world into subjection to Nazi political aims. For Hitler is quite accurate when he says that he did not want war. He greatly preferred to win everything without war. And the Luftwaffe and the mechanized army were designed to produce this result. Look back to the days when Germany had an air force greater than any that could rise against it. Those were the times of dread. The war of the air still was new and untried and it had terrible potentialities. The writers of prophetic fiction, like H. G. Wells, had depicted the war of the future as bringing civilization to ruin, with mankind burrowing like rodents in its rubble. The Luftwaffe was created to exploit fear. And those who created it were not mistaken about its effectiveness—not at the outset. To all corners of the world the Luftwaffe sent out its missionaries, converts to its powers of destruction, preaching the peril of affronting it, and exhorting foreign countries to come to terms, any terms, rather than be subjected to its fury. For a time Hitler and his associates probably thought they could get all they needed by terror, and were content with moderate gains. But then the new weapons they had built captivated their imagination. And the day came when Hitler chose for war and went to work to convince Germany's military leaders that the chance of a thousand years was at hand, thanks to these weapons and the unpreparedness of the

rest of the world. Having sold them this thesis, he could proceed to map out his campaign.

Hitler and Goering had something akin to awe for the Luftwaffe and what it could achieve. It did not enter their minds that the Luftwaffe could do its worst and a nation on which it poured its bombs still could survive. They laid their plans of conquest: first Poland, then Norway—which was taken partly by surprise, partly by deceit, but chiefly by air—and then the Low Countries and France. Hitler's progress was almost through its first phase. It remained only for the Luftwaffe to knock out Britain. Then phase two, the attack on Russia, could be entered with confidence. The British problem did not much bother Hitler and Goering. They took their time in France. They were cocksure of the outcome. And, I might add, so were a great many non-Germans.

How the Luftwaffe failed to conquer Britain is already an old story, but it will be as old as the ages before it is forgotten. The crux of it is that Hitler and Goering made a slight mistake in their calculations. They figured that when the bombing of British cities began, the British Government would have to sacrifice the R.A.F. to try to save the cities. Then the R.A.F. would be knocked out. It would cost the Luftwaffe something. But when the R.A.F. was gone there still would be enough Nazi planes to dominate the air over Britain. And Britain would be beyond defence. It is fascinating to see how and why the Nazi leaders made this mistake. Like everybody else, they put themselves in the other fellows' shoes to judge what they would do in the same circumstances. Being tyrants in their own country, they knew they could not ask civilians to go undefended, so that they should save an inferior air strength for the gamble of trying to save the country as a whole. Tyrants keep their power not by the co-operation of the people, but by shrewd consideration for them. And this dread of air attack, the most horrible spectre that warfare had yet created, was not something the British Government could expect their people to endure without using what air force they had, so Hitler and Goering calculated. They just didn't understand how free people act. The British faced the spectre; they accepted the worst it could inflict; they watched their cities being pulverized about them. And they did not insist on the R.A.F. being wantonly sacrificed for their safety. The result is that Britain was not knocked out but began to rise as a military and air power. And by the time that Hitler attacked Russia he could not muster the strength to end the job in a few weeks. Here he miscalculated again, this time on the fitness and numbers of the Russian Army. But his miscalculation about Britain was a factor in his fate in Russia. He can no longer conquer by terror; he can

no longer conquer by might. Though he is still strong, he is on the defensive.

The Luftwaffe has had only ten years of life. The creature of terror and dread was built; it frightened and paralysed Europe; finally a free people faced it, and as soon as they faced it they had begun to conquer it. Now one of the most spectacular and brutal concepts in all history has brought upon itself a staggering retribution. Last night, on the tenth anniversary of the Luftwaffe, the R.A.F. was over Berlin with twice as many explosives as ever the Luftwaffe spewed forth on London in a single night. And in the past eight days the air warfare against Germany and German-occupied cities has reached the highest pitch in the history of war. It is said that the Germans, when they speak privately of Goering, call him "Herr Meyer." Early in the war Goering promised in a public speech that Allied planes would never be able to bomb German cities. "If they do," he shouted, "my name is Meyer." The hall rocked with laughter when he said it. It is part of the retribution that the creative mind which contrived this terror should have been so superficial in appreciating what in time it would cost his own countrymen.

Just how effective these raids on the continent are going to prove in shortening the war is not a matter for laymen to discuss dogmatically. But it is well not to exaggerate the actual area of destruction caused even by many eight-ton bombs. It is not so large as used to be imagined in the days of dread. I think it was last October that the British put out a statement about air raids on the Continent up to that time, including some thousand-plane raids, and said that the total area of destruction amounted to the area of the island of Manhattan in New York from Forty-second Street down to the Battery. The statement was meant to be impressive, but it shrunk my own imagination quite seriously. Without going into that phase, it still is indisputable that this tenth anniversary of the Luftwaffe was celebrated with a special fitness; since it demonstrated that men who plot diabolical destruction for their fellow men, as a gainful occupation, end by bringing that same destruction upon themselves.

BURNS REPORT, EXPLANATION AND COMPARISON WITH
BEVERIDGE PLAN

March 11, 1943

It is inaccurate to describe the social-security report sent yesterday to Congress as outlining a system of security from the cradle to

the grave. Actually no recommendations are made for special benefits to mothers, for allowances for minor children of employed parents, or for payment of funeral costs. These are features of the Beveridge Plan. The American report is not a Beveridge Plan. It is not a blueprint of a social-security system. It cannot be summed up in a few words, like the Beveridge Plan, which assures everyone a uniform income and promises certain minimum benefits. To say that the American report is not a blueprint is not to find fault with it, but to make it clear that it is just as American as the Beveridge Plan is British, that the two systems are basically different, and that their recommendations cannot be compared except in a general way. Both the Beveridge Plan and the American report recommend strengthening the existing social-security systems. The British system is largely an insurance system, covering a compact country with fairly uniform economic conditions. Our system has grown to be insurance in part, public-assistance relief in part, with wide variations according to local conditions and the provision of work. The main difference between the Beveridge Plan and the American report is that if we develop our American line of dealing with the problem of want, we shall provide work to every able-bodied person after his unemployment insurance has run a given term of weeks. No such objective is found in the Beveridge Plan. Another basic difference in the American approach is in the treatment of youth. If we develop our method of dealing with this problem, every young person beyond the compulsory school age will be able to obtain an education, along with work training. The Beveridge Plan has no such objective. The Beveridge Plan, for its part, has insurances which the American plan does not include.

The American report is the product of a staff headed by Dr. Eveline Burns, and though it comes out with the full sanction of the National Resources Planning Board, and fully agreed to by its committee on long-range work and relief policies, it will be named correctly if called the Burns Report. Dr. Burns's committee did not set out to draft a legislative programme. It set out to ask and answer a series of practical questions about social security. What do we want? Have we defined what we want? Have we planned what we want? Have we achieved what we want? And its findings are, to put it mildly, disconcerting. As a nation we have not known clearly what we want, because we have wanted a number of things, some of them incompatible with each other. We have not planned well, and we have not achieved anything like the social security that most people imagine. There have been enormous difficulties. The United States is a federation, so that states and local authori-

ties all have a part in dealing with the problem of want. Some states are unable or unwilling to bear their share. Then we have gone about making provisions for certain categories of persons, some of them generously, like the aged and the blind, others less generously, some with callous indifference. The various schemes do not add up to a blanket care of all the needy. We have no standard of what minimum provisions should be. Even our work programmes failed to meet what is called an emergency standard. To read the factual analysis of the various undertakings is to get a sense of complexity and improvisation. Basically, of course, the question is whether we want to provide relief for the needy on a poor-law basis or whether we want to combine the maintenance of decent standards with the opportunity to work at a wage that provides decent standards. If we were content with the poor-law approach, we should have to dismiss at once the aspiration to freedom from want. If we are going to develop the experience of the past years and really come to grips with the problem, then the whole system has to be overhauled, correlated, integrated, and strengthened. And that is what the American security report points to. There must be greater use of the Federal authority and leadership. Money for social security must come from normal taxation. Present insurance schemes must be broadened. Unemployment insurance will have to be a merger of the state schemes. But before any of this can be thought through, it is essential to be clear about one point. All of our social security to date has been planned on the assumption that public aid in the form of local relief is available everywhere in the United States, which simply is not so. It must be clear, too, that even if we have full employment in the United States, we should have three and a quarter million families who will need assistance, for there will be this number of families without an employable member. The problem, then, is a permanent one even in the healthiest of economies, and our present provisions to meet it are woefully inadequate. The recommendations in the Burns Report are broadly to provide work programmes and to extend insurances, and then to make sure of adequate public assistance to persons who do not qualify for benefit under either work programmes or extended insurances. And in addition to give American youth an equal opportunity for education and training. It would be impossible in so brief an outline even to mention the numerous recommendations. But it can be said that they arise not from a disposition to blueprinting, but from an objective analysis of the experience already gained and the difficulties already encountered. If we are going to strengthen our system of social security, either it will be done substantially, as this report proposes, or we shall have to

make a fresh start along entirely new lines, regardless of experience. The only other course would be to leave things as they are, which a study of the report will convince nearly anyone is unthinkable.

HATCH-BALL BIPARTISAN RESOLUTION INTRODUCED INTO CONGRESS. GENERAL GIRAUD REPUDIATES VICHY

March 15, 1943

It is just a coincidence that a bipartisan resolution to pledge United States co-operation in maintaining peace and in economic measures and rehabilitation after the war should be mooted in the Senate at the moment Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden is in this country. But it is a coincidence that might well be exploited, for Americans would do well to appreciate how all their discussions about peace are hampered by the memories of 1920. The events of that year haunt the foreign offices of our associates in the war, and while they are assured that American opinion is no longer isolationist, they want something more concrete than public-opinion polls to go by. One of the weaknesses of the American practice of democracy has been its failure to place foreign policy, in its broad terms, always beyond the reach of party politics. In times of quiet this is no great handicap. But in times of crisis it is possible to take a decision on a fundamental matter of foreign policy, such as joining the League of Nations, whose consequences involve the whole world. And after the decision has been made, the consequences cannot be changed by changing the decision. That is, the Senate by a party vote can take an action which sets certain forces into motion outside our own borders, and the forces can't be brought to a stop by a change in the party strength in the Senate and a reversal of a vote. It is part of good instinct that basic questions of foreign policy should not be decided by a party vote, and as a matter of fact most of the basic votes taken before this war were not closely partisan. That instinct comes to expression now in the proposed resolution of two Democrats and two Republicans, Senators Hatch and Hill, the Democrats, and Senators Ball and Burton, the Republicans. If their resolution should be adopted, it would at once make our basic foreign policy in regard to the peace national, and it would give the government a much freer atmosphere in which to discuss plans for the peace. One objection is being raised to the resolution—that the debate about it might cause disunity among the United Nations. Another is that its defeat would be a catastrophe. Its defeat would be a catastrophe,

but there is no reason to fear its defeat. And if it should be defeated, it were somewhat better to have the catastrophe now than at the peace conference, or after it. It is to be doubted if the debate would prove disconcerting. Senators would be well aware of the effect of their words on the war effort, and no more responsible time for a discussion could be chosen. We already have national unity in prosecuting the war. It would increase our power if we could have national unity, too, in the broad principles of the peace. Every report I have studied about public opinion in this country points to the unmistakable conclusion that the resolution of the four senators embodies the view of all but the meagrest fringe of American thinking. So it can only be hoped that the resolution will receive early, sober, and thorough consideration.

General Giraud's speech yesterday has not of itself settled the vexed question of unity between his administration in North Africa and the French National Committee in London. But it has answered a question which is of greater importance to Americans. What has troubled a substantial body of Americans about our policy in North Africa is a suspicion, and the suspicion is that elements in our own State Department preferred the ideology of Marshal Pétain to the ideology of the French Republic. This suspicion was not allayed by calling collaboration with Admiral Darlan a temporary expedient. For it appeared that persons in the State Department, here and abroad, were more sympathetic with the social thinking of Vichy than they were with the democratic activities of the Third Republic, particularly as manifested by such an expression as the Popular Front. There still are details about our policy in North Africa that have not been satisfactorily explained. But General Giraud's clear repudiation of the legality of Vichy and of all its legislative works shows that suspicions about the ideology of American policy have not been justified. The man we have chosen as our associate in North Africa, General Giraud, has clarified our own position for us. I do not mean that we could not have done it ourselves; in fact President Roosevelt did it clearly in his Lincoln's Birthday address. But we could not speak for Giraud, since he is an associate and not our instrument. He had to speak for himself. He had to take his stand, and if our policy was going to be clarified, he had to take his stand unequivocally. Either he could be vague, and so retain some intangible tie with the marshal, or he could cut every tie with that architect of the armistice and advocate of collaboration. North Africa was a web of intangible ties with the marshal even after our arrival there. These ties existed until yesterday, when Giraud spoke. They appeared to be there with our approval since we sponsored Giraud and associated ourselves

with his administration. Now we are relieved of them. And that, one might say, is the first substantial quid pro quo we have had from General Giraud. Henceforth it will not be necessary to make tedious explanations about our policy in North Africa. The general has stated that the French people repudiate the armistice, that nothing done by French officialdom since the armistice is legal, and that a liberated France will start its renewed national life in the framework of the Third Republic. The fact that General Giraud has proceeded at once to the application of his now-stated democratic doctrine within his own administration is heartening. He should know that Americans are grateful for his clear statement of democratic principles and for every application of them, and that they will applaud the removal of men bearing the mark of Vichy from high places in his regime and the reinstatement of men dismissed from that administration because of their democratic fidelity. If he finds he can dispense with Peyrouton—General Bergeret, Giraud's deputy and a Vichyite, already is reported to have resigned—so much the better. Americans will be happy to see Noguès relieved of his duties as high commissioner in Morocco. If General Giraud can see to it that his military mission now in this country is staffed by democratic Frenchmen, and by no one who bears the Vichy stamp, that will allay suspicions still more. One cannot fairly ask too sweeping changes, not at the outset. The big thing is to have the principle clear.

And while much remains to be effected, and while the question of French unity may not be settled, the accord with democratic principles is what matters most. It is not a burning question to most Americans whether De Gaulle or Giraud should be number one or number two. It is of burning importance to them that association with the illegal and anti-democratic thinking of Vichy should be brought to an end. It could be done, first of all, only by General Giraud. And his having done so is an important milestone in the affairs of the United Nations.

ANNIVERSARY OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE. DECISION MADE IN DARKNESS

March 25, 1943

TO-DAY is the 122nd anniversary of Greece's Declaration of Independence. The day finds the nation in the grip of privation and disease and its government in exile. It is a birthday in the dark of an eclipse. But it is not a day only of memory, for the fighting Greek spirit lives in the towns, hills, and mountains of the Greek

mainland and in Crete, where guerrilla resistance is being maintained with daring and effectiveness. The Greeks are contributing fighting units to the Allied cause, and a navy, as well as 1,800,000 tons of merchant shipping. With the King of Greece and Premier Tsouderos already in Cairo, and official headquarters of the Greek Government probably soon to move to Egypt, one sees a clear indication that this regime hopes also to be back soon in Greece itself. An army is being gathered in Egypt, to which daily come recruits who have managed to escape from Greek soil. To this army King George to-day issued an order of the day assuring them that "on the anniversary of our independence there comes a stage in the war where we can be sure that a victorious end to our struggles is now in sight." And Premier Tsouderos, in an interview, said that the army is training intensively for fresh battles, while guerrillas in the homeland not only are operating as a military unit but are successful in harassing Axis efforts to build up their defences. In a broadcast he told the Greek people that they might expect liberation this year and urged them to continue their resistance. "You will be given the warning," he said, "when it is time to act as one man." Prime Minister Churchill, in a message to the Greeks, said, "To-day the people of Britain salute the heroes of the new war of liberation sprouting forth in the mountains, the cities, and the villages of Greece. Greece fights on; slavery will pass. To-day the King of the Hellenes and the Greek Government are in Cairo in order to make ready to restore to Greece the liberty for which she has always fought. When the hour strikes, the Greeks will drive the barbarous usurpers from their soil." The statement that the Greeks had a hand in saving for the Allies their position in Africa was made by Premier Tsouderos, in a foreword to the new Greek White Book, which publishes some of the diplomatic dispatches leading up to Greece's resistance to the Axis. He declares that Greek resistance upset the Axis timetable and delayed the consummation of a campaign by which the Axis, using Greece and Libya as twin bases, should proceed to expel the British from the eastern Mediterranean and from the Middle East. That was to have been the prelude to the attack on Russia. The Axis intended to spend the winter of 1940 not in fighting the Greeks, but in consolidating the German positions in the Balkans and expelling the British from the eastern Mediterranean, so that the campaign against Russia could have begun early in the spring. "For this purpose," he argues, "they would have had an ample margin of time and superiority both by land and in the air. They would have had even naval superiority, because at that time the Italian Navy was still intact. In Syria, Iraq, and Iran," he proceeds, "the Axis had already set

up strong centres, through which it had gained sympathizers and supporters. These countries were ripe to follow the example of the European countries which had submitted. Turkey thus would have been encircled and, as the Axis believed, would have been drawn willingly or unwillingly into the crusade against the Soviets. If it had been possible to follow this plan," he continues, "the campaign against Russia would have started much earlier, at the beginning of May instead of on June twenty-second. In addition Germany would have been unhampered in the Near East; Iran and the Persian Gulf ports would have been under German control, and the possibility of sending reinforcements to Russia through the Indian Ocean would have been ruled out." Instead, as we know, the seven million Greeks decided to fight. They were not sure of receiving help. They decided to fight, with or without help. And the German General Staff had to revise its plans, extricate the Italian armies, conquer Greece, seize Crete, and wage battle against the Yugoslavs. And it was June 1, 1941, before Greece could be fully occupied.

It may not always be profitable to figure out what might have been and wasn't, in a war. But it is a duty to truth to recognize what has been, and what force it has exerted in a rising tide of victory. Obviously the Greeks did not fight the Italians, and decide to resist even the overwhelming Germans, as a calculated contribution to a great international campaign against the Axis tyrannies. They were not of the United Nations then, for there were no United Nations. They did not know then that in due time the Axis would be driven back in Africa all the way to Tunisia, and that there would be battling there tanks and men from the United States. But they did know that they had one contribution to make to themselves, which had to be made without a promise gleaming in the light, assuring them of a benefit from it. They had to decide to fight and lose, rather than compromise and save an immediate comfort for themselves. That is a hard decision to make, because it has to be made in darkness. But since they made it, they have the gratification of seeing that they did contribute to themselves in ways they could not have foreseen, and contributed to more than themselves, as is the law of such sacrifice. They now know that they delayed the Russian campaign, which may have saved Moscow. They now know that they prevented the Axis from driving the British out of Africa and the Near East. They now can see that Germany and Japan were unable to join hands in the Indian Ocean, and that they had a part in preventing it. Now there are the United Nations. So it is altogether timely and pertinent for Mr. Tsouderos to point out what the contribution has been. And

it is fitting that to-day, on the birthday of Greek independence, the people of the United Nations should acknowledge the contributions and see in what a broad measure the future of their own liberty has been served, in that the Greeks were willing to pay the highest price for theirs.

ROMMEL ABANDONS MARETH LINE. U-BOAT WARFARE AND
SECOND FRONT

March 29, 1943

OVERPOWERED and outmanœuvred, Rommel has abandoned the Mareth Line and is withdrawing northward in Tunisia. The British Eighth Army, which chased him on the longest and swiftest retreat in military history, beat him again when it finally brought him to battle. Rommel has paid dearly in casualties, nor will British losses have been small. But Rommel has paid too in tanks and trucks and guns, which he has had to leave behind in substantial amount, some of it undamaged, and the German prisoners taken so far are estimated at six thousand.

It takes some of the gloss off the splendid news from Tunisia to speak of the submarine war. But if one tried to guess at what is passing through the mind of Adolf Hitler as he contemplates Tunisia and the possibility of the Allies opening a big and dangerous new front in Europe in the near future, a good guess would be that he is telling himself: "They can't do it." And the ground for his confidence on that score would be his knowledge of the U-boat campaign, as it already is shaping up. For reasons not clear to a civilian mind, it has been decreed that the essential facts of the world's greatest battle, the battle of supply, are not revealed to the publics immediately involved: the American public, the British public, the Russian public, and the Chinese public. The tightest lips on this subject are in the British Admiralty, though we have some advocates of secrecy in our own services. There are ample reasons for a certain kind of secrecy. It would be foolish, for instance, to give out information about losses which would aid the Germans to check up in detail on an operation against a particular convoy, or on a particular kind of attack. But the Germans know accurately enough what they are achieving, and the secrecy is not keeping information from the enemy, it is primarily keeping it from the home fronts in the countries most vitally concerned in maintaining the war effort against the Axis. For without a true sense of the achievements of the U-boats, no one can measure the current of the war and see how fast it is moving. If the war

could possibly be over this year, everyone would feel differently about all the problems of war, those in which democratic citizens have a right to participate, either as workers or as the power behind legislation. If the war could probably be over at the end of next year, the very probability would make a difference in the treatment of home problems. But if the war is more likely to reach into 1945, and is going to require a far greater share of the nations' united and concentrated effort, that is sure to colour behaviour to-day and every day for the ensuing time. The denominator which will decide the length of the war more than any other is the U-boat. But though the public is told in abstractions that the situation is serious, the facts are not visible, graphic, and convincing enough to become a part of the general thinking. We do get a few hints of tonnage lost, of numbers of ships lost, and of the strenuous efforts being made to combat the U-boat. But we are never told how many cargoes go down, and so it is impossible even to gauge what effect these, the decisive losses, have upon the possibility of future military moves. Hitler knows well enough what the situation is. So do the military and naval leaders in Britain and the United States—and, one may hope, in Russia and in China. But if the Allied publics don't know, they are bound to accumulate an impatience and distrust that can grow formidable and play havoc with a stoic war effort. We know that March will prove to have been one of the worst months of the history of U-boat warfare. We know that the Germans have now embarked on a campaign of intensified submarine warfare, in which they put constantly more U-boats into the service than we are able to destroy. We know that there are gaps in our defence. We know also that the best minds and most energetic measures are being applied to get on top of the submarine menace. And we know that there is little likelihood of our getting on top of it until toward the close of this year. In other words, despite our doing the best that we can do now, the U-boats will succeed in chopping off a substantial part of our war effort most of this year, before it reaches the other side of the ocean. And while we may be increasing our effort, we can't increase it enough to make our true physical power tell at its true strength. We shan't really be able to feel that we are gaining fast enough until this year of hope and confidence has run a somewhat disappointing course. This is not said in criticism of the efforts of the Allied navies. If blame is to be laid anywhere, it must be laid to those who, many months ago, assigned priorities to production of other than the adequate number of escort vessels and the intricate instruments and paraphernalia for them.

As to the navies, their task in the matter of supply is far greater

than in the last war, and comparisons between achievements in the first year of the last war and this are in themselves comforting. Thus in the first year of the present war nearly ten and a half million measurement tons of army freight were shipped overseas as against one and a quarter million in the first year of the last war. We sent abroad far more men in the first year of this war, over 891,000 as against 366,000. We have shipped in army freight, apart from supplies for our Allies, eighty-two pounds for each man, as against forty-three pounds for each man in the same period in the last war. That is, the navies and merchant fleets have had a much bigger job this time, and have had to do it over vastly longer distances. The record is nothing to be ashamed of. But shame is not the point. The point is that the biggest battle of the war goes on every day without a communiqué, and without any factual reporting, and that this battle is the denominator for all the other battles: Tunisia, the opening of a European front, when it is opened, and, most crucially, the battle of Russia. It is even the denominator for the battle of Burma, which cannot be begun without shipping, and which in turn affects the supply of China, and the possibility of striking Japan steadily, not at the underbelly but in its industrial heart.

Everyone in a sense is daily struggling in his mind to put together the Chinese puzzle of the future of the war. But you and I, and the British, the Russians, and the Chinese, fumble along without the central piece of the puzzle, and what we put together is an illusion. The odd truth is that Hitler and his advisers have this central piece. None of this secrecy keeps from them the essential truth of the U-boat campaign. And for the sake of keeping it secret from them, all the publics of the United Nations are condemned to work on that puzzle in vain. It is, to put it temperately, a bitter mistake in public relations, and one must hope that those responsible for it will not have to pay too dearly when disillusionment and distrust begin to reap their harvest.

THE FOOD SITUATION IN TERMS OF NUTRITION

March 31, 1943

I AM going to devote most of my time to-night to a discussion of the food situation, so as to do it in terms of nutrition. We have had a good deal of panic talk about the food shortage, while not enough attention has been paid to nutrition. Nutrition is what matters, particularly since we must cut down on our consumption of food. Let me start by reminding you that plenty of food in

itself does not mean plenty of nutrition. For example, a meal of beefsteak, potatoes, apple pie, with trimming of a cocktail, hors d'oeuvres, and bouillon, while it is plenty of food, is inadequate in nutrition. It does not contain enough vitamins A, B₁, B₂, and calcium, and it is low in vitamin C. If, on the other hand, there is not an abundance of food, the nutrition can be supplied and the health of the nation safeguarded. That is what the British have achieved, and though some aspects of their nutrition policy may not be perfect, it is true that the health of the British nation actually is better than before the food shortage.

I should explain first of all that an adequate diet, measured in terms of nutrition, is only adequate if it supplies all of the nutritive essentials. These are calories, protein, certain minerals, such as calcium, phosphate, and iron, and certain vitamins. It does not matter where these come from, whether from the field or the factory. And no nutritive essential can replace another. If a single essential is omitted the diet is deficient; that is, it is a disease-producing diet. I should also say a word to correct an impression that an interest in vitamins is just a fad. What is true is that the ordinary individual should not be required to take an interest in what vitamins he is getting. If he is forced to think about it he may not get what he needs. A sound national practice is to add vitamins to certain standard products, so that the needs of the whole nation are provided without the individual having to worry about them, which is what the British have done in dealing with their shortage of food.

Now for a survey of our supply of the essential of calories, proteins, and vitamins. As to calories, their main sources are cereals, sugar, potatoes, and fats. Our potato supply may be restricted somewhat, but we shall have a supply of all the calories we need.

Proteins we get from meat, milk, eggs, cheese, beans, and cereals. We shall have barely enough proteins if the present meat rations are maintained and if the present amount of beans is available for home consumption. But if the supply of meat and beans is lowered, the protein shortage will become serious. For six months or so there will not be a national shortage of protein, though local shortages are to be expected due to defects in distribution. But there is shortage of protein foods for livestock, which will produce a shortage of proteins for human beings later on. Here we have a need of long-range planning.

Now to report on our supply of vitamins. Of the four principal vitamins, A and D present no great problem. Vitamin A is easy to add to margarine, as is being done to many brands, and enriched margarine is more nourishing than winter butter, though not as

nourishing as summer butter. It is much cheaper than either kind. Vitamin A being found in green and yellow vegetables, as well as in milk and butter, the natural supply is large, and it also can easily be supplemented.

Vitamin D also is available, and though it is not present in most foods, it can be added, and is being added at extremely low cost, to milk. We have the technical knowledge, we have the plants, and we have the means to supply the nation all the vitamins A and D that are essential to nutrition this year.

Nor shall we need to suffer from a shortage of the three B vitamins. We are familiar with the concept of enriching flour. Before the summer is over, if present plans are carried through, all the flour and corn meal consumed in the United States will be enriched, not only to the point of adding as much of the B vitamins as is found in the wheat germ, but considerably more of them. The source will be synthetic vitamins. This simple statement is really one of the most dramatic of facts. For if as a nation we can eat only enriched flour and enriched corn meal, one of the most expensive diseases to the United States will disappear. It is pellagra, due altogether to a deficiency of one of the B vitamins. How much this disease costs the nation would be hard to say. Probably 10 per cent of the cases of insanity in the South are due to pellagra. The prevention of this disease will prove quite simple. The manufacture of the vitamins will take some new machinery, but this is being made available, and the millers are prepared for the fullest co-operation.

So we are in sight of having an adequate supply of five of the six principal vitamins needed for human nutrition. They are vitamin A, the three B vitamins, and vitamin D.

The report on vitamin C is not so promising, though it could be made so by the same enriching method, and at relatively little cost. Even with our citrus fruits, tomatoes, cabbages, and potatoes, and certain green vegetables, we do not have enough vitamin C. We have about 60 per cent of our needs, but we must send a good part of our vitamin C supply abroad. A large amount of vitamin C is being made synthetically, but most of that must go to the armed forces, Britain, and Russia. The output could be increased, but priorities stand in the way, rightly or wrongly, probably wrongly. Those who determine priorities may find it hard to believe that the war can be won by vitamin C as well as TNT. As a matter of fact, all the vitamin needs of the whole world could be met by this country at the cost of a few battleships. And we could guarantee all the vitamin requirements of the United States, if these are made available by the enrichment of a few staple foods

at the stage of their primary processing, at the cost of about one dollar per capita a year. This, however, would not provide protein needs. Yet we are within this range of solving the nutrition problem permanently. In a few months enough could be done to meet all vitamin needs at home, our Lend-Lease commitments, and the requirements of the armed forces. All that it takes is the adoption of a national policy, and then suitable administrative action. But first there must be the understanding that a shortage of food does not mean a shortage of nutrition, and that when there is a shortage of food knowledge of nutrition is an urgent necessity. A scientifically fed chicken to-day is better nourished than the average human being. If human beings laid eggs that could be counted, we should see more graphically the difference between food and nutrition.

Now for a word about the feeding of Europe. That is even more a nutritional problem than one of food. We don't have, and never can have, enough food to feed Europe, and even if we had, it would cost far too much in labour and land and in shipping. It is to be hoped that the Lehman Commission is preparing to treat the problem in that light. It will need to be piling up a surplus of vitamins and food concentrates, utilizing such waste products as the mash of our fermentation industries, which is rich in vitamins and is now being largely lost. It will need to establish factories in Europe to make synthetic vitamins, to salvage wastes, and to dehydrate food. And it will have to accompany its food distribution in Europe with a primary education to consumers on the subject of nutrition, how to prepare food to save its nutritional content, and how to supplement available foods so as to obtain the maximum amount of nutrition at the minimum cost. If this is done, the drain on our food supply after the war will be reduced. Europe will be brought back more quickly to health and productivity, and the diseases due to existing deficiencies can be overcome and their spread can be prevented.

To sum up the prospects for our own nutrition this year, we are sure to have, or can easily have, all the vitamin A, the three B vitamins, and vitamin D we need, but we are going to have a deficiency in vitamin C, though not enough to produce scurvy. We don't need to worry about calories. But there is a real danger of a protein shortage for our human population in certain areas this year and for our livestock, and the shortage for livestock will affect the protein supply for the human population by the end of the year and later may endanger our Lend-Lease commitments. The deficiency in proteins cannot be overcome by the addition of vitamins.

Aside from that we stand fairly well as to nutrition. But we could stand even better this year, and for the more distant future, and the feeding of Europe could be better achieved, if those who decide our national policy were willing to make an energetic application of the existing knowledge of nutrition.

THE FLAME OF COURAGE. SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF GERMAN
ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA

April 6 1943

OF all the peoples who hear the thunders of war from Africa, and from the heavy Allied bombings in Germany and Italy, none can listen with a sharper catch of the breath than those in Yugoslavia. To-day is the second anniversary of the German attack on Yugoslavia. The two intervening years have given that land an experience of barbarism, at the hands of the Germans, the Italians, and the Hungarians in particular, that vies with anything in the most sanguinary centuries of the past. It is, no doubt, idle to try to compile a catalogue of savagery and say it was dreadful in Poland but it was still worse in Slovenia and Serbia. Certainly the reports of the butchery and bestiality, which are adequately authenticated, are not suitable material for broadcasting. But if it is horrible, it is also inescapable; it is there, it is part of our current history, and it will shape history to come. The dry statistics of what happened to Slovenia can be reported. Slovenia was a thoroughly decent little country of two million people, as peaceable as any in Europe. Germany took part of it, Italy a part. Hitler ordered simply that the German part was to be Germanized. So eighty-five thousand people were deported to Axis countries, their places taken by Germans. A further thirty-one thousand were deported to Serbia, and eight thousand children were taken from their parents and sent to unknown destinations. A further thirty-eight thousand simply disappeared, some of whom may be living. Beyond this it is estimated that eighteen thousand men were sent away to forced labour, another eight thousand to concentration camps, two thousand were killed in so-called action against communists, and eight thousand girls were forcibly recruited and sent to unknown destinations. The missing, of course, include all the known leaders in every field who were to be found on Slovene soil. The hostages killed as such in military executions number fifteen hundred. It adds up to one person out of five in the German part of Slovenia having been killed or led away in slavery.

The Italian part of Slovenia has fared no better. Thirty-one thousand males have been deported, three thousand have been killed in so-called action against guerrillas, nearly eight hundred hostages have been shot, another six hundred and fifty have been killed by secret Italian agents, and those who have disappeared or presumably are in prison come to more than six thousand, this from a population of 231,000 or again about one person in five. The Italian military administration has been just as ruthless as the German. Mussolini himself said last July in Gorizia that he was going to apply to the Slovenes the law of the Roman emperors, who ordered that all males of hostile tribes must be killed. The massacre of Serbs by Hungarians in town after town and village after village, and the tortures inflicted, are matters of record. So are conditions in concentration camps. In January a year ago virtually all Serbs in Hungary itself were killed. Toward the end of January Hungarians went on a rampage in northern Serbia, committing such excesses that word came back to Hungary and gravely disturbed the public, which was pacified with the assurance that energetic measures had been taken to preserve order. It has been estimated that in that month the Hungarians killed more than ten thousand people. No doubt resistance in these districts played its part in giving the invaders grounds for strong measures, but as a rule the strong measures came before the resistance. It stands to reason that civilians do not take to the woods to live the life of guerrillas, hunted like beasts, and killed like beasts if they fall into the hands of their captors, unless they are driven to it by despair and rage. The Germans and Italians tried not only to cow these people with calculated terror. They wanted to deprive them of all their leaders. They wanted to be rid of the fighters. At first they were not thinking ahead, except to the time when they would colonize these lands with their own folk. But now a new motive plays in the policy of the tyrants. Yugoslavia may well be on the line of march the Allies will take into Europe. And these intrepid sons and daughters of Yugoslavia, whom they themselves have goaded and brutalized into open resistance, are becoming a sharpening menace.

On the Anniversary of the attack on Yugoslavia it would be appropriate to say no more than that this country, like Greece, made its contribution to the Allied cause early, and did so without counting on material dividends from a spiritual investment. But it is well to remember, too, that no land has been more bestially and systematically racked and tortured, and that the flame of courage which burns there feeds not on outside help, or on early hope, but on as fine a heroism and spirit as are to be found in

the world to-day, or ever. If people like the Yugoslavs could have been trodden and tramped into submission, Hitler might have created a unified Europe within his European fortress, and won his war. As it is, he has his fortress, and it encloses peoples seething with as deep a hatred for tyranny as the world has ever seen.

MR. EVATT OF AUSTRALIA APPEALS FOR MORE AID. EFFECT
ON AMERICAN PUBLIC

April 13, 1943

NOT many weeks ago it was the fashion to report the Japanese air force as showing serious evidence of weakness. Its planes were coming straight from the factory into service, and its pilots bore all signs of greenness. The impression was given that Japan was past its peak in the air. Since January Japan has doubled its air strength in the south-west Pacific and has greatly extended its air bases as well as the numbers of planes. And little is now heard about the incompetence of Japanese airmen. Another Australian warning was to be expected, particularly as Mr. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, has arrived in this country to ask for the assignment of more force to Australia. And General Blamey, commander of the Allied ground forces in Australia, voiced the warning: "The Japanese," he said, "are concentrating their aggressive attentions—already to a strength of two hundred thousand first-line troops and a powerful air force—along the island arc northward of Australia. Their purpose is to return to the offensive that was interrupted by the Allied successes in the Coral Sea, the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Bismarck Sea. The result of this struggle in the next few weeks will have the greatest importance to us." Another voice raised in warning against rising Japanese power was heard from Rome yesterday. It was in an Italian propaganda broadcast in Turkish, and it warned the Allies that while they were concentrating so much power in Africa the Japanese were gaining the upper hand in the south-west Pacific. So the Axis is watching the discussion by the United Nations as to where to expend their power and is putting in its not very subtle two cents' worth.

As the chief arsenal of the United Nations, the United States must also be the most patient listener to the claims of the various Allies to a larger share of the output. Mr. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, who is pressing Australia's case for a larger share, has already seen President Roosevelt. He will go on to London to see Prime Minister Churchill. But it is part of the

mission for Mr. Evatt to air his views to the American public. Madame Chiang Kai-shek has been on a similar mission and has used essentially the same methods. There is consultation with the leaders who already have decided the major strategy. Then there is an appeal to public opinion. Neither Madame Chiang nor Mr. Evatt quarrels openly with the beat-Hitler-first school of thinking. But both of them undertake to show that beating Hitler need not interfere with holding Japan in much stronger check than now is being done. Both of them point out that Japan should and could be kept from exploiting the raw materials in the lands it has conquered. It hardly needs to be said that it is highly proper and also instructive to have these missions come to the front office of the American arsenal. But the American public, which is used as a sounding board for these appeals, is perhaps a little bewildered and even uneasy over what it is told. For the American public does not know the allotment of supplies. It knows only in a general way what beating-Hitler-first entails. It is not informed about the next step, or what will be involved in the way of distributing supplies. The public, for example, cannot say what is going to follow the Tunisian campaign. Or what the next step means in transport of troops and materials, how much tonnage it will require, how long the accumulation of supplies will take before the Allies can invade the continent. It does not know whether all this can be done, and that at the same time the United Nations can prepare for the invasion of Burma on a large scale after the monsoons in October. The public is in the dark about all such matters. It is not able to have an opinion on how much more could and should be done to strengthen Australia. And yet it is part of the mission technique to appeal to the public as though it knew, and as though talking to the American public was somehow going to bring pressure on the supply councils which do distribute materials, or even on the high staff officers who decide the major strategy. Perhaps it does work out that way. One is entitled to wonder, however, whether the decisions made in regard to China have been greatly altered by Madame Chiang's activities. The major decisions were made at Casablanca, before she launched her activities. We never have been told what they were. But decisions were reached, and a timetable was set. And Sir John Dill and General Arnold proceeded from Casablanca to Chungking to tell the Generalissimo the plans. Then the leading American military and air and naval commands in the Pacific were told to send representatives to Washington, and they in turn were given the plans. It is clear that the plans call for greater activity against Japan. That is what Madame Chiang wants. It is what Mr.

Evatt wants. However, they both appear to want plans that go still further, and so they carry their appeals to the public. But the public doesn't know how far the plans go. So it can't consciously bring pressure. All it can do is to serve as sounding board for these claimants and feel bothered at not knowing more than it knows.

However, both Madame Chiang and Mr. Evatt do perform a service to the American public, for they both give it a fuller sense of what their countries are enduring. The story of China cannot be told too often, for reiteration does not dull the heroism or the tragedy of it. And while the story of Australia is not on that epic level, Mr. Evatt calls attention to some vital facts which need emphasis in this country. One simple one is that Australia is carrying the brunt of the Pacific fighting. Perhaps the name of General MacArthur has deluded Americans into feeling that they are doing most of the fighting in the Pacific. Of the land forces involved, 80 per cent are Australians. Australia, Mr. Evatt reminds us, has been in the war against Germany since 1939. At present 68 per cent of the total population of Australia, he says, is either fighting, producing war supplies or doing jobs classified as essential to the war effort. He also points out that in reciprocal Lend-Lease what Australia is supplying the United States armed forces amounts this year to fifty-five million pounds, which on a per-capita basis is equivalent to the expenditure by the United States of \$3,600,000,000. So each individual Australian is giving in reciprocal aid just seven times as much as each individual in the United States gives to Australia by way of Lend-Lease. Mr. Evatt points out that what the supreme strategical or political authorities decide is not always carried out in the allotment of supplies. Bottlenecks and delays occur down the line which are quite unknown to the high commander. These delay deliveries at the point of combat. That is one kind of problem he wants to discuss here. Mr. Evatt also wants Australia to have more of a voice in United Nations decisions. He wants wider representation by Australia on the munitions assignment boards in Washington and London. But on such matters, as on the problems of assignment, the American public is in no position to judge the issues. It is one of the phenomena of the war that these public debates start, then run out in the sands. One must hope they accomplish more than the bewilderment and uneasiness they also produce.

HITLER'S COMING BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION LACKS ENTHUSIASM. ITALY'S MORALE AT NEW LOW

April 19, 1943

TO-MORROW Adolf Hitler will be fifty-four years old, and the German radio is blaring out its eulogies and its fervent appeals for the patriotic support of the Fuehrer. But the keynote of this propaganda is not what Hitler has been used to on his birthday. The references to the greatest victories ever won in military history are no longer stressed. Goering, in an appeal to be released tomorrow for the German press, states the issue before the German people is victory or destruction. "The time of severest trial and the most decisive test of our nation, and of every single German, has come," he declared. "What we gladly promised the Fuehrer in the past years, full of enthusiasm about the successes he has achieved, we shall now faithfully observe in the severest storms of this war." This note of supreme crisis is also dominant in a speech of Goebbels. "The war," he said, "in its fourth year has reached its hardest stage, and the way out of its trials and sufferings, or its end, cannot be discerned." He appealed for unity of the German people, and asked them to "ban the devil of doubt and discord. Confidence is the best moral weapon in this war," he declared. "Only when it begins to fail has the beginning of the end arrived." The propaganda line in Germany has not changed yet. It remains victory or destruction. And if a German peace offensive is in the making, apparently Hitler's birthday will not be the occasion for it.

The state of Italian morale appears to be at a new low, as evidenced by another shake-up in high Fascist offices. The twenty-eight-year-old secretary of the Fascist party, Vidussoni, has been dismissed, and his place is taken by a veteran Fascist, Carlo Scorza, memorable for his leading role in the Fascist movement in the days of its addiction to assassination and castor oil. Vidussoni's dismissal must count as a major event in Italy. He was appointed sixteen months ago and has failed in all his assigned tasks. He was expected to stamp out the black market, to carry through the civil mobilization of Italy's men, women, and children, and finally to purge the Fascist party of all undesirable elements. Not only that, as a young man he was expected to rally Italian youth to Fascism, and in this, too, he has failed. Another Fascist minister, Carlo Tiengo, Minister of Corporations for only two months, also resigned this week-end. In ten weeks there have been three shuffles in Mussolini's Cabinet, involving seven ministers.

Man after man of rank and some standing, in the Cabinet, in the army and navy, and in the party, has gone down, and political posts have been filled by some second-rate party boss. Thus Mussolini is surrounding himself with trustworthy men, but the quality of trustworthy men in Italy is sinking fast. And these innumerable shake-ups testify eloquently that the fabric of national life in Italy is wearing perilously thin.

CALL TO ARMS. TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE

April 20, 1943

THE British cheese ration was cut last week to three ounces a person a week, and the public was warned to expect further reduction in the meat ration. No deception was attempted; the public was informed that this was because of the shipping shortage and the requirements of Allied tonnage for military operations. This is not news of food shortage so much as it is news of approaching war activity. Yet just now, while there has been a lull in Tunisia, with relative quiet on the Russian front, and the chief Allied activity in Europe confined to bombing, the American public has been invited to weigh the case of the war in the south-west Pacific and to grope to its own conclusion as to the priority of the simmering war in Europe. The American public may be as intelligent as any in the world, but for all its intelligence it is not equipped to pass judgment on priorities in the war. It cannot say how many more bombers should go to Australia or decide precisely what use should be made of our fighting and military resources. Such decisions are committed to the combined chiefs of staff, who know the answers and keep still about them. But since the issue has been raised as to priorities in the war, it is well to restate the general strategic situation in Europe and be reminded of the reasons why the defeat of Hitler was placed first, still remains first, and in the interests of a durable peace must remain first. It should be remembered that the Axis and Japan are allies and work together. And while the Australian case rests on its own sound footing, as an Australian case, it is also in the interest of Japan to make this case plausible, since it might serve to draw Allied power from Europe at a critical time. The Axis and Japan played their squeeze game as a team before the war broke out. They may be playing it as a team to-day. And if the Japanese are making a show of strength in the south-west Pacific just at the time that Australia is pleading for more power, one can be sure that Rome and Berlin are duly thankful. For they would have

much to gain from a diversion of Allied power to the south-west Pacific, and if the defeat of Germany can be made more difficult, the defeat of Japan also becomes more difficult.

It is a truism that the Axis and Japan no longer can hope to win the war, yet both of them hold invaluable conquests and their entire devotion henceforth must be to hold as much of them as they can. Since they cannot win an outright victory, only one policy is possible for them—to compromise on the most favourable terms they can get. It is no coincidence that the new Foreign Minister to-day appointed in Japan is the former Ambassador to London, Shigemitsu, and that the new German Ambassador to Spain is Dieckhoff, former Ambassador in Washington, while Von Thomsen, former German chargé in Washington, was recently made Ambassador to Sweden. The Axis and Japan are putting into key places the men experienced in democratic countries, therefore most likely to understand how to play on democratic thought, habits and sensibilities. The appointment of Shigemitsu as Japanese Foreign Minister brings into office a man known throughout his career as advocate of Japanese co-operation with the democracies. No one can be deluded into thinking that he and Dieckhoff and Von Thomsen have been placed where they are to wage ruthless military war against the Allies. They are there to exploit their knowledge of the democracies. They are working for the day of the coming of the compromise.

Yet it is clear that the Axis and Japan do not expect to make a compromise peace right away. The Casablanca conference, with its insistence on unconditional surrender, scotched any prospect of an early peace. Ever since that conference, and indeed since the Allied landing in North Africa, the Axis had been feverishly busy preparing itself for defence, both with fortifications and with a great economic effort. It has been rallying the satellites, Hungary and Rumania, and enlisting Bulgaria. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans have been marshalled, like the slaves of ancient Egypt, to build new fortifications for the Continent. And the Tunisian bridgehead was established and strengthened to become the great time winner for the Axis, in holding off the Allied assault on the Continent while this defensive work was pushed forward. If there is to be a compromise peace, the Allied assault on the fortifications of Europe must be made as costly as possible. The Axis propagandists know that they cannot talk to war-weary Americans until there are war-weary Americans. But they figure that there will be some, and war-weary Britons too. And they know that to convince war-weary people in democracies they must talk the lingo of democracies. And that they are preparing to do, too. Europe

will soon be given a charter. Hitler, the despiser of the weak and the small nations, will proclaim himself their protector. He will adopt all the Allied peace aims. He will promise to do everything that a victorious democracy itself could wish to do. For ultimately, he thinks, the war-weary democracies, counting their dead, their wounded, and their diminishing resources, and looking at their own peace aims, will ask, "What is the use of fighting on?" The time for this campaign is not now. Nor will it follow at once after an Allied victory in Tunisia. It will come only when the Allies have battered their forces against the fortification of Europe. But those fortifications are not yet completed, and they are not yet adequately manned. Nor is all the emotional campaigning done, which will give the enslaved people behind the fortress walls the submission which a good defence requires. The Axis needs time. There is a campaign still to be waged against the Russian armies. The defence of Italy must be organized, if it is going to be organized.

The British rations are being cut down. This means that the day is near when the Allies will make their first assault or assaults on the Continent. It may be that the Allies will strike not in one place, but in several. They will disperse Hitler's forces if they possibly can. But to strike in a way to disperse Hitler's forces, the Allies need every ship, every landing unit, every plane for the campaign. Just as the Axis needs time, the Allies cannot afford time. In a tremendous sense, time is not on our side. A few months of delay this summer might prolong the war indefinitely by permitting Hitler invaluable opportunities to strengthen his continental defences. It might enable him, by concentrating his attack in the East next month, or the month after, to deal a blow against the Russians which, if it does not destroy the Russian resistance, will render it incapable of aggressive warfare for a long season. Time lost to Hitler now enhances his ultimate hopes of compromise. The central objective of the Axis is clear enough. Americans and British have not yet landed a great blow; they are still sparring. The Axis must make sure that when a great blow is landed it is not decisive. It must be costly. It must be discouraging. It must be followed by a sober realization that winning the victory will be a long, arduous, and very costly undertaking. And then the moment will have come to talk compromise. To come back again to the question of priorities. If the power of the Allies can be drained, even a little bit, from the earliest and most effective use in Europe, the campaign of the Axis for a compromise peace is that much helped.

And then there is a further consideration. There are some people both in this country and in Britain who would be disposed

to favour an ultimate compromise with the Axis. They may not favour it now, but let the war proceed, and the wounds begin to drain the Allied stamina, their predilection to compromise with Hitlerism will come to life. And this the Axis also knows and counts on. Those who regard Japan the prior enemy may be altogether innocent of knowing that this favours a compromise with Hitlerism. But it does. And what is just as true, if the Allies can be induced or seduced into a compromise with the Axis, under any guise whatever, Japan itself has everything to gain. For if we have compromised with the Axis, compromise with Japan will prove still easier. And it hardly needs saying that a compromise, anything less than unconditional surrender, means leaving the Axis and Japan with part of their conquests; it means that they have won the war, even if not as grandly as they had hoped. And it means that all chances of organizing the peace on the collaboration of free peoples is again lost until it is opened up by another global war in perhaps another twenty-one years.

At the moment, of course, nobody in this country or in Britain dreams of a compromise peace. Everyone is set for unconditional surrender. But we should be realistic enough to look ahead and see what is coming. Just now it may appear easy to put up a good show against both the Axis and Japan. But let the Allied offensive against the continent of Europe begin and we shall think otherwise. Fortunately, when that moment comes we shall be able to maintain a holding operation in the south-west Pacific. But we shall need every ton of shipping, every mobile gun, every plane in the costly attempt to batter our way into Europe. We shall need them as early as we can muster them. It will put a very real strain on our resources, on our production, on our transport, on our stamina and morale. The British are already feeling the pinch. They are to have less cheese, which means less protein. But they will know there is a race with time, and since they are impatient already, they can and will bear it gladly.

The present relative lull is deceptive. We seem to have a margin to play with. And the debate about priorities in the war has a false air of plausibility. But the combined chiefs of staff who know the war programme remain silent. They go on with their job. They were goaded by civilian and military and naval experts before the landing in North Africa. They kept silent then. Their silence must again be taken to be eloquent with the promise of action to come. If and when it comes, the current debate about the disposal of our air-and man-power and our resources will be forgotten like last year's newspapers. We shall know what we are up against.

MYSTERY OF THE MASS GRAVE NEAR SMOLENSK. BREAK IN
POLAND AND RUSSIA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS*April 26, 1943*

PERSONS with firsthand knowledge of Russian-Polish relations have long known of the mystery as to the whereabouts of several thousand Polish officers and non-commissioned officers captured by the Russians in the defeat of Poland. When Premier Sikorski went to Moscow he asked where the officers were. He was given to understand that they had been dispersed throughout European Russia and Siberia. He pressed for further information but was not able to obtain much. He did negotiate with Moscow for the liberation of Polish troops and civilians, and obtained full co-operation. But on the subject of the Polish officers the Polish government in exile has never had specific information, let alone satisfaction. Then recently the Nazis took a hand in the mystery. They announced the discovery of a mass grave near Smolensk and produced what they presented as proof that it contained the bodies of twelve thousand Polish officers, alleging that these had been killed by the Russians and buried there. This story was broadcast with all the arts and gruesome emphasis that the Goebbels propaganda department knows how to muster. It was repeated daily; all the Axis-controlled radio stations were required to carry it. And for a week the air waves of Nazi-controlled Europe have heard little else than the German account of the horror story. The Germans insisted on an investigation by the International Red Cross. The Polish government in exile reacted to this campaign, and it did ask the International Red Cross to make an investigation. The upshot is that the Soviet Government to-day announced that it has broken diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile because it took the Nazi defamation seriously enough to move for an inquiry. If it were not for this dangerously discordant breach in United Nations relations, the mystery of the Polish officers would remain simply one of the great mysteries of modern times, perhaps of equal interest and mystery to the famous Reichstag fire. Now it has stirred up a passionate issue which will have its effect on United Nations relations in general. One wonders what British and American diplomacy has been about, in not exercising greater influence on the two governments. For the breach between Russia and Poland is as serious in its way as a lost military campaign, and it should have been averted.

Before going into the German accusation I should explain that there will not be an investigation of the German evidence by

the International Red Cross. In fact, what is called the International Red Cross is really a Swiss organization, and while it serves as communication centre between the various national Red Cross societies, it is not international in its own composition. This International Red Cross did receive two requests for an investigation of the Nazi story. One was from the German Red Cross and one from the Polish government in exile. It replied that it would sponsor an investigation if asked to do so by all the parties concerned, and since the Russians have not asked and are not likely to ask an inquiry this means that one will not be made. In announcing its policy, the International Red Cross took the line that it would not itself serve as an investigating commission or arbitration tribunal, nor designate any of its members to take part in such procedures. But as a principle it would be ready to select one or more competent persons to lead such investigations or arbitrations, who in certain circumstances would pronounce a verdict.

Without an impartial investigation of this story, the public has only charges and denials to judge. The story of the Germans can be summarized as follows: They say they discovered recently a mass grave at Katyn near Smolensk. They say it was cleverly camouflaged by sand hills and pine trees planted three years ago. Excavation revealed the bodies of Polish officers, at first estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 and then at 12,000. They are still being exhumed. The Germans then allege that these officers first had been interned by the Red Army and after being distributed among three camps had been taken to Katyn in April 1940, with all their uniforms, personal documents, papers, and private correspondence. Then, the charge proceeds, each man was lined up, had his hands tied behind his back, and then all were shot through the back of the neck by four Jewish members of the G.P.U. Thereafter the bodies were piled in layers in a series of huge graves, which were covered by sand hills. The Germans did their exposition of this story thoroughly. They quoted local peasants as to the original slaughter. They recounted the story of bestial orgies held in a near-by place, where Polish officers are stated to have been tortured for hours. They broadcast the names of the alleged four executioners. With the beginning of the exhumation they brought in the head of the medicolegal and criminological institute of Breslau to supervise the task of digging out the bodies. German and Polish committees co-operated in identifying the bodies from their documents, all of which were legible. Daily lists of names were published. They were broadcast to Warsaw; Polish writers, journalists, and officials, as well as representatives of the Archbishop of

Kraków and the mayor of Warsaw, were brought in to witness the horrible scene. Photographs were taken for publication in the *Deutsche Wochenschau*.

There can be no doubt that bodies in Polish uniforms were taken from the grave. There can be no doubt that identification papers were found on the bodies, some of them diaries whose entries ended in March or April three years ago. This much is confirmed by the head of the central committee of the Polish Red Cross.

Now let me sum up the Russian reply to the charges. It is to question, first, why the Germans have held up the story so long, why did the local witnesses remain silent for two years and speak up only now? Why are these bodies so well preserved, and come to view just now with all the documents and diaries? The Russians charge that the Polish prisoners near Smolensk fell into German hands when the Russian troops withdrew in 1941. It says that the Polish prisoners were killed by the Germans and killed only very recently, which is why the bodies have been preserved so well. And the Russians remark that the Germans have good reason to distract the eyes of the world from their own quite well-authenticated massacres in Russia and Poland.

It is not possible to sift evidence in a case like this in which there can be no impartial investigation, and it might well be impossible to learn the truth even if an investigation were made. But certain questions arise which the two stories do not answer satisfactorily. There is the first and obvious question, what *did* happen to the Polish officers? If they were dispersed throughout Russia, why has it been impossible to turn them up? And if they were captured by the Germans in 1941, why wasn't the Polish Government so told? On the other hand, the German story is anything but convincing. It is doubtful whether the bodies have been in the grave for the three years stated. It also is highly doubtful that the papers of identification would have been legible if they had been in the ground for this period. And what also is striking, the German story assumes that the Russians, in planning a massacre, which they would want to hide, accumulated all the evidence of it and put it in the grave itself. If the Russians had wished to kill thousands of officers and keep it secret, would they not have destroyed uniforms, papers, and all conceivable identifications? And would they not have employed chemicals to hasten this destruction? But certain documentation is absent. The local peasants who are alleged to have supplied their account of the massacre have not been brought forward, and they are not even named.

This is not the first mass grave discovered in Russia. But the others, also containing hundreds and thousands of bodies, have

been civilian victims of *Nazi* massacres, slain during the Nazi occupation. The Russians have made effective use of these graves in their campaign against the Germans. Now, they say, the Germans are trying to balance the score. But one need not go so far in search of a motive, if this is a Nazi hoax. The Nazis had everything to gain from it. And they have gained far more than they could possibly have hoped for. They have brought about a break between the Soviet and Polish governments. They have brought their story to the notice of almost everyone in the world. It is a story which by its very nature cannot be disproved. At best the world can decide that the Nazis have not established a case, and then largely because they are such incontestable criminals, as to both massacres and hoaxes. This story is like the Reichstag fire: it is too finished and it is too timely; it has been too thoroughly and exhaustively exploited.

The Russian note breaking diplomatic relations declares that since the campaign about the alleged massacre had begun simultaneously in the German and Polish press and is being conducted on the same plan, there can be no doubt that contact exists between the Polish Government and Hitler, as well as an agreement to carry through this hostile campaign. This is a bitter allegation, and one that calls for more detailed substantiation. But it shows that Moscow is angry. It may be that the Soviet Government will now establish a Polish government in exile of its own, composed of Poles now in Russia.

RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS NOT BROKEN, ONLY SUSPENDED

April 27, 1943

A SLIGHT rift showed to-day in the clouds that darken Russian-Polish relations. It was the news that a wrongly translated word in the report of the note to the Polish Government by the Soviet Government had given the impression that relations were broken. They are not broken, but only suspended. The use of this word "suspended" is a novelty in diplomatic relations. But this may be a novel situation. Since the news of Russia's abrupt action yesterday, correspondents in Moscow have been allowed to reveal that Russia's relations with the Polish Government have deteriorated over a long period, and in this time troubling incidents occurred that did not creep into print. It also is stated that certain members of the Polish Government have aroused criticism in Moscow, and it is not out of the question that some resignations from the Polish Government might lead to a restoration in relations.

PORTUGAL'S NEUTRALITY NOT UNCONDITIONAL

April 28, 1943

WHILE the battle of Tunisia is bleeding to its conclusion, the Axis is doing what it can to prepare for the aftermath of the Allied victory. One after another the satellite leaders have been brought in to cross their hearts and promise to remain faithful to the Axis. It is a spectacle that may reassure the humble folk of Germany and Italy as they read about it. And again it may be anything but reassuring. For as the nature of the war changes, and as the Axis goes over to the defensive, not only does the inherent weakness of the satellites come into view and have to be openly admitted, but the attitude of the neutrals undergoes a change. This is singularly demonstrated to-day by news of a broadcast by Premier Salazar of Portugal. So far in the war Portugal has behaved and spoken with exemplary correctness as a neutral. And its Premier has refrained from any and all public indications of the slightest leaning in favour of one side or the other, and that despite the long tradition of alliance with Great Britain. But in his broadcast Dr. Salazar, speaking of Portugal's neutrality, went on to say: "It is not unconditional neutrality, as neither our national dignity nor the higher interests of our country are to be forgotten. Nor," he concluded, "can we forget the existence of our English alliance, which we have not failed to reaffirm loyally in spite of the dark and difficult hour. I do not hesitate," the Premier said, "to call our situation delicate, not only because we have friends in every camp, but also because we seem to be involved in a struggle of nations with which we have such close relations, and such close political comradeship, as England and Brazil." It may be thought that this statement does not go far. But it says two simple things. Portugal will not remain neutral if it believes its higher interests are involved. What might Portugal's higher interests be? Certainly one of them is the very considerable Portuguese colonial empire, about which the Premier proceeded to speak at length in the broadcast, with a special assurance that British capital would continue to be welcome in it. The other simple statement is that Portugal's two best friends among the belligerents are Britain and Brazil. As a statement from one of the shrewdest and best-balanced political minds in Europe, the broadcast is highly significant. It can be hailed as a fresh sprout in the United Nations victory garden. It is a pretty clear judgment of the trend of the war, and it is made by a man who is much closer geographically to the Tunisian battle than civilians are in this country, and whose interests are vitally concerned in that

battle. It also must be assumed that he would not have said what he did without consultation with Franco of Spain, with whom he is in intimate accord. If a note of warning to the Axis was intended, it will have been a warning from both Portugal and Spain.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COAL CRISIS. NEED FOR AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES

May 4, 1943

It is clear enough, from reading the Axis radio reports on our coal crisis, that this peculiarly American kind of struggle has been utterly incomprehensible to the dictatorships. And while the Axis countries have been told all about the coal stoppage they will not be told that the miners went back to work without a soldier appearing at a mine or a shot having been fired. But if the coal crisis has been incomprehensible abroad, there is no excuse for it to be incomprehensible in this country. And it needs to be said that it is not an ordinary industrial dispute. It is a phase of an economic struggle which is not yet resolved and which effects everyone. The stoppage was part of the unresolved crisis over prices. And it still is unresolved.

This country has been going through certain definite stages of education about economic matters. It has learned by now that it does not want inflation. It has learned that if food prices rise, wages are bound to rise. It has learned that if food prices and wages both rise, they start in pursuit of each other, and that this chase goes up the spiral of inflation. Inflation defeats both the rise in food prices and the rise in wages, and the struggle at this time between one section of the community to benefit at the expense of another section threatens to bring down the community and all its sections. The country knows this. It is against inflation.

But now another lesson has to be learned. If prices and wages are to be held in leash, they must be controlled. Wages can be controlled more easily than prices, because they can be controlled through collective consent. But the collective consent will not come easily unless the control of prices is genuine. And the new lesson to be learned is that prices cannot be controlled simply by decree fixing prices in retail stores. Prices do not rise because men are evil. Retail prices, as a rule, rise because demand exceeds supply. In this war food prices would be bound to rise so long as there is less food than the public or the government wishes to buy. So the control of food prices is a problem, first of all, of obtaining all the production possible. Since food prices cannot rise without being followed by a

rise in wages, some other provision must be made for the stimulating of food production, even though products are to be sold at fixed retail prices. If production is not stimulated, the kinds of food needed will not be produced in the maximum quantity. So far the spokesmen of the agricultural interests in and out of Congress have demanded that the one stimulus to production should be that of higher prices. That was sound capitalism so long as there was a free market. But now we have no free market we cannot operate in the old habitual capitalistic way. If food prices rise, wages will rise and we shall be threatened with inflation. So there must be some other stimulus to production. Those farmers who are not able to produce to capacity must be helped financially to do so. Many small farmers need the help of credit. Whether this is offered through the Farm Security Administration or some other agency is beside the point. The point is that the technique of the Farm Security Administration will have to be used if the farmers who cannot produce now, because they need credit to buy machinery and tools and equipment and seeds, are made capable of producing.

Then there is another technique which is just as vitally necessary to stimulate production. That is, subsidies. A subsidy is an addition to a price, paid by the government, and ultimately borne by the taxpayer. The consumer does not pay it as a consumer. As a consumer he continues to buy at a fixed price. But later on he pays for it, as taxes are paid in a democracy, according to his ability to pay. This saves the price level, and hence the wage level. And it helps to increase the kind of production needed.

Look for a moment at the way the British deal with the problem of prices. They are not fixing ceilings on everything the way we are doing it, but their aim is the same. They may realize that the price of this or that food may have to go up to obtain the production needed. If so, they bring down the cost of living in some other way, say, by subsidizing of certain kinds of clothing and bringing down the price of clothing. They pick and choose which prices shall be allowed to rise and which made to fall. But they have the same purpose of keeping the level of the cost of living steady. But without subsidies, the British could not manipulate prices. And in this country, where we are committed to price ceilings, we cannot function without subsidies either. So far Congress has steadfastly refused to vote subsidies in the sums needed. Congress so far is acting as though there were a free market when there is none. And if this philosophy were to prevail we should not be able to escape the threat of inflation.

To bring this back to the miners, you will not need to be reminded that the Bankhead and Pace bills were kept from becoming

laws because they would have increased food prices, and that would have justified an increase in wage rates by the miners. The two segments of the problem, prices and wages, were dealt with one at a time. The Bankhead and Pace bills were sidetracked, so that a rise in wage rates would not be inevitable in the mine-fields. For if miners had been granted higher rates, then other workers would be entitled to higher rates too. Now the other segment of that conflict, the wage segment, is awaiting settlement. There is a little confusion at this point because the miners are to have a six-day week and will get overtime for the sixth day. That overtime for the same amount of work on one day is inflationary. But in the main the issue is not over the amount the miners get. The rates of wages in one industry affect rates in other industries.

The administration now has promised to reduce certain prices and to hold all other prices. And workers are now waiting to see if the government can fulfil that promise. If it can, they are committed not to press for an increase in wage rates. But the administration cannot keep the promise simply by fixing retail prices. It can do it only if at the same time that it holds retail prices it increases production, first by aiding farmers with needed credit and then by the wise use of subsidies. But the administration is not able to do either without the collaboration of Congress. Congress so far refuses to grant either kind of power. It withholds subsidies, and it rejects plans to advance credit to small farmers. It insists on living as though a price economy were still possible. In other words, we are trying to prevent inflation without the action it takes to prevent it in the present kind of economy. The OPA can shout at prices until it is hoarse. The Department of Justice can send black marketers to prison. But that will not produce the quantity of food we need, nor will it stimulate this or that kind of food production. If a price economy is gone, control alone can take its place. It can be police control, which doesn't grow much food, or it can be economic control, which does. The only control which will avert inflation is economic control. And that the government cannot exercise without the authority of Congress. If Congress continues to deny the authority, then incentives cannot be offered to obtain the required results. It is true that we have had to forgo some of the techniques of capitalism because of the war. But it is all the more true that we do and must retain the technique of an incentive economy. And if that is not all there is to the capitalist system, it is what matters most to a society whose citizens want to be free.

AXIS SURRENDERS TUNISIA. TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
BURNING OF BOOKS IN BERLIN*May 10, 1943*

AN official announcement to-night stated that operations on the American sector in Tunisia have been completed. The Germans in that sector have surrendered, to a number well above thirty thousand, including six generals. The ceremony of surrender was graphic; it was unconditional surrender, and the Germans undertook to cease destroying their equipment, a vast amount of which has been taken. The Germans state that they fought on until their ammunition was gone. That means that credit for the American victory must be shared with the naval and air arms which enforced so effective a blockade.

The Allied victory is having its immediate repercussions. It rings in the ears of the Germans like a signal for invasion; where they do not know, but one point they fear is Holland, where they have clamped down martial law. The fall of Bizerte and Tunis sounded like a signal, too, to General Franco, who undertook a one-man peace initiative in a speech last night. It is only a one-man move so far as can be discovered, though General Franco said he was joining in the peace efforts of the Vatican. What these efforts might be was not known either in London or Washington. General Franco based his peace argument on there being a deadlock, which he said would make it impossible for either side to win—ever. And then he seasoned his argument with a panic warning about the danger of Bolshevism. The day before Franco had made another speech, one of his frankest in denunciation of liberalism and democracy, and highest in praise of totalitarianism. So there can be no doubt which side in the war his peace move was contrived to benefit. Berlin made a great play of it. London and Washington received it with disdain.

The news from Tunisia and the premonitions of an imminent invasion of Europe fill the calendar of the tenth of May this year. But this tenth of May is also a day of remembrance. Three years ago to-day the Germans invaded Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Three years ago, too, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister of Great Britain. And ten years ago to-day the Nazis burned the books in Berlin. So the tenth of May offers perspectives as well as events. And it is well to see first where Germany stands to-day compared with three years ago. The sun of victory glinted on the weapons of Germany three years ago. The dream of conquest and dominion was being realized. Zealous preparation, skilful diplomacy, and high military arts had unfolded the unprecedented

opportunity. Poland had been crushed, Norway had fallen to duplicity and daring, and the turn of the Western democracies had come. The Germans swept into the Low Countries with a power that was to win the briefest military campaign of modern times. The West had no answer to Hitler's warfare. It collapsed. And looking back to the summer of three years ago, one realizes that only a voice and a nation for whom the voice spoke were able to utter the solemn quiet negative to Hitler which saved the world from his triumph. The voice was Churchill's; the spirit was Britain's. Of military substance, neither the voice nor the nation could produce much three years ago. The British First Army was to be taken from the beaches of Dunkirk. Hitler heeded neither the voice nor the nation. He planned his larger conquest, the one in the East, and in that too he was to stride with giant steps deep into the enemy's country, so that by the autumn of the next year the invincibility of German power held most of the world in a spell. To-day we see a contrast indeed. True, Hitler still holds his European fortress, but the Germans shed their invincibility on the plains and in the cities of Russia. Their best troops who faced the Americans at Bizerte were not invincible; far from it, they surrendered with alacrity when it became good sense to do so. Note that Bizerte was the best fortification in Africa. It was a jewel of military science. And because Bizerte fell so quickly the word fortress, in the phrase "the European fortress," will mean less, not only to us, but to the weary, harassed, bombed nation which still follows the leadership of Hitler. The Germans all knew that Bizerte could hold out and had been ordered to hold out. Moreover, the Germans lay little store by fortresses. Their genius in this war was to make a mockery of fortresses. They know that victory will go to the side which can fly over fortresses and smash through fortresses, for that is how they planned their own victory. The Dutch had wonderful fortresses; the fortresses in Belgium were even better, and the Maginot Line was the greatest fortress ever made by man. Three years ago they almost won the war by having gathered a power and an art superior to the fortress. To-day they themselves depend on a fortress, and no longer is theirs the superior power or the equal art. And since they depend on defence, they are only hoping to last out the Allies, to impede, to delay, to addle the stronger strategy. To most of us, I am sure, the three years feel like ten. But three years have not been long to transform the greatest striking power the world has ever seen into a garrison, committed to only one objective—to postpone the inevitable. That is the view of to-day, in the perspective of three years ago.

The anniversary of May 10, 1933, gives perspective in still greater

clarity. For on that day the world had its warning and should have known what was in the making. But the world hadn't been training ears to hear warnings or eyes to see such beacons as were lit in the Berlin bonfire of books. And here I shall repeat something about this event which I said a year ago, and do so at the request of the Council on Books in Wartime and the OWI.

I know I didn't appreciate the full portent of the warning of that event in Berlin. But it came to me shortly, and on this anniversary I see again vividly the figure of the man who taught me. He was an unusually tall, an unusually narrow man, with legs as long as Lincoln's, a rounded stoop of the shoulders, and a long, gaunt face. He had been chairman of the Social-Democratic party in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic, and his name was Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid. In my newspaper days in Germany I had come to know him well. And after Hitler seized power I knew that he had managed to escape to France. Then he came to London, and I was deeply moved to hear that I should be allowed to have an hour with him alone at the home of a member of the House of Commons. I found him in that home, slumped and, it seemed, almost collapsed, in a big chair. He looked up at me with large eyes filled with the pain one sees during a mortal illness. The first glance at him told its story: here was a man whose lifework was in ruins, who had lost not only his country but all possibilities of serving his country or himself, a man bereft and broken.

I expected him to tell me, in that hour, about himself and his escape, and to give me the news of our personal friends in Germany, many of whom, I knew, had been tortured by the Nazis. I was keyed up to withstand the shock of the brutality our friends had suffered. But I was stopped short by his tragic appearance and was unable to start the conversation. I hoped he would begin without prompting, in his own way. He was silent for quite a time, then he looked up with an expression of utter helplessness in his face, and he said weakly, but with horror: "Swing, they're burning books." I was startled, and for a moment I thought that he was being irrelevant. I was expecting news of persecution, torture, and terrible personal disasters, and he began by mentioning what I already knew, that in Berlin they were burning books. But he was a true messenger of tragedy, for that *was* in the furthestmost depth of the tragedy, the burning of books. That was the symbol of it. A power had been formed in Germany capable of assassinating ideas, of destroying other men's words of truth, of shackling the freedom of men's minds. And that was what distinguished the Hitler regime from all other modern political menaces. Personal hardship, arrest, even torture—these were the inevitable lacerations of violent

revolutions. But what other movement had begun with the flaming signal to mankind that it was no longer to be free to think, to search for truth, to exercise its mind? This was promising the end of the aspirations of all civilization. True, Hitler's organized hooligans were torturing their enemies, beating them with steel whips, expressing against them the brutal excesses of diseased personalities. But that was not the mark of the regime nor the meaning of it to Hitler and his close associates. It meant to them a blow at their chief foe, for they were set to wield power over the world. The chief foe was not the hapless democrats of Weimar Germany, nor was it the Jews. The chief foe was thinking, ideas, the free search of truth. And Hitler struck that foe. He put his foe in a fire.

That fire has not died, and it will not have died until Germans themselves have free minds again and no power remains on the face of the earth to deny the liberty of man's mind. And when the history of this awful war is written, there is a description of it that would be fitting. It was the war to put out the fire which Hitler lighted in Berlin ten years ago to-day.

COLLECTED SPEECHES

YOUTH, WAR, AND FREEDOM

Olivet College, June 16, 1940

A FEW weeks ago Dr. Robert Ley, chief of the German Labour Front, in the course of a broadcast gave this definition of freedom. "A man is free," he declared, "first, when he can eat, drink, dress, and live as and where he pleases or finds necessary; second, when he can wander out into the world whenever and however he pleases; and, third, when others honour and esteem his labours. That is the true meaning of freedom." I am not going to criticize this definition at length for what it says, though it is worth pointing out that it does not define such freedom as exists in a totalitarian state, where there is a distinct limitation on earning power, so that a man has to eat, drink, dress, and live according to an income set by the state, and not according to his pleasure or ability. In the Germany of to-day all young men and women, as labour conscripts, have to give outright of their services to the state, and later in life they are subject to the state's dictated rules as to how long and under what conditions they shall work, and as to the prices at which they must buy their food, clothing, lodging, and travel. But this freedom, Dr. Ley may say, if it does not now exist in practice, will be put into practice as Germany prospers. It is the Germans' ideal. It is what they are striving for. And I want to examine it first of all as an ideal.

The world, at this hour, is in dreadful chaos. It is in the grip of a conflict which bespeaks more than a competition for political power, more than a shift of world markets. Also at stake, besides political and economic power, is a concept of life, its establishment not for this year and next but for many years to come. For this reason, because the concept of life on which our nation was founded is the one that is being challenged, we are involved in this conflict, no matter how much or how little we may decide to do in defence of our concept. Even if the war in Europe ends in the defeat of the democracies, our concept of life will be still intact. But the challenge to it will continue, and either our concept of life or the challenging concept of the totalitarian order will prevail in the end.

Dr. Ley has defined freedom as Germany intends to establish it. It consists of economic security, the ability to travel, and the respect of the community. These are worthy objectives. But they are not the American concept of freedom, not because of what Dr. Ley

says, but because of what he omits. For in his doctrine of freedom the individual is not free to think, free to speak, free to read, free to formulate his own experience of truth, free to contribute responsibly to the community, to help shape its life and direct its affairs. His freedom gives man an economic minimum and a sense of satisfaction in his labour, which surely is good. But it disregards his individual spiritual life, and the co-operation of men's individual spiritual lives, for the benefit of the community and of the state. To put it bluntly, man is economically free but politically and spiritually enslaved. And there is the conflict of concepts.

A great many persons in this country have tried to evade facing the choice. They have told themselves that they were not involved in the struggle in Europe. They have ascribed other issues to the war. They have said it was a war between imperialisms, and so in a sense it is. They have said it was a war brought on by a peace treaty after the last war which did injustice to Germany, and so in a sense it is. They have said it was a war being fought a long way off. But what no one can deny truthfully is that the outcome of the war, whatever its origins, will be to establish or destroy in Europe a concept of individual and political freedom. And if it is destroyed there, it already is partly destroyed in all the world. For unless all civilized countries are free, no one country, nor even a single continent, can progress in freedom. It will be on the defensive. It will go into a stage of striving to preserve a freedom which is on the wane, which has lost its appeal to modern men.

I think all of us are reluctant to admit to ourselves just how much we care about certain values in life. It is a deep process to square away to certain truths and to know that in necessity one would not flinch in defending them. Life is precious to us. Anyone who says lightheartedly that he would be ready to die for something can't be very sensitive or very honest with himself. We hope that when a test comes of our courage and our loyalty we shall not fail, but we don't go about advertising the aching conquest of ourselves. I believe that most enlightened men and women, young and old, when the emergency arises would make any sacrifice, even of life itself, to preserve a right to freedom. I believe this because it is the revelation of the ages. Many men have died to attain freedom, and to many men in the long past the necessity of freedom was the necessity of life itself.

There is a great deal of talk these days, particularly among young people, about what they are not willing to die for. I cannot criticize the younger generation for saying that they have no intention of dying for the contribution made to civilization by the older generation. As I look back upon that contribution I can well understand

and respect their attitude. The generation to which I belong has done some splendid things. It has mechanized life, which is not to be sneered at. It has reduced space. The airplanes which are dropping bombs in Europe mustn't obscure our vision of the airplanes that are making the unification of China possible, that are bringing Latin America into close neighbourhood with us, that have reduced the Atlantic Ocean to one fifth its breadth, that are making all men close to all men, as few men who lived in the same province a century ago were close to one another. Modern communications systems have pulled us still closer together; news, music, discussion draws every home into the vortex of art and current thought. Our newspapers and periodicals, our radios and television have annihilated the sense of separation. We all have access to the same things. We have untold opportunities of participation. The world has been given the physical integration which had to come before the development of the still more important spiritual integration.

This has been a contribution, made with initiative, resource, devotion, with an abounding energy and optimism rarely if ever duplicated by any generation. But I admit as I survey these achievements that young people who fall heir to them should not be expected to feel like dying for them. They are resplendent, but they do not evoke the deepest sense of need and gratitude. One would not die for a newspaper, not willingly, or for an automobile plant, or an airplane design, or for the stark beauty of that monument of a prosperous, mechanized America, the buildings that make up Rockefeller Centre in New York. Nor have the other works of beauty of my generation been inspiring and enlisting. We have our literature, our painting, our contemporary music and verse, but we could, in necessity, dispense with them, as some men in times past could *not* dispense with their Scriptures and their psalms. The older generation has also spread before the new generation the riches of education, and done it lavishly, as in no other time in the long history of human society. Millions to-day have the equipment to understand the intricate complexities of this mechanized society. I do not say the education has been available to all, or has been always wise. The educational process is slow, but it is the only known process by which man does finally pull himself up by his bootstraps. Thus in appraising the older generation one must admit that it was not concerned wholly with mechanism. It had reverence for learning and beauty. It strove to make them accessible to all young people as their common right.

But the devotion and loyalty of young people to the world handed on to them has been weakened by two tremendous factors.

One of these is the World War and its consequences. The other is our loss of our sense of personal validity. The second point I shall come back to later. The World War should have been the last great war and it wasn't. If the generation that fought it couldn't learn the lesson of that war, it was far too innocent and timid to deserve devotion and respect. The very first opportunity to organize peace that ever presented itself to a modern, almost integrated world came as a result of the World War. My generation botched the job. It not only botched it badly, but did it with sublime indifference, letting the strands of a golden opportunity slip through its hands without clutching at a single thread. But it was not an experienced world. Never had the organization of peace in a democratic civilization been faced, thought through, and understood. People had gone through a war, had detested it, had suffered death, desolation, poverty, and they believed that to resolve not to fight another war would be enough. They put war down as an evil in individual and national thought. They did not understand that war, whatever it may be in terms of evil, is simply the consequence of the breakdown of peace, and that peace is something that must be built, understood, practised every day, wisely cultivated, constantly and consciously nourished.

It is the fashion to-day to decry the Treaty of Versailles and find in it the root of the present war. But that is superficial thinking. A treaty does not produce a war in a democratic world. There can be no great war in a democratic world in which peace is maintained with the same scrupulous opposition to lawlessness and the same devotion to justice as in the domestic life of a democratic nation. Peace is an international responsibility. Its maintenance is a function of a modern society. One cannot enjoy the fruits of freedom in a world made safe for democracy unless there is social organization to dispense justice and to curb lawlessness. The failure after the World War was not the Treaty of Versailles but the inadequacy of the organization of peace. That inadequacy was in the League of Nations, both in its constitution and in its membership. Before the League could work—and it was man's first experiment with an organized peace—old nations, with long memories of wars, had to be certain of their security. Lloyd George and Wilson undertook to guarantee France's security, as the precondition to the launching of the League. But Wilson's pledge was repudiated by the United States Senate, and this country was kept from membership in the League by a minority of the Senate. So the French entered the League determined to make it not a new experiment in organized peace, but an instrument of security. Through the League the French nation of 40,000,000 was to be kept as strong as the German

nation of 65,000,000. If the United States had joined the League, even with the reservations worked out in the Senate, France would have been secure, and the League might have grown from its imperfect beginnings into a workable system of peace. The origins of this war include the failure of the United States to understand that you can't have a democratic world unless you have organized a peace in which every free nation assumes its share of the responsibility.

I think the people of this country were ready to join the League. It is a myth that they weren't. If four men in the Senate had changed their votes, we should have entered, for those four men would have completed the two-thirds majority needed. I don't think the people of this country realized in the election of 1920 that they were voting on the League. Harding promised them a society of nations, and the leading Republicans of the day—among them Root, Hughes, Hoover—gave their endorsement to the Harding pledge. Only after the election was won was the public told that the League had been repudiated. And having been told so, it didn't stop to read the record and check the facts. Somehow membership in the League, and with it organized service for peace, eluded the people of this country.

The breakdown of peace didn't begin at once, not till 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria. If we had been in the League, this hardly would have been dared. If Japan had not demonstrated that peace *could* be broken down in safety, Mussolini would not have dared the theft of Ethiopia, Hitler would not have dared the militarization of the Rhineland, the disarmament conferences would not have collapsed because of the growing sense of national insecurity. And the world would still be enjoying the blessings of peace. I say that the older generation fought the war and lost the peace. And the new generation must either fight the war now, as it is doing in Europe, or stand to fight it later. For there is no organization of peace to-day, no democratic world, no system of society where power is diffused so that no single man and no little oligarchy can drive men into conquest. Unless the Allies win, peace and freedom will be on the defensive in this nation for as long as the mind can foresee. There can be only two kinds of peace—the one imposed by concentrated power, the peace of tyranny, and the peace of a free society where power is vested in free individuals and where justice and the observance of law are organized as a social function in which all bear their responsibility. Only if the younger generation has learned that, and will set out to find the peace that alone can be tolerable—peace in a free world—can it scorn the older generation for failing to find it.

I said before that there are two factors which make it hard for young people to treasure their immediate heritage. The loss of the peace is one of them. The other is the loss of the sense of personal validity. I suggest that more destructive than the mechanized equipment of the modern army have been certain branches of the modern so-called sciences of psychology and economics. They have produced a revolution in man's attitude to himself, and it has not been, like some revolutions, a constructive influence, though I think it will be in time. Fifty years ago it was fairly easy for a person to think things through and reach a conclusion that rang as clearly as a bell. Those were the days of intellectual security. And they are gone. In their place we have the overwhelming sense that nothing is what it seems to be. We distrust all outward evidences; we look in all corners for hidden motives; we know that nothing that man tells himself is quite so, nothing that he tells others is really dependable. We have found out that the human mind works in layers, that man's thought is moulded by inscrutable influences of which he himself is unaware. The modern psychologist can demonstrate that one's subconscious life is the product of emotional influences, of patterns out of childhood or infancy, and that one's conscious thought is a counterfeit, which one tries to pass off on a suspicious world. The psychologist has destroyed man's faith in the other fellow's sincerity, and to some extent man's faith in his own sincerity.

The branch of economics in which the term economic determinism was developed has done for social thinking what psychology has done for individual thinking. We are told that society never acts as it does for the reasons it gives itself. History is just the result of economic motives which men have not recognized, and history is what it is not because of these and those individual actions, but because vast impersonal forces have played upon men. Thus there can be no national policies, there are only sinister conspiracies working beneath the surface, against which the educated person can defend himself only by utter scepticism and indefatigable suspicion. Now I think that this conception has finished off everything handed on to the new generation by the old. Why should young men revere the values of such a world, acknowledge to their depths the dignity and beauty of individual life, and be grateful for that world, if need be, to the point of sublime sacrifice?

But here again the young have no right to scorn the confusion of the old unless they are keen and talented in rediscovering the validity of the individual. If they must question all outer semblances, have they learned to trust the *processes* of establishing truth, which can be demonstrated in the research laboratory and in the recesses

of their own souls: trial and error, the humility to be wrong and the greatness to learn from being wrong, the faith *in there being truth*? Do they know that the truth lies within them or does not exist for them? That for each there is no truth save that of his own experience? And can they have faith in the process of their own lives by which they steadily become more free as they become more wise? And can they have faith in the process which makes society free, the democratic process, the process of social trial and error, in which all individuals share in the trials and errors and the accruing social insight?

To come back to Dr. Robert Ley and his definition of freedom in a totalitarian state, it will be recalled that this definition omitted the freedom to think and speak and to participate in the process of government. Only individuals who have lost faith in themselves and in their individual validity would accept such a disguised enslavement. If a man does not believe in the godhood that is in him, he is going to believe there is godhood in the dictator. If he is confused and suspicious, if he can't trust the process of experience, if he can't rely on his own judgments, in humility but always in fervent faith, he is going to give himself up, abandon himself as a worth-while possession, give himself by default to a national leader. Not having cared for responsibility, which is the other meaning of freedom, he will have thrown all the responsibility on the leader. And he will be secure, he will have no responsibility, but he will not be free. That is what it means to be a man or woman in a totalitarian state. It is a police state. You either believe what you are told to believe or you are purged.

In conclusion I would ask young people not to form a judgment of the times by looking too closely at what has been given them by the preceding generation. It is true that generation has not added much to freedom and has prepared people poorly to have faith in themselves. But we have a longer heritage. And the freedom that we possess and that young persons exercise with all the unconsciousness of good health came not with the wind and rainfall, but out of human effort and anguish, out of great striving, great believing, and great sacrifice. Man was not always free. He did not always have the right to say, think, read what he pleased, or to have a responsible part in making and enforcing the laws to which he is subject. Men died for these things. And the soldiers of George Washington who went through the winter of Valley Forge liked the idea of dying, just as dying, no more than young men do to-day. They, and the men who founded this republic, prized some things more than life itself. We are their heirs; they have no other heirs but ourselves. And if we can't be proud to be the heirs of our

immediate parents, we can look farther back along the line of human endeavour and find cause to be grateful that we are free and that there were those willing to pay for that freedom. The ancestry is long, and men strove to be free, died to be free, long before Karl Marx depersonalized history with his partly true aphorisms about economic determinism, and long before Sigmund Freud made us aware of the complexities of thought processes. No label that can be glued over the freedom for which men have died can hide the reality of it. It *is* freedom. And it is *individual* freedom. They cared for it, and unless we care for it we are going to lose it.

PEACE, POWER, AND EDUCATION

Muhlenberg College, June 2, 1941

SEQUENCE is a simple word, conveying a simple meaning. Events follow one after the other, and they follow not haphazardly, but in an orderly procession. There is no mystery about this procession. Cause produces effect, and effect reveals cause. Sequence is the foundation of individual and social thought. By studying sequence, we come upon the principles which shape our circumstances. And the understanding of these principles gives us the control over our personal and social affairs which we call freedom. We know that we can do to-day the deeds which will prepare for our having our desires to-morrow. And if it were not for this knowledge, we should be automatons, hapless victims of chance without the need for morals and spirit. We should have no use for dignity, for faith, for a social order, for individual integrity, and for that greatly misunderstood concept called idealism.

Idealism grows from an understanding of the laws of sequence. It is the knowledge that doing the wise deed in time will avert disaster and produce benefit. By an intellectual error, the word idealism has come to be used as the opposite of realism. But there is not a real world in which idealism has no part. Too often there is a real world which has refused to heed the advice of idealism and so has refused to act wisely. But every real part of individual and social life which is beneficial is the fruit of idealism. Every disaster is the consequence of insufficient idealism. Idealism is not of the ivory tower. It is simply good realism which either has been given a chance and is accepted as a matter of course; or it is potential realism which has been kept from becoming real.

Now with these two words, sequence and idealism, let us approach the miserable scene of the modern world. Let us see that it has become what it is by a procession of events which might have

been directed otherwise, and that it was not so directed because of the indifference of men to an accessible idealism. It is a world for which every individual bears punishment, and has become what it is by the exercise of will or the refusal to exercise will. Individuals chose the sequence which produced it.

The past may have seen more painful patches of misery than exist to-day, greater outbursts of cruelty, vaster massacres, more hunger, disease and pillage. But I doubt if history has recorded any scene so hideous as the world of to-day. Two years ago, many people hoped and prayed that sequence was not going to produce this scene, and may have felt in their hearts that they and their fellow men did not deserve it. But now they can have no more doubt of sequence, and they must now face up to the sorry business of formulating and acknowledging their contribution to it. For that is the only hope the future has, that men learn in adversity the idealism they reject in easy times.

In using the word "punishment," and in speaking of mankind "deserving" what it now is experiencing, I am not obsessed with a sense of man's sin or even of his guilt, since it is my own conclusion, after studying sequence both in personal and social affairs, that we are not punished for the folly we commit so much as for the wisdom which we fail to enact. It is the inadequacy of our best, rather than the lingering of our worst, which produces tragedy. And I am not now surveying the sequence of the last years, seeking for evil to excoriate, evil men to upbraid, or wickedness on which to vent such wrath as I am able to muster. I want to search, instead, for the wise things left undone, which, had they been done, might have averted the doom which now has befallen us. And I want to point a particular question at education, at teachers, whose profession it is to be wise as to their services while the procession of sequence was leading up to the hideous present.

In pointing a question at modern education it will be not to find fault with what has been taught but to seek what it is that has not been taught, and without which we have arrived at our present failure. It is not to criticize the absorbing intellectual exploration which has marked not only science but all educational activity. This has been a time of re-valuation, of finding new names and more accurate concepts for things and ideas, and for working over the garden of history, biography, psychology and sociology. This has been the great era of weed-pulling. Not a few concepts of virtue, heroism, singleness of mind, motive and patriotism with which the flower beds of human experience were choked, were untrue and untrustworthy. The educational gardener has had a busy time, passing his tools through the foliage of the past, striking down what he

found to be invalid and misnamed. Such tools as the theory of economic determinism, and the analytic approach to psychology, have slashed at and uprooted many preconceived ideas. There has been an intoxicating decimation of untruths and half-truths.

This has been the era of excited scepticism, the era of the discovery of the inner complexity of the physical and mental world, the era in which the thinker has been saying, "That is not so." And to say that is indeed part of the function of education. But obviously it can be only part of its function. For if the stress in education is laid upon the uprooting of weeds, with no heed for the produce of the garden, the garden will not bring forth its full fruit. Men live by affirmation, and the service of scepticism is not only that men shall doubt half-valid affirmations, but that they go on to complete affirmations that shall be sound and true. A sense of the bewildering uncertainty about the structure of the physical universe, and the obscurity of the functioning of the mind, cannot be made into a dogma. And if it is used in place of a dogma, as many persons in this generation have used it, the individual loses his self-reliance, society loses its stamina, and civilization loses its security. For the individual who tries to make a dogma of non-affirmation becomes a disciple not of truth but of leaders. And if he follows leaders without faith in truth, he turns his back on truth, and leadership becomes a vast conspiracy for the imposition of tyranny on individuals who have ceased to have the defence of positive individual faith.

I shall confine myself to two particulars in suggesting what education has understressed and underaffirmed in the immediate past. It is in teaching the future citizens of the United States the nature of society, and the fundamentals of security. I put first the neglect in teaching the nature of society, for many in the present generation of Americans, it seems to me, have grown up in innocent ignorance of the simple fact that lawful society is based on force. It is a society of ultimate coercion. I know there is a plausible philosophy of anarchy which wants to be rid of the state because of the force and coercion it can and must impose. But the kindly Americans who shrink from force and coercion are not anarchists. They have not become enemies of the state. Their mistake has been to assume that civilization, which, for one thing, is the subordination of force and coercion to the lowest possible minimum, has brought about the abolition of force and coercion.

The men and women who sincerely detest the killing of war do not detest the protection of the police, which can also entail killing. That is not to say that killing in war has the same social meaning as killing by the police. But the killing is the same, and criminals are killed for the protection of all members of the community, without

a protesting resolution being adopted by any pacifist organization. Killing in war, as a social act, is the opposite of killing by the police; it is the breakdown of law and order. And what pacifists and everybody else with any civilized standards should do is to study sequence. The breakdown of law and order ends in killing. Hence the breakdown in law and order must be prevented at all cost, since any civilized person detests killing. But first it must be clear that we live in a society based on coercion, with the ultimate sanction against violent criminals of killing. We know that civilization is in part the conduct of social affairs in such a way that the conflicts between individuals shall be consigned to the conciliation or judgment of courts, and that the coercion of the state shall be applied only with due regard to the liberties of the individual. That reduces killing to an almost unnoticeable episode in national life. But if law breaks down, force and coercion burst their bounds, and then there is murderous havoc until law and order again prevail. These are the simple facts of social life. They are the facts not only of domestic life but of all social life.

We have an ingenuous generation of Americans who have managed to accept these facts as a matter of course in their domestic life, but have been blind to their being the facts of international life. And that brings me to my second point, that education has not sufficiently taught the fundamentals of security. In the days when the Atlantic Ocean was several weeks wide and human beings could not travel over land at more than ten or fifteen miles an hour, and communications were as slow as sailing ships and stage-coaches, the men who were responsible for the United States were more aware of the problems of national security than we have been during the past generation. Vast spaces did not make them feel secure, and they resolutely resorted to political and military measures when they saw them to be necessary. They knew that peace was a product of a balance of international forces. They knew that if the balance was disturbed, it would affect the security of the United States. Granted, the problems of security were simpler for them. International society was not so integrated, wars were cheaper, and safety was not a vast social problem as it has become. But they knew that security was the first duty of government, and they provided it, or we should not be here to-day as Americans. On the other hand, the present generation of Americans, faced with a far more complex problem of security, has, it seems to me, performed the most astonishing feat of escaping altogether from the consideration of security.

Let me expand this sweeping statement. Having emerged from the last war, what lesson did we learn from it, what lesson in

national security? What lesson was taught us by modern education and by American political thought? At first the lesson was the obvious one: we detested the end product of war. But there we stopped. We did not begin the study of sequence. If we loathed the end product, we did not educate ourselves in understanding the processes which had produced it.

After the last war we faced three choices in making ourselves secure. We could help construct a system, never before tried, of collective security. We could cut ourselves off from all informal obligations to the remainder of the world, and build up a stupendous force of our own. We could revert to the historic task of maintaining a balance of international forces.

We did not join the system of collective security, and that was quite conscious, though it can hardly be said that we rejected it by popular or majority action. In fact we were kept out of the League of Nations by a minority, and we never held anything that can be truthfully called a plebiscite on the League issue. But we did know that we were doing it when we stayed out of the League, and the majority did not assert itself with any telling conviction and energy.

We also were quite conscious that we were not building up a stupendous force of our own, for we went in for limitation of armaments by international agreement, and we burned up the blueprints of a two-ocean navy. So, logically, one must say that we consigned our security to the third choice. We would rely on maintaining the balance of international forces. Either we were doing that or we had no policy whatever. It is historic fact that we did not join the League. It is historic fact that we scrapped our plans for stupendous defences. But it is not historic fact that we entered wholeheartedly into world politics for the maintenance of the best possible balance of international forces.

Suppose we had gone in for collective security. Certainly the educational system of the United States would have taught us the elements of the new experiment, would have instructed us about the various problems in far away places, where the blessings of justice were needed if peace were to be preserved. We should have learned to apply to international affairs the same wisdom about sequence which we have gained in domestic affairs. We should have been familiar with the themes of minority rights, of the evils of customs barriers, with the technique of a world court; we should have been applying our idealism, and the life in the universities and colleges would have been imbued with so much constructive activity that there would have been much less emphasis on weed-pulling. It would have become a season of affirmation.

Suppose we had gone in for stupendous self-defence. That, too, would have been a theme for education. It would have been a new experiment for America, since in all our history we have not committed ourselves to nursing a tremendous power in solitude. I can imagine that education, after that choice, would, to start with, have made every student familiar with the simple geography of national security. Every schoolboy would have known what adults are just beginning to hear about, the crucial importance of bases, and the meaning to us of Dakar, the Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, Martinique, Guam, and Greenland. We should have been tank-conscious, and might have produced Panzer units long before Hitler produced his. We should have developed bombers and fighters and had a plethora of anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns. We should have known what it takes to defend a hemisphere, not only in armaments but in trade and cultural relations. This choice might have produced a too muscular civilization and quite easily have turned into rip-roaring imperialism. But we did not choose it.

We really did not consciously choose the third and only other policy of national security. We simply lapsed into it, as though the world were unchanged, as though it had not produced the World War, as though we could rest back without conscious application to the great theme of our security. It should have been plain that our security did not depend only on us. That should have been simple enough to teach every child, adolescent, and adult in the United States. And if it did not depend on us, on whom, then, did it depend? It depended on a balance of forces. For one thing, during the last ten years the control of the Atlantic has been left to Britain, so it depended in part on Britain—not on Britain altruistically looking after us but on something much more trustworthy, on Britain remaining British and looking after itself. But did we know it? Were we told so by our political leaders? Were we so taught in our universities and colleges?

The fabric of peace was torn in Manchuria, and that threatened to upset the balance which makes for peace and so for our security. Did that event produce an educated sense of alarm in the United States? Were the young men of draft age taught that if Japan was allowed to grow too strong, they might find themselves in a war, because the balance of power was being gravely menaced? When Hitler came into power and started rearming, and when the three partners in blackmail, Germany, Italy, and Japan, began laying their plans for despoiling the have nations of the world, did the public men of the United States and the universities and colleges point out what was happening to our security? How much of a shudder went through our universities and colleges when Hitler tore up the

Treaty of Locarno and when he marched his troops into the demilitarized Rhineland? Not that the balance of international forces was changed then and there by those acts. But a procession of sequence did set in. Nobody with a sense of responsibility for national security, no teacher or political leader, could have watched the immediate event without foreseeing the possibilities of untold woe.

You may ask did the universities of Britain and France quake with apprehension? Did the political leaders of Britain go to their constituents, telling them the unmistakable direction of the sequence Hitler had begun? The answer is that they did not, not enough of them. But it is no apology for American democracy and education that other democracies and educations, too, were indifferent to security. We had not committed our security to Britain and France to be managed for us. We had committed our security to a system in which British and French strength were essentials. But it was our duty to ourselves to match with our own strength what Britain and France were failing to provide. It does not absolve us from our duty to ourselves, and to our own security, if those on whom we rely are delinquent to themselves. If we were to be secure, peace had to be preserved. If peace were to be preserved, the power of civilized nations had to remain greater than any power pitted against it. The power had to be physical. And let me add that it also had to be spiritual. It had to be power which the threatened nations knew they were ready to use. A good deal is said about the inferiority of the military strength of the democracies. But that inferiority has not, in my opinion, been the basis of to-day's disaster. They were not ready to use such power as they had, and at one time they had enough to assure the continuance of peace. I believe that if all the democracies had known, and had made it known, that they were spiritually prepared to use force to blot out blackmail and aggression, they never would have needed to use the force. The most civilized nations, the best educated, were the most afraid to face the reality of social structure, and to admit the necessity of meeting crime with force. They were the blindest to the simple principle in the law of sequence, that what is put off to-day may cost double to-morrow and may be too late the day after.

One reason why we were not interested in safeguarding our security by the method we chose may have been that it was not an inspiring method. It did not stimulate us, did not invigorate us. It was not a system based on justice, liberty, and the application of law and legal sanctions to international affairs. We had forsworn having any responsibility for justice beyond our borders, and we devoutly prayed that by escaping from responsibility we were

escaping from the sequence of escape. It happened that the countries on whose strength our peace depended were countries of our own civilization. But they, too, had no great wish for responsibilities beyond their borders.

But, inspiring or not, the system we chose now lies in ruins. A great war is on, whose outcome will determine our privilege to maintain our freedom. Not only is there murderous havoc in the four corners of the world, our own security is gone unless we make a colossal effort to restore it. And though our thoughts are focused on this effort, it is wise, too, to see that we are in dire danger, not because of the betrayal of our friends or the wickedness of our enemies, but because of the inadequacy of our own insight into reality. We are where we are because we were not wise. And unless we accept wisdom in this hour of travail, we cannot look out on any prospect of peace and the enjoyment of liberty, and we shall not know how to build more strongly the peace which has collapsed.

We had two other choices, as I pointed out. We might have nursed a tremendous muscular power in solitude. Or we might have assumed our full responsibility along with other civilized nations for peace and justice throughout the world, and helped administer the affairs of nations, on a system of law and the enforcement of law.

Toward which future do we look to-day? I am sure that we cannot choose to create a might to sustain us and keep us free, single-handed, against the power that is potentially arraigned against us. It is too late to make ourselves a solitary giant, for another giant has a head start on us. For if the war is lost for European civilization, the factories and the man-power, the shipyards, and the resources of the tyrannies will be far greater than our full national strength. We might prepare for the battle, but it is hard to believe that we should have the soul for the defence of our freedom in that dread test, if we do not have it to-day, when we can still defend ourselves with allies, and at lesser sacrifice. This future of gigantic solitude can only be tempting to individuals and groups who crave for their own power within the nation, more than they crave for the liberty of the nation as a whole. But the nation itself cannot choose to wait for such an uncertain fate.

We have only one true choice for the future. It is to apply to international affairs the scruples, the forbearance, the humanity, the dignity, the ethics, and finally, if need be, the coercion, which are the bases of domestic peace and civilization. It is to accept responsibility for a world from which we now know we cannot hope to escape.

I am not going to offer a blueprint of a future system of peace. But it is plain enough what it must be in essence. It must be a world of common responsibilities. If so, it must be one of concerted action in the defence of peace. And if it calls for the application of concerted coercion in dire extremity, it must have a common foreign policy as well, since common dangers must not be incurred, except by decisions made in common. We cannot give a blank cheque of our man-power to be filled in by some other foreign office. It will of necessity be a world of force. But it will become a civilized world; in due time the force will be subordinated to the almost invisible service of justice. It will be a world, first of all, of affirmation, a world of fellow men in which each shares some responsibility and knowingly owes and pays his humane co-operation.

This is idealism. It also is potential realism. And it is the living truth which may be implanted amid the rubble of destruction of to-day, on which to build with whole heart and whole mind, where half heart and half knowledge are piling up their ruins.

UTOPIA VERSUS DEMOCRACY

Brooklyn College, June 23, 1941

No one of my generation with a sense of the state of the world can face a graduating class this year without a feeling of humility. Every commencement address is fundamentally the same address. Each one says: "You are now going out into the world, and the world will be what you make it, so hold true to yourselves and you will not default in your opportunity. But these words carry a special burden this year, and one of my generation is bound to address you with a sense of failure and a special plea that you, on whom the responsibility now falls, will redeem what your elders have not made secure."

You of the Class of 1941 have lived through an exciting four years in Brooklyn, and if I say that this has been good preparation for the test you now face, it is because I believe that society is always a cockpit of conflict, and you are better off for having participated in intense conflict, and won some experience in it, than if you left college in the ingenuous faith that life *can* be alive and still not filled with friction.

The college is not only a seat of learning, it is also a preview of a more perfect society, and all of you who have gone through four years in this college have been partaking in advance of social relationships which you will be striving to bring into reality. Thus the college is a group of individuals. You have been accepted as

individuals, you have been encouraged as individuals. You have counted, not for your self-abnegation but for your self-expression.

It has been a group of individual equality. By that I do not mean that each of you has been of the same capacity. But each of you has had the same opportunity. Not all of you are graduating with honours, but the road to honours was open to you all. And some of you may have chosen not to take the road to honours, so as to develop particular interests. So you have had a pre-experience of a society of equal opportunity. Here in college you have had this equal opportunity without much regard to your property possessions. And that, too, is a foretaste of the better world to come.

The accent in the college has been on the past and the future much more than you will find it in the non-college world, and that, too, is prophetic. For civilization, like education, is a heritage to which each generation must make its addition if the civilization is to live. But before the addition can be made, the attributes of the heritage must be known, the nature of its organic development must be appreciated, its values must be formulated. You in college have seen more clearly than the non-college world that what we call the present is a metaphysical convenience and not a reality, since the past really leads into the future without a halt. You have thought more about the future than most of your elders, and have related these thoughts to the past more than they. So you have caught a glimpse of the great continuity of life which society itself will have one day. To govern, someone has said, is to foresee. A more perfect government will be one of clearer horizons, the past will be better appraised, the future better charted. And you already have had some experience of this wiser society.

But I wish to come back to the topic of the conflicts through which you have gone, for you will be wise to see that these, too, have been a preview even of a more perfect society. Civilization is not the avoidance of conflict but its refinement. In a good society conflicts are kept within well-set bounds, and channels are provided for their settlement. But civilization being incomplete, the settlement of conflicts is not a perfected system. Injustice abounds not only abroad but in this land of ours. You are aware of that. You have thought about it a great deal. That is your pledge of improvement. For if you did not know sharply and passionately the injustices of our incomplete civilization, you would have no agenda for the work that is yours to do.

A great deal has been said in the last years about the morale of American students in this time of growing national crisis. My generation no doubt has dulled its vision to injustices, and some of

its members have shut out the sight and recognition of certain injustices altogether. So it has been good that you should have opened your eyes and reported what you have seen. It is good that you have been impatient; it is good if some of you have been scornful.

If you have swept aside any empty words of the past, if you have applied acid to test the concepts presented to you as reality, if you have been sceptics, even intemperate sceptics, that perhaps is not to be deplored but to be appreciated. The commencement address this year that I liked best of those I read or heard was given by a senior at Williams College, who spoke of the benefits of scepticism. He said that it had driven the students back on themselves; they had no inviting asylum to escape to since they could not believe in asylums, and in the end they had grown to appreciate that dependability was something inside themselves, and by that they had to live. Listening to that speech, I saw a man whose spirit was stripped for action. His fat was sweated away. He was beyond disillusionment, but he was not paralyzed. He could not be seduced by any intellectual siren, nor pushed over by a slogan. And I had a glimpse, which I trust is a true glimpse, of the stark strength of American youth, and of a vital gain from the last years of intellectual conflict.

If I understand correctly, some of the liveliest hours you have spent in Brooklyn College have been produced by a conflict between the advocates of Utopia and the defenders of an imperfect democracy. It is a conflict in which the Utopians have a certain advantage. You can always outargue the apologist if you can rest your case on a blueprint. For there are no imperfections in a blueprint. And there are imperfections in the United States, in Great Britain, in any country with a long or short experience in self-government. There are many of them. But what is notable about this country of ours is not its completeness, but that the opportunity remains to complete it. The Utopians do not see this, for their blueprint is complete. And as long as it remains a blueprint, they seem to be winning all the arguments. When they come to do the building *from* the blueprints they will be making imperfections, too, and their dialectical advantage will begin to melt away.

What has been the basis of some of the conflict has been in the realm of loyalty. That word, I imagine, has caused more confusion in colleges than any other. The Utopian is loyal to his blueprint. And that loyalty has brought him into a curious jumble.

To begin with, loyalty is a great human capacity. It implies faith and discipline. A loyal person is one who is sure that when he

hears that you, his friend, have done something which looks reprehensible, it will turn out to be reasonable and forgivable if all the circumstances are known. The man with loyalty practises the dictum that to understand all is to forgive all. He is willing to wait for the evidence to be produced. He will not prejudge you. He will see your good qualities and how they outweigh your deficiencies. He defends you, he praises you to others, and if he sees a fault in you he tells it to you privately, with forbearance and affection. This same loyalty can be given to a cause. And I am sure that a young man or woman who is loyal to a blueprint of Utopia is a meritorious specimen of mankind.

But there is one loyalty which is still greater than loyalty to a cause or to a friend. It is loyalty to truth. Here I beg of you not to dismiss that word truth as vague, abstract, and subjective. Instead of truth, I nearly said moral values, that a greater loyalty than to a cause or a friend is the loyalty to moral values. I also nearly said loyalty to oneself. For the sense I have of truth is that it is a personal judgment based on a sense of social obligation, as well as on a scientific appraisal of evidence.

I do not believe that a Utopia can be built out of bad building material. I do not believe that Utopias are really ever made from blueprints. In social building, what is of value is the soundness of materials. What each of us has to contribute to society is himself or herself, his own honesty within himself, his faith in sincerity, his own sincere dealing. If any of you believe that you are going to achieve Utopia by deceit, by raising false flags, by wilful misrepresentation, by conscious misstatement, by guile, conspiracy, and fraud, and finally by giving over to someone else the power to think and judge and study the evidence for you, you know little of the ways of progress.

For Utopia is no different from democracy. It, too, is never completed. It is a start made in a desirable direction, and the task of constructing it is infinite. If it were otherwise—as some young people to-day believe—they might succeed in their sophistry. It might be so that the ends justify the means. One might arrive at a destination of a perfect society, and then in a great celebration and ceremonial make a vast bonfire of all the lies and all the surreptitious trickery which had been resorted to in reaching the destination, and then start life anew on an elevated plane of social decency.

Perhaps the chief difference between the generations is that the young people hope to achieve social changes more quickly than their elders. But their elders had the same hope, and only experience taught them that it is a slow grind and that it cannot be

done with impetuous joy or with any temporary suspension of the moral code. When you are along in life and can look around you, you measure what it is your generation has done, you see a far different view of the Jerusalem that was to be built in this green land. You see that this Jerusalem is not a mirage, but that it is a tedious compilation, and you see quite clearly that what one gives to erecting it is not something outside oneself, but from the very innermost heart of oneself. One sees that this Jerusalem is not a dream, but a reality, and this reality is the sum total of individuals, and its strength and value are no more and no less than the strength and value of those individuals. Whatever trickery and deceit you take with you to this destination stays with you. The means you employ to achieve what you want become part of your achievement. And if you think you are building a better society by temporary deceit, you will be astonished to find that the deceit is not temporary, it is a permanent part of the society you have built. You do not arrive at the moment when you can throw off the social immoralities, for social immoralities never buy anything but social immorality. They do not buy Utopia.

I hope that your experiences in Brooklyn College have given you a groundwork in appreciating the nature of the civil liberties in society. The words "civil liberties" are not to be bandied about carelessly. They are precious words, but they also are responsible and realistic words. Academic freedom, for instance, is not a long heritage, nor is it ever a secure heritage. Like all freedoms it must be continuously maintained. One importance of academic freedom that I wish to mention is that it allows for heresy. It is a recognition of the changing nature of orthodoxy, and it is a kind of life insurance, for without it thinking might come to a dead end and so die. But the guarantee of the right of heresy is the guarantee of the individual's right to seek the truth, wherever that search may take him. I am sure that you have grasped that. Academic freedom is the safeguarding of the scholar who is weighing truth in the scales of his own inner being. If he is not doing that he is not a scholar. If he is not a scholar searching for truth, academic freedom is not for him, and he has no right to appeal to its protection. If a man who has been a scholar takes on a political obligation which binds him to accept a judgment of truth outside his own experience and forbids him the privilege of search, he has himself contracted out of academic freedom. That is plain. You cannot be a scholar, entitled to academic freedom, and give up your right to think, inquire, and judge.

I hope, too, that it is clear to you that minority rights have been granted by the majority. Be quite hard-boiled about it; the

majority has bestowed these rights not out of any quixotic altruism, but out of a wise sense of self-interest. It has given them because the majority wants a wholesome life, and a wholesome life is not to be had in any tyranny whatever, even the tyranny of the majority over the minority. But those who enjoy minority rights must know that they enjoy them only so long as the majority can be convinced that their freedom is to its own interests. The majority will never uphold the right of the minority to destroy the majority. That should be plain.

And a civil liberty that is used to frustrate the majority and to bind it, and to paralyze it, is not a liberty the majority will continue to bestow. For if the tyranny of the majority over the minority is not wholesome, the tyranny of the minority over the majority is less so.

It is good if you have had to contend with these concepts and conflicts here in the community of this college. For you will be contending with them for as long as you live. As I said, you go *into a career of contention henceforth*. You will find it a wearing and wearying career. You will find truth not elusive, but everlastingly incomplete. You will find some of it here, some of it there. You will find some of it in the cause you do not espouse. You will find it in no one cause, not in one political scheme. If you appreciate this early, you will be early ready to serve the cause of democracy which provided this homeland of yours. For democracy is the conscious knowledge that an imperfect society can be made more perfect, as well as the political freedom to act to that end. Democracy is unfinished business. That is what we mean by saying that democracy is not fulfilment as much as it is a process—the contentious, wearying process—of always advancing toward fulfilment. It is for you to decide what about our American way of life you find inadequate, and to set about making it adequate. But what is Americanism is not only the America that has been handed on to you, with its great achievements, but the free opportunity to build it always better.

And in that building be sure that you have no other gift to make than yourselves. Some of you may be called upon to make that gift with great courage and great sacrifice. I humbly thank you for being capable of it. Others will make it in less spectacular ways. But be assured that what virtue you practise, what insight you gain, what restraint you place upon your intolerance, what sincerity you dare have with yourselves, what truthfulness and honour you pay to your comrades will be your contribution to your times.

VALIDITY OF DOUBT

University of North Carolina, June 9, 1942

CLASS of 1942: Ever since I knew I was to have the privilege of speaking to you on this occasion, I have been trying to gather together my ideas about the world crisis, and I hoped that by to-night I might have a statement of political faith which, being positive and representing a clarification of my own thinking, might be worth repeating to you. This search for a formulation of my political faith has had an unexpected conclusion. Instead of faith, I found my thoughts so dominated by doubt that I came to the conclusion that it would be more honest to speak freely to you about doubt than to hide the doubt and set up a few positive beliefs as a satisfactory creed of faith. So let me confess to you that at night I take doubt to my pillow, that doubt makes my sleep uneasy and my waking troubled. But let me also say that the more I have thought about it, the less guilty I have come to feel. Perhaps I am only trying to justify what is uncertain in me if I say that I see the time we live in as the Age of Doubt, and the war, in a sense, is the culmination of a struggle between the determination to doubt and the determination to reject doubt. And the cause to which the United States and other democracies are committed is the vindication of doubt and the establishment of a society which shall develop in every direction as the result of doubt.

A great deal has been said of the want in modern democratic society of positive political faith. We are told that young men will not die except for fixed beliefs, that we cannot have a national morale, or bear sacrifices and privation, without the mental armour of certainty. If this is true, have we not lost the war already? For if there is anyone who can say with certainty just what the world will be like after a victory of the United Nations, say twenty years hence, he is indeed as fortunate as he is rare. I can mention one certainty we do have, but it is negative. We *are* sure we reject the Nazi and Japanese concept of society. We would rather die than be slaves to their mastery or compromise our prospects of remaining free. But when we say that we are fighting to preserve the American way of life, I am not so sure what is meant. How can we honestly say that the American way of life *is* going to be restored, in all its fundamentals, after a victory? For how many of us would agree on a definition of the American way of life? I know some quite sincere persons who think that the American way of life ceased to exist in 1933. Others believe that the former American way of life gradually ceased when individual enterprise,

which created the United States in the first place, was partially transformed into something quite different, *private* enterprise, corporate and not individual, and private simply in the sense that the state was to have little to say about it. If on these and kindred themes you also have doubted, if your pillows have been unquiet and your sleep disturbed, join me to examine whether having doubt is not a worth-while contribution to our times. We may serve the democracy of our forefathers better by doubting than by stubbornly holding to certainties that already have lost their validity.

For we of the democracies are committed to doubt. It is the Fascists who are sure. To doubt Fascism is to the Fascist the only treason. *He* will not permit men to toss in their beds in worry over social problems. The individual in his state is denied the right to question. The society for which he wars is a final society, a set shape, built upon such unalterable dogmas as racialism and the concept of the dominance of subordinates by masters. In his world, thinking is disparaged. In its place is the declaration of doctrine. Justice has become the enforcement of the will of the elect, not the elected. This is a positive, highly organized order; it has the focus and the power of certainty.

It is part of our doubts that we can have no more than an inkling of the magnitude of the transformation through which we are passing. We sense that deep changes are expressing themselves at a tremendous velocity and that our own control over them is slight indeed. We are not much more than workmen at the moving belt of events, and each event seems to halt before us for a moment, for us to add to it our own minute contribution. But what the whole future is to be when the separate parts are assembled, we do not know and we cannot see. We can only make it minutely better or worse by the little we add to it.

To be specific about certain of my own doubts, I doubt that we *shall* be able to return to a completely individualist economy. But then, I doubt whether what we called individualist society, had not already become unbearably unjust to large numbers of individuals. But though I believe we shall evolve into some kind of a more co-operative society—perhaps with a piebald economy of state and private business—I still doubt that we shall have to submit to *tyranny*, such as the Fascists and State Socialists have practised in trying to control their economies. I know that this is a troublesome contradiction, and yet I doubt the logic which proclaims it as impossible. I believe that we *can* preserve a high degree of personal liberty and yet produce a world organization and national communities in which more of the economic functions are guided by the state than in the past years.

As to the future, I doubt the necessity of economic or military nationalism. All of us here inherited a faith in nationalism, but I doubt that faith. And yet, in looking forward to first experiments in genuine internationalism, which seem sure to come, I have more doubt. International society will have to enforce law, or it will not stand. That we know. Yet law always breeds rebels, and rebels often serve to extend liberties. So I do not foresee a permanent, rigorous peace for a long future, but I do foresee constant and desirable change, brought on either by minor wars, or violence, or the threats of them. Being unable in my mind to set up a certainty *at this moment*, I am less able to set it up for the future.

But I rejoice that there may be uncertainty. And, for one, I am not frightened because you of your much-criticized generation have filled your minds with distrust of certainty, with scepticism of oversimplifications, with dislike for slogans, with contempt for insincere shibboleths. We used to be told that such young men as you could not make good soldiers, that good soldiers must have belief, not doubt. But if I understand you aright, you are accepting as finally true only what you establish by your own experience. If so, you will have freer spirits, more valid personalities, hence greater self-assurance and quickness of action than the youth of any tyranny. You rely neither on political dogmas nor on orders from above. You are capable of initiative. In a crisis, man against man, *you* will be enterprising.

Modern warfare, like modern industrialism, is to some extent the replacement of man by the machine, but this should not be overstated. Modern warfare, far more than in the First World War, is the fighting of individuals rather than masses, and its outcome, in the end, depends on individual qualities. There must be planning, discipline, and co-ordination, and because of these, which the Nazis had to a superlative degree and the democracies lacked to a superlative degree, the Nazis seemed invincible. But it was not the individuals who were victorious earlier in this war; it was the prepared plan, worked out in all details. It was the superiority in the *numbers* of machines. Now that the democracies *are* planning, and are building machines and armies equal to those of the Nazis and the Japanese, the outcome of the war is assured finally by the character of the individual soldier. So I stake my hopes on the soldier who doubts. I believe he is a stronger individual, a worthier warrior; he stands face to face with reality, beyond the possibility of disillusionment from any source. His chief reliance is on himself. Give him the equal weapons and the equal staff work, and you will see him sweep the indoctrinated hordes from all the fields of battle!

I admit that in asserting the virtue of doubt I am indulging in a paradox. For underneath the assertion is a foundation of positive faith. There is faith in the need for freedom and in the practicability of freedom, freedom of the mind and freedom under the law. There is faith in the ultimate benefit of generosity and the truth that man is his own best keeper in being his brother's keeper. There is faith in reason and its being more powerful than any physical force. There is faith in the truth that the individual dare not compromise with himself lest he be lost, but that he must be glad to compromise with his fellow man, lest both of them be lost. Such faith is the cornerstone of democracy. For democracy itself is a paradox, a society of individuals who are true to their own visions but who are concerned with the rights of other individuals. It establishes principle, where principle must be inviolate, and it organizes for compromise where compromise alone safeguards the application of principle. In voicing a delight in doubt, I am in harmony with the minds whose impetus gave democracy its foothold in a world of absolutism. For democracy, whatever its constitutional form, is dedicated to the protection and fulfillment of the individual, and the individual can grow only if he has the courage to doubt.

If you will permit some references to my own life, I first encountered doubt walking down a railroad track between Oberlin and Elyria, Ohio, with my boyhood chum. I was probably ten or eleven years old. He stopped me solemnly and asked me one of the most important questions of my life. Did I believe in the doctrine of evolution? I didn't know, because up to that moment I had never heard of evolution. But he told me about it and I began to feel the structure of my Oberlin world crumble around me, with its positive belief in a creation some five thousand years old, in the mathematical accuracy of Hebrew prophecy and in a code of circumscribed behaviour. That was my initiation into the faith of doubt. I went on from Oberlin into newspaper work. I became duly excited by the deeds of science, all created by those who doubted the truth as it had been presented to them. I was infected—as were so many in those years—by the sight of change in the world, and began to feel the infinite capacity of development in human society through conscious informed action by the individuals who composed it. I began doubting most of my preconceptions. I began saying, "I do not know," in looking ahead.

It will have occurred to you that when scientific dogma appeared on the scene the scientist became a kind of pope, who proclaimed what could and could not be believed. He decreed that nothing

was true unless it was scientifically established under laboratory conditions. Probably you have learned, too, to doubt *that*, nor is it difficult, because the truth not yet established under laboratory conditions is far more extensive than the truth so far confirmed. The scientist doubted previous science in his experiments, he rejected popular superstitions, and yet he himself had to be doubted. When I was your age came a season of tremendous mental excitement, exploration, and a widening of horizons. A new world glimmered ahead in the haze, and mankind was attaining it along a thousand highways of doubt.

Then came the explosion of World War Number One. It was my lot to be stationed in Berlin as foreign correspondent before its outbreak and after it began. I became personally afflicted in varying degrees. During the war, *all* was hideous. After it the vistas opened for a time, and the new world glimmered again and still more clearly. But the democracies did not achieve the new world, and they slipped away from it, and as a correspondent I had to record their want of heart and their loss of opportunities. And my affliction returned. I said bitterly it had been given to me to watch and to report the disintegration of civilization. And my only reward, I feared, was to be fascinated by the unfolding of doom, before Munich, through Munich, in Poland, in Flanders and France, in Russia, and in the south-west Pacific. It has indeed been a fascination, the stately inevitability of the greatest tragedy in human history.

But in the past months I have seen doubt destroy much which we had accepted as certain. The war itself destroyed the deep-rooted certainty in which the democracies felt secure, the certainty of the vast superiority of defence over offence. But we have paid dearly to learn the lesson that we can and must attack.

It is the annihilation of other certainties that once more has opened to view a new world. One of them is the whole gamut of certainties all of us shared a while back, about public finance. Five years ago all of us were certain that huge government spending was sure to end in inflation and disaster. We had other certainties about money and certainties about property. We may hardly notice it, but they have gone. We already live in a system in which money and property have become entirely different tools, with greatly changed services to perform. We live now by standards of production, and what that is going to do to the one-time America I do not know and neither do you. But one of the certainties which is gone is that it must be disaster. On the contrary, we shall have the opportunity and some of the organization to deal with immediate post-war problems. The international management of war

makes feasible the international management—not the domination but the intelligent direction—of the affairs in the transition period. We are so far along in our thinking already. But the *transition to what?* We cannot be certain. That is the essence of it. The new world is not going to be a return to the past, neither will it rise from a blueprint. It will be made by dint of great social adventure, guided by open minds, by experimentation, by trial and error, and by the determination not to be strangled by our own preconceptions and old certainties.

In this new world the United States will take the leading part. Equipped with greater capacity for production than any country in history, capable of turning out goods—the one really substantial wealth of the future—goods for ourselves and for vast multitudes all over the world—the United States will emerge after the war something never before dreamed by Americans. This is a greatness for which we have not prayed. Indeed we have prayed that it should be spared us. We wanted no world responsibility, we wanted only to be left alone. Now we have had to assume responsibility.

It is conceivable that after the war we shall cringe and try to slink back to littleness, and let the new productive capacity rust and rot. But if that is what we are to expect from you of your generation, you who have cleared your minds of our past shibboleths, and who are accepting the sacrifice of service, and have been stirred by the discovery of such brotherhoods as the ones now growing with the people of China and Russia, and the British Dominions, and India, we do not understand you. For you of your generation will have borne the brunt of the war, and you will not have been fighting for the older world nor to repair the failures of your fathers. You will have been fighting for the world of your own flesh and blood, your own sorrow and your own promise. Nor do I base a hopeful prediction on what may sound like idle idealism. After this war America will have factories, machines, tools, and workers, all in their place, where they will have finished the greatest assignment of production ever yet conceived. What will you of your generation choose to do, dismantle the factories, throw the machines and the tools on the scrap pile, and send the workers back home? To what will they go? Many occupations of the past will have ended. Some workers can at once retool the factories for a hungry domestic market. But that will not take all the factories or all the machines and millions of workers. There they will stand, the true components of the true wealth. And all they will need, to create and enjoy that wealth, is to make it available. Hundreds of millions of men and women with low standards

of living, in China, in India, in Pacific lands, in every corner of the earth, will be waiting for the benefit of that wealth. For you to be prosperous you will need the wisdom and the sense of responsibility to care for the world according to your capacity. The alternative will be that you should have unemployed and hungry men by the millions, and in a sudden regression rise up in some kind of counter-revolution against the revolution of production which the war already is working. An old-fashioned capitalist, with a mind in the groove of good banking standards, might be excused for flinching if he faced a new opportunity like that. But you of your generation are not old-fashioned and your minds were not moulded in a banker's groove. You will not say, This has never been done before, therefore it is impossible. You will not say, Better to drift in orthodoxy than to make mistakes. You will not consult economic theories based on a nineteenth-century order. Just how you will do it, you to-day cannot say. But you will know that if it is possible for men to produce a miraculously large accumulation of destructiveness in war it will be no more impossible for them to produce a miraculously fruitful plenty in peace. And you will not be deterred by the shaking of grey heads. You will doubt the economic certainties of old men.

I am not sorry for you. I do not lament that you have come upon the scene in this tragic hour. You have the stamina and the fortitude to bear the exactions of deep change. You will dare to examine all, to doubt all. You will build the new world with the bricks and the mortar of doubt. You will erect, and then have to change your plans. You will rebuild and redesign. But you will press forward. The doubters are the forward movers. You, too, will toss on your pillows. You, too, will feel the dread that goes with growth. You will know that you do not know. Well may we put our positive faith in you, for you give promise of being what your fathers were not able to be—a generation of builders.

WHY WE FAILED

Harvard University, June 11, 1942

MUCH has been said, in remorse and in truth, of the failure of the generation which planted the tree of peace after the last war to produce any fruit from that tree. No generation can have less to show of permanent achievement after a great war, at least in achievement that a clear victory brought within grasp. If great wars are fought for simple aims and if there is clear victory, the aims usually are realized. The Revolutionary War made us an indepen-

dent nation. The Civil War preserved our Union. Two simple aims were announced for the last war. It was to be the war to end wars. And it was to be a war to make the world safe for democracy. At this moment to recall those aims is to feel the sharpest whiplash, for few if any greater failures ever stung the minds of men than does the failure to win the last war after victory had been assured on the field of battle. But having said that, let us admit that the failure was not produced by evil, or indeed by a want of effort. Let us see that we have been victims of a far more destructive influence, the fault of short sight.

It happens to have been my own assignment to have reported the last war and to have reported from Europe much of the effort expended to secure the peace, and to preserve the new democracies created after the war. I should not be able to acquit this generation of its failure. But it is fair to say that it made a tremendous effort. Conference after conference sat, pondered, analyzed, and debated the problems of the peace. Many hopeful gains were made. At moments it seemed as though the great victory was going to be won. More statesmanship was expended than the public knows. Harder, more conscientious work was done than has been acknowledged. In retrospect one is entitled to the opinion that what was lacking was not the sense of responsibility, but something far more limiting, the scope of mind.

That is not to say that we did not all have an education during the last war on certain primary themes. We learned the meaning of militarism, the importance of political freedom, the rights to self-determination. You who recall those days know they were stirring, and hearts indeed were true in seeking the good. Dreams were dreamed of a better world. Nor do I belittle such dreams by calling them dreams. I say, indeed, that without dreams, in the years of terrible tragedy, the impulse from that tragedy fails to work through to constructive ends. What I do suggest is that the dreams during the last war were not expansive enough and inclusive enough. And the failure after that war was the counterpart of the inadequacy of the dreams. And what should mark the difference between the last war and this is the measure of our dreams. Our dreams to-day can be and *must* be greater. The achievements after this war can be and must be greater on that account.

After the last war it was not enough to defeat militarism with superior force. It was not enough to draw up documents giving people self-determination. If war was to end, the conditions which produce war had to be understood and changed. Little enough was said about this by the dreamers of 1917 and '18. Did they have

much thought, for example, for living standards in China and India? Did they care much about bestowing the dignity of full equality on the coloured races of the world?

Great as was the last war, in loss of life and wealth, the thinking it produced did not go deeply enough into world relationships. Now we are discovering that our own safety as free Americans is at stake, and its fate is being decided not behind the defended shores of this continent but on faraway battlefields and distant seas. Look for a moment at how clear the connection has become between once remote and obscure problems and our own security. We in America suffer from a rubber shortage which is partly due to the fact that the defence of the Malay Peninsula was without the aid of the natives of that region. Had they been brothers of the white democrat in fact, Singapore might not have fallen for many months, or perhaps not at all.

The wonderful resistance of the Chinese, which is a large part of our own security against Japan, has been dealt a deep wound in Burma, and the Burma Road is now cut off. The Japanese victory in Burma was based in part on the aid of the Burmese, who had not become brothers of the white man in fact. If we are to win the war, the United Nations must not lose the control of the Indian Ocean, yet who is to say that the Indians themselves have been made sufficiently alive to their membership in our system of human brotherhood to aid in holding India from the Japanese? The resistance in the Philippines turned into a heroic and helpful delaying action through the courage and spirit of the Filipinos. They had been given some measure of brotherhood, and it contributed to our own safety. And we should—and do—begin to see what man has never seen so clearly before, that brotherhood is not a Sabbath sentiment; it is a crying necessity, a defence, a source of strength, a relationship without which we ourselves are exposed and can fall into dire danger.

Out of fragments of experience in this war we already are learning that we have a responsibility to other peoples, no matter how far away they may be, and if this war should be lost it would be because of the inadequacy of our past concept and practice of brotherhood. And if it is won it puts us on the highway to the practice of it on a scale surpassing the dreams of the past.

The sufferings of a person or a nation are the same; in them the mind is stretched to encompass truth it could not hold before. To-day we of the living generations are seeing truth never before perceived by democratic societies. We are seeing that what we need, if we are to survive as free peoples, is not less but more freedom. We are beginning to perceive that political freedom is not

of itself sufficient. The world is economic as well as political. Just as political freedom is not safe if it is not part of a world system of political liberties, economic freedom cannot be secure unless it is part of a world order based on economic opportunity for all. We begin to have an inkling of the necessity to our own children and their future that the standard of living shall be raised for millions of men and women in what we call foreign lands to whose lot we have been comfortably indifferent.

In the process of mind-stretching, we do not learn policy. We only see. Policy is the subsequent application of a vision. To-day we dream; to-morrow we lay the roads to the realization of the dream. All of us dreaming of a dignified and peaceful world may ask ourselves, in the anguish of present perplexity, How can the dream be realized? How are we going to remain free and yet govern the world by social action? To-day we need not concern ourselves too gravely with the difficulties of future policy. There is an element of fate in human destiny, not a fate dictated by supernatural powers, but the fate of being circumscribed by our own vision. That which we cannot see we cannot perform. And that which we do see, if we see enough, lies within our ingenuity to achieve. The last war stretched the minds of men to see visions surpassing their previous dreams. They did not establish what they had dreamed. It is said of them scoffingly that they were dreamers. But it should be said of them that they dreamed not wisely enough and not perceptively enough. To-day we see much more. We behold it in the peril and wrath and the greatest power of destruction mankind has ever devised and encountered. It is no paradox that in such awful hours men envision their greatest and their gentlest potentialities. We are striving for a better good. We failed not because we were not good, but because our concept of the good was inadequate. So it is truth that this must be a war of the people for all peoples, a war for the establishment of brotherhood, a war to be followed by strong nations shouldering their responsibility toward those who are backward and poor. Seeing the war in that perspective, we give the statesmen of the peace the foundation for policy which they did not have after the last war. They tried to build a new world with the tools at hand. And what were the tools? The minds of the men and women of the world. And these minds were partly closed. Now in the ruins of their failure we must know that our own preservation is in acknowledging the reality of the power of realistic brotherhood. This time we open our minds to apprehend that, seeing it, we must practise it, lest we perish.

THE PEACE TO COME

Middlebury, Vermont (Forefathers' Day), December 15, 1942

TO-DAY you are commemorating not the forefathers of Vermont, but their predecessors, the Pilgrims themselves. In many respects their Vermont descendants were like them. But the Pilgrims faced a more exalted test. They had left England first for the calculated risk of Holland. And then they abandoned the calculated risk and replaced it with the incalculable risk of colonizing the unknown and hazardous New England. This called for greater courage, and also for greater recklessness. And it is this quality of recklessness which is not often enough attributed to the Pilgrims. For we know them as men and women of most prudent dispositions, and our concept of them nowadays is of persons of the most rigorously imposed repressions. I doubt if they would be recognized if we called them what they were, grand gamblers. They were not gamblers, but they gambled with fate if ever men and women did so. They gambled for the highest stakes, not for ordinary winnings. They did not seek primarily to win money, power, and an ultimate ease and security. They played for the rights of conscience, first of all, and then for freedom in the search for truth. They gambled for these winnings with their lives; that is, they were ready to die if need be in the great venture. And in this evaluation of things, setting their lives as worth risking for certain freedoms, they laid their mark on the doorway of America and left their heritage to all Americans who have since lived. From the centre of New England, and also from other centres of early settlement, the high gamblers went forth and invested the American continent. Everywhere that siege was laid to it the evaluation of those first pioneers became part of the fabric of early American society. The pioneering spirit, as we call this noble gambling, spread steadily across the continent, and as men and women settled at their outposts they expressed their dual faith in the belief in the moral teachings of Christianity and in the search for truth. In time, to be sure, the great stream of migration was led by the need for economic well-being, and the accent shifted from the early idealism to material opportunities. But though the accent shifted, the idealism was never obscured, and it has always remained one of the elements not only of America but of Americans. As a nation we accept a common code of ethics, we take thought to protect the freedom of religious and political conscience, and we make generous provision for education, so that we can say that we have added to our heritage. And indeed to add to the legacy of the forefathers would

be the truest expression of gratitude for it. I am not saying that if the forefathers had drawn up a blueprint for a continental American civilization the structure now standing much resembles what they would have designed. But their values are there. Nor am I saying that we always adhere to our ethical standards. Standards that can be adhered to unfailingly would not be standards. For by now we know even better than our forefathers that the search for truth does not come to an end, and moral insight must penetrate always deeper into the human soul. We know that civilization is a direction rather than a destination; we know that growth is not an achievement but a process. We live less certain of finality, and though we know much more than they did about the physical universe, we know far more realistically how little we know. We have become by necessity better doubters than they, by which token we can in humility say we are a little wiser. But, I repeat, they are part of us. In us are the same elements. And though I am not trying to say that we shall in their measure succeed as they did in their great gamble of opening a new world in America, I do believe that we face our test in the world of to-day endowed with some of their spirit, reading like them the scale of values, asking of the future not only the harvests of the fields for which they asked, but as well the freedoms for which they were ready, if need be, to lay down their lives. I am not trying to say that we shall succeed like them, for we cannot know. We are like them in that we now are embarked on a great gamble. We too are playing with our lives for highest stakes. We are asking not primarily for material winnings though we are asking for greater justice in the distribution of material benefits. We are asking first of all to preserve and establish beyond peril the freedoms that alone are worth the risk of life itself. The forefathers gambled for a new world and won it. And now the new world which they found and whose building they made possible is itself gambling. We too have plunged into the unknown. We have no certainty of the outcome.

We cannot say comfortably, 'This war will end soon, and everything in the world can be set quickly to rights. We cannot say truthfully that soon we shall revert to the America of 1939, paying tribute of a kind to the sons who have fallen, and slip back into our patterns of thinking and into our patterns of dealing with each other and with our neighbours. We cannot say this, because simply winning the war is not going to enable us to snap back to 1939. That year has gone. The persons we were in that year have changed. Its frontiers have changed; the concept of what constitutes peace has changed. Some of us may yearn for that departed

1939 and seek for it. And those who have no stomachs for a gamble may insist on trying to find it. But all they will find is that it has gone. They cannot find it any more than you and I can find the agrarian democracy of Thomas Jefferson's days. Or, to make a comparison with a more recent time, they cannot find it any more than the Americans of 1920 could find the world of 1913. They thought they could, for that year was a token of peace, and a peace they had enjoyed, with the exception of the little diversion of the Spanish War, since 1865. The Americans of 1920 thought they could find that world again and bring their gamble to an end. They had staked all they were willing to gamble. And they lost their great session with fate. They cut their losses and they thought they had settled for 1913. But 1920 wore only the mask of 1913. The disarmament conference held two years after 1920, in which we took part, and the succeeding years with their half-hearted fumbblings with collective security in Europe, from which we stood aside, added to the disguise. We bemused ourselves. We kept reassuring ourselves that we really had our old world safely restored to us. And not even the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazi movement corrected our delusion. But now we know that we cannot circumvent fate. If a nation gambles for the highest winnings, seeks to cut the losses and settle for a half-truth, it asks the wrong victory, and it gets the wrong victory.

How much of the spirit of the Pilgrim Fathers was in the America of 1920? Obviously I am suggesting there was not enough. Then, you may ask, if I admit that, what do I think of the America of 1942? Are we wiser to-day? Are we willing, if need be, to lose more? I think we are. And I think we are because we might have tried to buy off fate and we chose not to. We might have tried to settle not for 1914, but to hold to 1939.

We are not in this war because we have to be. We could have bought off both Germany and Japan. They did not attack us because they wanted us in the war, but because we would not bargain with them. We could have made our shores secure, and our lands safe from invasion. We could have become the Axis trustees for the Western Hemisphere. We could have done business on terms of a sort with a Nazi Europe and a Japanese Asia. All we needed to do was to accept the portents of 1939 as permanent parts of our future. There would have been a world, not only without Britain and China, but a world, except perhaps for a brief time in our hemisphere, without the liberties enshrined in the life of Britain, and stirring the Chinese in their great struggle for unity. The same liberties which underlie our own life. It would have been a world of peace for us, so long as we were willing to accept what Germany

and Japan would concede to us. All we needed to become, to have that reward, was to become indifferent to the enjoyment of freedom in Europe and Asia and ultimately in our own land. All we had to tell the Nazis was that we should abandon our aid of and interest in Britain. All we needed to tell Japan was that it could overrun China and give us a minor cut in the swag. To say that we could have stayed out of this war is no speculation of mine. It is fact. And the fact is that this nation would not have tolerated such a peace. It would not settle for 1939. You see, I am not saying that in 1920 we settled for 1939. I am saying that in 1920 we settled for 1913, not knowing it was gone. And fate gave us 1939 instead. This time we demonstrated that we were not going to compound our failure of 1920. We were not going to be fooled again. We held to our course, we aided Britain and China, we refused to sell out to Hitler and Tojo. And because of that they attacked us.

So Americans are gambling quite frankly for a new world. Only this time we know the cost will be higher. And correspondingly, we know we shall have to ask more of fate for our investment.

I use the word gamble with the high respect I feel in so describing the adventure of the Pilgrim Fathers. Like them, we are out for great returns, and like them we risk losing, for the outcome is no foreboud conclusion. Nothing would be more foolish than to believe we are certain to win this war. True, our chances look good. We have the resources of men and materials, and the technical skill, and if this were a war of statistics, we are mathematically certain to win. But war is not mathematics. Ask the Greeks who bested the armies of Xerxes. At this moment, indeed, our success in North Africa is mortgaged in no small degree to the attitude of General Franco of Spain. We might be ditched by that apostle of Fascism, and then we should have to pull up and start over again in our plans to get at the Axis from the underbelly side or any other side. I am not predicting that it will happen, I only point out that in war a nation does not function freely, it does not control all the elements and processes which are essential to victory.

If it is not certain that we shall win the war, it also is not certain, if we win it, that we shall win the peace, which is what matters most. I shall not speak about the peace discouragingly, for that would belie my hopes and judgment about it. The kind of peace that follows the war is not going to be dictated by any single nation. And the weight of counsels which prevail at the peace conference will be decided to some extent by the contributions that have been made in the war and by the way the final victory is won.

Let me suggest the nature of one of the difficulties. There are those who want the structure of the peace worked out now, by agreement reached now between the Allies. That would be wonderful, if it were only possible. There can be agreement on certain principles, as has been well begun in the Atlantic Charter. But the peace treaty is the application of such principles to specific problems, and if you think that can be done now, ask yourselves how the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Serbs, and the French should sit down to-day and decide the future of a defeated Germany. Even on the hypothesis that the German armies are going to be beaten by a coalition in which each of Germany's neighbours bears a share and that our own army is there in great numbers, how should these nations sit down to-day to draft this vital part of a peace treaty? We don't know just how, when, or in what way the German armies are going to be beaten, and by whom. We don't know how heavy the casualties are going to be in bringing about the defeat. It may be that American casualties are going to bulk very large in the victory. If so, Americans will have quite distinct ideas about what they want done with Germany, and they will feel that they have a right to have their views of the peace prevail. The Russians, on the other hand, are going to come to the peace conference with their casualties and their ideas. Do you think you could draft the German clauses of a treaty to-day? Do you think we would accept what the Russians want, or the Russians would accept what we want? Or the Poles would be pleased with one or the other programme, or the Czechs, the Norwegians, the Yugoslavs, and the French? I am not suggesting that there cannot be now, and should not be now, agreement in principle on war aims. I am not suggesting that the Atlantic Charter, which was only a beginning, could not be expanded, and that conversations on its expansion would not be useful. But there is a school of thought which seems to be saying that unless we come to agreement in advance, we shall not fight well together or make peace well together.

Then there is another school which seems to say that if we bother about the peace now we are less likely to fight well together because of differences and the emotions they engender. They say there is only one job to be done now, which is to win the military war. Both schools, I think, have their points, and we might be wise to discuss principles now, when we need each other so sorely, and still not embark on the monumental task of trying to write the draft of a peace treaty.

But we can adopt neither course without what I should call a maturity of attitude by the public in its understanding of the peace

problems and of the post-war world. War, particularly modern war, is inevitably fought as a crusade. A crusade sets up the banners of a cause. And the cause is emblazoned in few and simple words on those banners, and these words are not and cannot be of the language in which the ultimate peace will be drafted. A crusade is an emotional experience, in which men and women induce themselves to bear burdens and take risks beyond their wont. Thus the last war was fought to make the world safe for democracy and to defeat Prussian militarism. As it turned out it did neither. By the time the peace treaty was drafted it was so different from those slogans as to appear to many to be a betrayal of the principles for which the crusade was fought. And many turned away from it in disillusionment. Yet the people who turned away from the work of peace did more to lose the peace than did the treaty itself. I mean by that that the treaty, unsatisfactory though it was, did set up the machinery by which a peace might have been developed that would have lasted far longer than the year 1939. The Versailles treaty was both good and bad. But when those who were disappointed by the bad declined to make use of the good, the bad had its freer rein. And the treaty turned out to be worse than it needed to be. For one thing, if the United States had entered the League and had brought its influence to bear, many of the bad mistakes of the treaty could have been modified. We were not in the League, and yet with the Dawes and Young plans we did exert our influence to rewrite the financial clauses of the treaty. We did this from the outside, not half so well as though we had been on the inside. Yet outside the League we proved that wise counsels could have influence in it. We helped rewrite part of the treaty. But we were disillusioned, we refused to accept responsibility. And our own fear helped other fears to prosper. In the end the League collapsed altogether because those in it also side-stepped responsibility. Without acceptance of responsibility, with all that it entailed—such as willingness to go to war to prevent Italy absorbing Ethiopia—there could be no collective security, and no maintenance of peace.

We must expect the next peace to be not altogether different from the last one. It will hardly produce a treaty that fulfils what we think emotionally we mean in the terms of our crusade. And we are going to be tempted to react in disillusionment against the peace on that account. Some voices are heard crying that the peace already has been lost by the fact that the system of colonial trusteeship is not going to be abolished. They say we went to war for freedom and are not going to give immediate freedom to all colonial peoples. There will be other shortcomings in the peace

treaty. That is inevitable. The treaty is going to be a compromise between conflicting interests. How else is a treaty to be written? It is not our grace in this life that truth is single. Truth is multiple, and compromise is an honourable procedure, as we in a democracy know so well. Compromise is the settlement made between two or more conflicting truths. We know that in our daily lives, in the village, the city, the state, and the nation. We govern ourselves by the application of this procedure. We never achieve at a single leap the visions of the most far-sighted. As a people we never satisfy everyone with everything we do. We still have not built a perfect democracy in this land left us by our forefathers. But in our own affairs we know that the essence of democracy is that it is unfinished business, and democratic living means going always forward toward a more perfect democracy. The peace treaty and the establishment of the new world order will be like that too, only more so, for it is a beginning. It is not going to be done at a single sitting, or at a hundred sittings of a peace conference. It is going to be done by discussion, compromise, by listening to the truth others see and which is set against the truth which we see, and by adjusting our truths to the truths of others, and others making the same adjustment to our own. In our own democracy we make mistakes and learn painfully from the experience, and then apply our wisdom. So must the new world order grow slowly, and have free play for trial and error and the procedure of growth.

What I mean by a mature attitude toward the problems of peace is the understanding that this is the nature of things, that in this way freedom will be added to, which is the best we can hope to do. The danger is not that the crusader believes his passionate principles, but that he may not sufficiently understand, too, the organic nature of growth. He likes to see the world in black and white. He sees virtue and he sees evil. And he asks for the triumph of virtue over evil. He must appreciate, too, that he is asking something that is performed only within the measurement of eternity. What we need now, as much as a good peace treaty, is the understanding that the peace treaty, even if it should be the best that human wisdom now can achieve, which is asking far too much, will not be good enough, and we must commit ourselves first of all against disillusionment. We must dedicate ourselves to have the faith which takes what is achieved, is grateful for the good in it, and goes to work to improve it. If that is the nature of a healthy life in a democracy, it is the nature of a healthy life in a world in which we accept our share of responsibility for the peace and well-being of the whole fellowship of nations.

Having said that we are gambling for a better world, it may not appear consistent that I should at the same time anticipate a peace treaty and a world order of inevitable imperfections. If we gamble, and stake our very existence, can we not count, if we win, on the avoidance of the disheartening compromises? Here I assert, no, we cannot, not if we are mature. A grown-up democracy sees the problems of village, state, nation, and international affairs as achievements by stages, as fruits of disagreement and wranglings, as the winning of partial progress first as the continued study and search for evidence and methods. A grown-up democracy knows that there is a dimension of time in politics, and that what counts as much as a Declaration of Independence, or a Constitution, is the freedom to work out in ensuing decades the destiny they imply. We have had our republic for a century and a half, and our continent has been opened little more than three centuries. We still have not translated into perfect, or even approximately perfect, form, the vision seen by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. We are patient with ourselves as a democracy, we know that the future is ahead, and we have the freedom to go on with the work of making a more acceptable society. We do not give up, we do not resort to dictatorship at every discouragement. We must learn to provide patience, too, for international affairs, for peace treaties and the first beginnings of a tolerable world order. Indeed that is what we are gambling for, for the opportunity, for the freedom, in which to proceed with the slow building of a better world.

I have one more thought to express before I finish. It is another thought about the nature of maturity. It seems probable that after this war we may be confronted by a problem not unlike the one we faced after the last war. It is a problem of having to choose between something fairly desirable internationally and something we may not want domestically. After the last war the tide was turning against Wilson, as it tends to turn against any war president. Without attempting to say that it should or should not have turned against him, the fact is that it did. And this was not reprehensible. If the majority in the country wanted to be through with Wilson, if its appetite was satiated with his personality, with his New Freedom, with his associates, or whatever the reason or reasons, the country had a right to do so. But in doing so the country also threw aside collaboration in the peace. And in choosing the one domestic result which it wanted, it abandoned a result in foreign affairs which I feel sure it also wanted. I shall not here enter into an analysis of the Harding campaign and the pledges and statements made during that campaign by Harding himself and on

his behalf by the most respected leaders of the Republican party, like Root, Hughes, and Hoover. These were promises that the United States should enter an association of nations. It may be that these pledges were well enough understood in Republican back rooms to be a tongue in the cheek, and it may be true that Harding was deliberately trying to kill the League by faint approval. But the fact is that the American public as a whole did not recognize the tongue as being in the cheek and assumed it was speaking truthfully from the throat. The public was ready to be rid of Wilson, so ready, in fact, that it was willing too to be rid of his peace treaty. And the peace treaty, as I have said, was not inspiring; it did not translate accurately the emotional principles evoked in the white passions of the war. So for the sake of being rid of Wilson, America, not quite deliberately, not aware of what was happening, was rid, too, of the opportunity of collaborating in the maintenance of the peace. And the pattern of action is one that can repeat itself. A domestic issue may move the majority of the country once more to be through with a war president and his domestic work, his associates, the whole flavour and tone of his administration. And we may find that in doing so we shall be getting rid of an opportunity to do our part in the post-war world. If we are a mature nation we shall recognize the pattern and not let it repeat itself. A mature nation will be able to see that in governing itself it must not make a decision about purely domestic affairs without thought for their effect on international relations. To put it bluntly, there is going to be a strong movement in 1944 to be rid of the New Deal. And we must be sure that the peace is not lost in that attempt. We must not again have a campaign to throw out a war administration in which lip service is paid to the cause of a sound peace. The nature of the peace is of far greater importance than the gratification of those who are tired of a Wilson or a Roosevelt. If a war has to be fought again in another twenty-one years, and hundreds of thousands of our sons again must offer their lives to set right what wisdom and clarity could have set right without warfare on a world scale, we shall not have merited our freedom. A mature nation not only governs according to the will of the majority, but if it is to survive it must govern in the interest of the majorities who are to follow. And if, at the end of this war, we find that we face problems on two planes—the domestic and the international planes—we must see that we cannot make a decision on one plane without attending at the same time to the high duties that lie on the other plane. We must recognize that domestically we change our minds, reverse our course, turn from one party to another, but in foreign affairs we are not given an endless series

of second chances. What we did in 1920 permitted the rise of forces in the world which could not be curbed by the turn of a tide in American elections. They had to wait to be curbed, as we hope they are, by the costly devastation of war and the sacrifice of the finest of our youth. A democracy which does not learn that foreign affairs cannot, in their elements, be dragged down to the domestic arena, and become part of a struggle to win a victory for one or another party, is not only digging the graves for countless numbers of its sons, it is digging its own grave. If we are not mature, if we do not measure the sharp difference between a local political feud and a stand taken in the world at large, we may indeed lose the gamble on which we have entered. We may lose it, after winning the war, as we did in 1920. It is the essence of wisdom to put first things first and to keep them first, allowing no gust of feeling to obscure their pre-eminence. It is a new world we are gambling for, the opportunity to contribute our effort, our counsel, and our responsibility to the slow process of laying its foundations and building upon them. If we lose this new world, we shall have lost ourselves and all that our forefathers risked so nobly to leave us as their heritage. We are not going to win on battlefields and with bravery alone. We can win only after a military victory with a sound sight of the distant road and a mature patience to plod that long road faithfully, with respect and understanding for our comrades on that road and with humility to learn from our own errors.

The men and women of Massachusetts, whom we thank and honour to-day, could not have foreseen a world in strife and chaos like ours. But they could hardly disagree about our duty in this world. They opened up this land, they laid well the moral and intellectual foundations on which the nation has been built. Now they might well ask to what avail was their idealism and their high adventure if we do not, as their heirs, carry with their same high adventure the spirit of freedom and brotherhood beyond the confines of our frontiers. I think they would be quick to admit that our task is more complex than theirs, that our chances of being confounded by confusions are greater, and that we stand to lose even more than they, since by now their work has become a civilization. But they surely would say it is essentially their civilization and pray of us to be steadfast and humble in our defence of it and in giving the brotherhood of mankind a freer opportunity to share and expand it.

WAR FOR WHAT?

Loyola University, January 31, 1943

It does not signify any want of solemnity on my part to say that this occasion finds you already running the rapids. A member of this graduating class, instead of being a well-built craft, here launched to carry the commerce of life on its steady waters, is more like a canoe, hurtling into the swift shallows of a stream, whose ultimate arrival at the broader, peaceful safety to come is beset by peril. Such knowledge of navigation as you have acquired cannot have equipped you with a sense of mastery over the forces which now rush you forward. You are, for the present, yielded up to their power and committed to their direction. Even if you would, you could not resist their might. Even if you would, you cannot hold back in refusal to proceed over these roaring shallows. You have experienced the acceleration of pace in your own studies. Many of you soon will experience in your own flesh the violence of the waters. You are now committed to their irresistible momentum.

In all conscience there is little one can say to you along with the words of good cheer and approval as you enter this phase, other than to speak of the qualities of the stream which has brought you to it, and to turn your thoughts downstream to quiet and steady stretches that lie ahead. For you will survive the present and achieve a future in accordance with the validity of what you have become up to now. When you do what is called maturing, you will find that it consists altogether of ascribing to the elements already in yourselves and in your relationships with man and the universe their true value, in the light of your own experience. That is, you are taking into the to-morrow, which now begins for you, the essentials. You have them already. And when you emerge into the peace to come, you will have done little more than to learn how to measure those essentials. To those of you who will go to war, may I say that you will learn that you have courage, and will know that courage is not the absence of fear but the presence of it in conflict with something greater—the will to perform your service. You will find you have loyalty, which is not the mercy of being above the temptation to neglect and to procrastinate, but the will to give of yourselves wholly to those who need you. You will find yourselves gifted with unexpected endurance. It is going to startle you to find how much you can stand. And by standing it, I do not mean that you will like it, for you are sure to loathe it, and the time of strain will seem almost eternal. Yet you will be

aware of a reservoir of strength which is your quota of the patience which has been gathering through the ages. You may not know it now, but you will have an abundance of all three—courage, loyalty, and endurance. The discovery will make you surer of yourselves. Each one of you must make the discovery in the moment of his own peculiar stress. I am not exhorting you to find these qualities in yourselves; I assure you that you are going to find them. You will find them because they are part of what you have taken from the past and they now are ripening in you. But you will know, too, that while these are the essential qualities of the soldier—courage, loyalty, and endurance—they are only part of your equipment. They are the part which now must come to the surface. They are the implements of character without which society cannot be shaped. But they are not more than implements. With them something must be made. And if you have only these implements you are not going to make more than other soldiers possessing the same implements who finally can shape with them only war, produce only might, and construct a society based only on the imposition by strength of men's rule over men. It is this difference between soldiers—those with only these implements and those with the vision of civilization which they mean to build with their implements—which is the promise of the future. Be sure of this: the soldiers of Berlin and Tokyo have courage, loyalty, and endurance. But they are being used by their leaders not for the security of human rights, not for the broadening of culture, not for the increase in the individual's scope and responsibility, not for the extension of freedom, but for vindication of the basic thesis that a few leaders of a race have the right to dominate mankind for the benefit of their race. Having first asked this domination in political terms, and found resistance, they resorted to violence to impose it. And that left us no alternative but to overpower them. Until they are overpowered we cannot resume our own work on the construction of a more civilized society. We are having to forgo the comforts of peace; we are having to suspend the debates about next steps in social policy; we are having to enlist soldiers and workers in the great obsessions of war and production. This is the hiatus, between the rich past and the richer future. These are the rapids of churned and perilous waters.

You will, then, be no more constructive than the soldiers against whom you fight if you are not aware, as you go to the war and as you come from it—and if we who benefit from your service are not aware, now and then—that the objective of this war is not simply to overpower the enemy. Nor is the objective simply to be done with this war. The objective is to construct something.

We were constructing it before; we shall have to be getting back to the constructive programme, time having been lost. Since we have had to suspend the programme, and in this turmoil of the rapids have had to question ourselves, our conduct, and our motives, it is to be expected that we shall come out of the war with a clearer vision of what we have been doing and so proceed with our task, quickened and inspired. We should see that we were living *for* something, not merely living. So we are fighting *for* something, not merely fighting an enemy. In defining the process of social life which the war interrupted, and which we are determined to resume, we name our objectives: the security of human rights, the broadening of culture, the increase of the individual's scope and responsibility, the extension of freedom. They were these through all our national history. We recognize them clearly, and with something of a start we see that we have not done what we might have done to achieve them. You, as students of your times, will be aware of the contradiction between what we have done and what we say we mean to do as a nation. You will have weighed the deficiency and have found, I am sure, that it is not proof of hypocrisy but due to the want of thought and zeal. So you will need to come back from the war stirred to thought and primed with zeal. And you have a right to ask of the nation which you serve that in your absence it give this constructive programme thought and apply with zeal that part of it applicable to a war programme.

One item of this catalogue of objectives, I suggest, you have a right to emphasize. It is appropriate to speak of it on this occasion, for it is the item of liberal education, or what I called the broadening of culture. I trust I have your sympathy if I devote the remainder of my brief remarks to this theme. First let me say that I fully agree that the army and navy must take their recruits from the colleges, must yank them out of their educational routine and train them for service in the quickest possible way. That means that most of the able-bodied young men of college age will have to sacrifice a liberal education to-day. For that they can be returned to the liberal colleges after the war at the government's expense, as an act of justice, which is already in contemplation. Then may I say that I do not think that all liberal education in this country, or all the liberal colleges, are worth saving. That obviously has little to do with the thesis that liberal education is an intrinsic part of our American civilization, and so is one of the elements of the post-war world which we are determined to strengthen. If some of our liberal education and some of our liberal colleges have been below the mark, that is all the more reason to strengthen liberal education.

We are in danger of being discouraged about liberal education

because of the emphasis in this day and age on economic security. Much of our education has been narrowed to the training of skills, so that a light has been growing dimmer which was brighter in our own past. It is the light that education is the training of the mind to think, rather than of the individual to earn. It is the gift to the mind of its own heritage; it is the appreciation of the sequences of growth, by which we find the past in our present and differentiate a desirable from an undesirable future. Education is quintessential to social freedom, for without it the choice of the future is submitted to the tyranny of chance. I have no fault to find with the War and Navy departments for their neglect of the liberal arts and their indifference to the liberal-arts colleges in their programme. It is their job to train soldiers and sailors. It is their job to bring the courage, loyalty, and endurance of soldiers and sailors into favourable fields where the enemy can be overpowered. But the War and Navy departments are not the state. They are specialists, behaving capably as specialists. They have not been entrusted with our civilization and culture, any more than the chief of police is asked also to be a superintendent of schools.

Since these young men in the services are being deprived of a liberal education and the training to think and to perceive, our entire national life is being depleted to this extent. And if this were unavoidable because of the war, the price would have to be paid, for the war must be won, even if liberal education, so to speak, has to die for the cause of liberal education. But it is not unavoidable. Only a percentage of the young men will have to forgo a liberal education, all of whose places can be filled by the young men who do not meet the physical requirements of the services, and by young women. Here is no commodity that needs to be rationed because of a shortage, or because we are shipping it to our Allies. There is no shortage. We have the schools; we have youth to fill every vacated place in the schools. The only shortage is in planning and in will power. Liberal education does not need to die for liberal education. On the contrary, more than ever it must live for it.

One of the objectives of the war is the requirement it brings for a generation of thinkers, of men and women not subject to the tyranny of chance, who can choose the future as free persons. This nation is coming to its full maturity; it will emerge from this war the strongest nation on earth. It will also come into that maturity somewhat impaired in heart and soul and mind, if it does not have young men and women in greater numbers than ever before who have had the discipline and broadening of liberal education. I am not worried but that some of the professions will be well

taught during this crisis and are being generously provided for under present arrangements. But there is more to civilization than that. Let me quote a passage from an earlier writing of a soldier whose name often appears in the day's news: "Power of mind," he wrote, "implies a versatility that one does not obtain through exclusive practice of one's profession. The real school of leadership is in general culture. There has been no illustrious captain who did not possess taste and feeling for the heritage of the human mind. At the root of Alexander's victories one will always find Aristotle." That was written long before the war by General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Fighting French.

Until now liberal education could be left to private sources and resources and to local communities, but in a war of the present magnitude the nation as a whole must act, since private sources and resources are utterly inadequate and local communities are unable to come to grips with a national problem. The nation has never been called upon before to take stock of its dependence on liberal education or to act in anticipation of a dangerous impairment of its civilized life. That time, however, has come, and the nation could more conscientiously send the young men to war who graduated from the colleges this year, if it could assure them that it was not shirking its duty to education and depriving them of the help they will need on their return. It is not true that their experience in war will of itself fit them to cope with the problems of peace. It will develop the implements of courage, loyalty, and endurance. Some will gain judgment and develop initiative in handling problems of administration. But not on the battlefields, not in the pilot's seat of planes, or the gunner's post in tanks, or in the turrets of a cruiser, will come the sense that history is a sequence, that we have become what we are not of our own invention, that we watch over a heritage, and that this must be added to if we are to have deserved our civilization. It will take more than dentists, physicians, veterinarians, chemists, and engineers to conduct the affairs of America. It will take men and women of culture, which is to say men and women who know themselves as products of a long process and who feel the privilege and the sacred obligation to add to their heritage in passing it on. And while it is easy to scorn contemporary liberal colleges because they did not forewarn their students during the past twenty years of the calamity through which they were to live, this is a criticism not of liberal education but of its want. Now, I should say, the very weakness of liberal education in the last twenty years makes its strengthening all the more urgent, so that we can enter the peace with greater preparedness than we entered this war.

All this is, of course, saying the obvious. This nation owes an enormous debt to liberal education. The men who founded the Republic included many of wide and liberal knowledge, with trained and active minds, some of them the finest minds of their time. Education in the New World was the synonym for opportunity. The settlers of America devoted handsomely of their slender means to free schooling. We send a greater share of our young persons to schools of higher learning than any other people of the earth. We have gone far in making education accessible to all, and we have avoided the inverted snobbishness of popular contempt for the intellect. The man on the street, the so-called average American, has deep respect for knowledge. He wants to know; he wants his son and daughter to be educated. To him the right to knowledge is an inherent American right and an intrinsic part of what is called the American way of life.

If we have needed our knowledge and culture in the past in its task of expressing the qualities and character of the intricate and numerous American people, how much more are we sure to need it in the post-war period, when, as is now plain, we shall be too strong to shrink back to our former dimensions and we shall shoulder a far heavier responsibility. For that time may we be granted more than technicians! We shall need the same breadth of vision and universality of sympathies which has marked America in its former eras of greatness. And these we cannot expect to find among your generation if we do not make provision for it. As plans now stand, we are not preparing to add to and to strengthen the teaching of the liberal arts, but are preparing instead to curtail it, to cripple it, and indeed to make it a war casualty. This is not by intention, but by negligence. It is to be hoped that in Washington it will be seen that the survival of liberal education is of importance to civilization and, moreover, that it is the aspiration of all rank-and-file Americans. To speak practically, it will be good politics, indeed successful vote-catching politics.

Members of the graduating class: The question will occur to you over and over again, as you take part in one way or another in this war, it is war for what? Your answers to that question will be varied, but they will all be individual mosaics to the same truth. It is war for the freedom to build. For otherwise it would only be war for the freedom to dominate the unfree. For the building, there must be wisdom. You who go to war services will be eager to make your contribution. But your contribution will be in assuring the freedom; the war itself will not permit the building. And those of us who are not called upon to make the sacrifices and

bear the ordeals which will be your lot shall better thank you for what you give if we dedicate ourselves to the appreciation of what already has been built and in training those who must continue the building.

HISTORY IN THE MAKING

Women's National Radio Committee! May 5, 1943

ALL of us are watching history in the making, history of heroic measure, deciding issues of a magnitude not surpassed in any of the history with which we are familiar. Out of the need for our individual balance we spend most of our waking time *not* seeing the world conflict as a whole, not gauging the power ranged against us or the weaknesses within us. Since we must carry on each day, we shut out a view of the scope of the war and of the perils which beset us. It is healthy to do this. For there is no benefit in anxiety unless one can act, and it is not given to us individually to produce action that will reduce the power of the enemy or strengthen the weaknesses in our national life. We are consigned to the resolution of the titanic forces pitted against each other. That has been true in the other crises of our nation. America never came through these earlier crises by parading through them as a united people all dominated by a single spirit. In the Revolutionary War, and in the years immediately following it, there was such a want of unity and such a dearth of belief in the fresh principles established on this continent, and such a disintegrating attack on the new state, that one reads the history of that time with wonder that we came through it at all. Similar forces of disintegration shook the foundations of the nation in the Civil War and shook the staunchness of the North in fighting to preserve and establish unity. One reads the history of that time, too, with wonder that our free government survived. To-day we are in a not dissimilar chaos. Looking back to the America of Washington's and Jefferson's day, and of Lincoln's day, we can see now what should have been clear then—how much was at stake. Our grandchildren are sure to say the same of us. They will read the record of this era as we read of the weathered storms of the past. They will find for the leaders of this war their fit place in the dormitory of history, and pay them the due they did not receive while they lived.

But America survived in the past not only because of the deeds of its heroes. There is a voiceless core of virtue and truth in the hearts of men and women which is the substance of which free nations are made. Washington and Jefferson in their time, and

Lincoln in his, could not have moulded a sound and free America by their individual deeds. They had to have those hearts to build with. And the world of to-morrow will be made of the same stuff. Our grandchildren are sure to read the history of this war in terms of its leaders and their rare talents and great foresight and courage. But this crisis, too, is not to be solved by leaders alone, but by the contribution of numberless men and women—a contribution not of action, but of fidelity to a standard within themselves. It is again the core of virtue and truth in the hearts of men and women which is the substance of which the new world will be made. And each individual, in this grave and dangerous time, even if he does have an Olympian view of the world conflict, does make his contribution to it by working without wearying in being true to himself.

I say this to introduce a letter I am going to read. It reached me last week from a listener whom I do not know and whom I shall not identify. Call her Mrs. Prescott. Mrs. Prescott has had an experience that may come to many of us in this room. For this is what she wrote:

DEAR MR. SWING:

A while back I heard you speak of the Merchant Marine and how little is known of the losses in that branch of the service. I also listened to the claims made by the Axis and hoped they were just talking. But in the reports given out by our government the damage inflicted on the Axis seemed to be known to the last barge and tender, so I wondered if Hitler was completely ignorant of his successes. Then I received one of the dreaded yellow slips, saying that our son had been lost at sea, so we knew that Hitler had some grounds for his boast. The loss of our son is a very real loss to us, a fine, strong, handsome A-1 American, and when you multiply our loss by thousands, it's a real loss to our country. Sooner or later these losses will be made known, and when that day comes I hope it won't be made an orgy of hate. Let us buy our bonds with courage and high hopes. The other way is too much like a political campaign, where class hatred, social hatred, and mud-slinging in general are indulged in, and five minutes after the returns are in the various contestants are slapping each other on the back, sending telegrams to each other and forgetting the whole thing. Hate is akin to fear. It's unhealthy. If our whole adult population hated the way we're supposed to we should all have indigestion and our nursing babies would all have colic. If hate is merely superficial it is worthless. So why not put the emphasis on courage and honesty? Our boys in the service have these qualities, and they and we have the determination to see that the offenders against decency are punished. Our son knew, and we knew, that

he was in a tough spot. We accepted it and hoped he would come through as he had many times before. We on the home front need to face reality and give positive proof of the faith that is in us in our actions. Then and then only are we worthy of the sacrifice by our men in the service. We need to understand what the war really is, in truth and without fear.

Here is no programme, no blueprint, no raised banner. It is simply the response of a stricken woman to her loss. She says, "let us have more truth and more courage." That is the way Mrs. Prescott responded to the receipt of the dreaded yellow slip. Out of the depths came her wisdom and her faith. And before long thousands of Mrs. Prescotts will feel something die within themselves, and they too will wish to dedicate what remains alive to truth. For by such dedications made in grief does posterity enjoy the privileges of freedom. There were Mrs. Prescotts in the time of Washington and Jefferson, and of Lincoln. It is upon their successors that the foundations of the new world will be laid. Our grandchildren may not identify them in reading the history of to-day, but *they* are among the authors of liberty.

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